

## Yugoslav - Italian relations in the XX century. Italy in the Balkans, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo

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### Abstract:

*In the early nineties, in the face of deep and violent crisis intestine that crossed Yugoslavia Because of irreconcilable conflict between the various national components, Within the Italian ruling class returned to manifest Fluctuations and changing attitudes that had characterized Governments policy of Rome against the Yugoslav Been since the formation of the composite team Balkans in December 1918. In the Italy of the postwar period, the creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was greeted with open hostility and authentic discomfort by a large sector of public opinion and the political world. The union of the South Slavs was not only an obstacle to the political and economic penetration into the Danube-Balkan, but a constant threat all along the eastern border to the national conflicts between English and the Slavic element in Istria and Dalmatia, and for That Yugoslavia fear could become an instrument of pressure in the hands of rival powers of Rome in the Mediterranean and in the Balkan Peninsula. For Those Who disliked the unification of the peoples of Yugoslavia, as Sidney Sonnino, protagonist of Italian foreign policy from 1914 to 1919, and as many members of the Italian nationalism, would be functional blackberries and more useful to the Objectives Italians favor the formation of entities were minor, blackberries compact and homogeneous in terms of national, forced to gravitate towards Italy for strategic and economic Reasons, and absolutely Not able to threaten Leadership in the Adriatic and the Balkans.*

**Key words:** Yugoslav - Italian relations, Italy, the Balkans, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo

## **The difficult relations between Italy and Yugoslavia in the XX century**

According to a position, not least, inside the Italian political class of the time, it was necessary, take notes Yugoslav unity, ITS apparent inevitability and the favor he seemed to enjoy at the other great powers. Through a policy of friendship and cooperation with the Serbs, the Majority group and politically predominant Within the multinational Yugoslav state, it would be possible to guarantee the security Necessary to Italy and make them have, at the same time, a leading role in Balkan Europe . With the Serbs there goes any Territorial Disputes and directed the creation of the Yugoslav Seemed to have been satisfied the aspiration to completion of national unity, Bringing together Within These boundaries the Serb population of Bosnia, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Montenegro and the Serbian. On the Contrary, the claims of Slovenian and Croatian territories Giuliani Istria and Dalmatian, passed under Italian sovereignty at the end of World War I, would make it difficult, if not impossible, to reaching understandings loyal and sincere with Ljubljana and Zagreb. There was no question, in fact, That One of the Main Reasons That Had prompted Slovenes and Croats to accept, albeit with Difficulties and mistrust, the union with Serbia was PRECISELY the fear of the expansion to the east Italian, who had gone to add to the deep and decade-long aversion towards the element Italian local<sup>1</sup>.

For Those Who Advocated a policy of friendship and cooperation, as Gaetano Salvemini, Luigi Albertini and, above all, Carlo Sforza, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1920 to 1921,

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<sup>1</sup> E, SESTAN, *Venezia Giulia, Liniamenti di una storia etnica culturale*, Udine, 1997. C.GHISALBERTI, *L-identita nazionale nell'Adriatico*, in *Clio*, 2003

the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Because Of Its multi-ethnic composition, would have been to country unstable and unable to lead an active and independent foreign policy, in contrast With That of Italy, the only power That could Ensure That external security needed to know Strengthening internal. Basically, to hegemony by the element of Serbia would Yugoslavia was a kind of "giant with feet of clay", in need of political, economic and military protection of the collaboration Italy<sup>2</sup>. The presence Within the Italian ruling class of These two positions decisively influenced the development of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia between the two world wars, creating That "singular commuting attitudes", Repeatedly noticed and remembered, I know the policy in Friendship and cooperation Implemented by Italy with the Rapallo Treaty in 1920, with the agreement of Rome of 1924 and with the agreements Belgrade in 1937, was interrupted by attempts at international isolation and internal maneuvers disintegration of Yugoslavia, until the aggression of 1941. At the end of World War II, to the Territorial Disputes with the Slovenians and Croats and Serbs with the rivalry for hegemony in the Balkans, was added the ideological contrast determined dale opposing basic choices in the international arena and in the political, economic and social, made by the Governments of Rome and Belgrade<sup>3</sup>. The Yugoslav Communist Party, the dominant focus of movement of national liberation in the fight against the Nazi-Fascist occupation, managed to revive the idea of Yugoslav unity, promising a radical political and social renewal through the transformation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the Federal Republic and the Yugoslav society into a socialist and anti-capitalist, Following the example of the Soviet model; renewal and transformation of Which would have done the same guarantor Yugoslav communist movement leader, Josip Broz

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<sup>2</sup> G. S ALVEMINI *Dal patto di Londra alla pace di Roma*, Torino, 1925

<sup>3</sup> *Roma-Belgrado. Gli anni della guerra fredda*, a cura di M. G ALEAZZI, Ravenna, 1995

Tito ditto, Croatian Slovenian mother, first head of state is not Serbia. To power the united will and Strengthen the centripetal forces Within the state of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Communists did also lever on the nationalist sentiments of Slovenes and Croats, Whose territorial aspirations in Istria and Venezia Giulia, at the end of World War I, were unmet Benefits of Italy. Again, were the political and territorial conflict with Italy and aversion towards the Italian population to be one of the main thrusts of the Slovenes and the Croatian union with the Serbs? The ruling class of Republican, although with different emphases and nuances than previous periods liberal and fascist, continued to look with suspicion, discomfort and in some cases hostility to the new Yugoslavia, Federal and communist<sup>4</sup>. This attitude continued even enabled once the Yugoslav government, as a result of the political break with the Soviet Union and the expulsion from the Co inform in 1948, came up considerably to the Western powers, becoming a sort of status "buffer" between the two ideological blocs, political and military where Europe was divided at the end of World War II<sup>5</sup>.

Governments Italian post-war, despite having Had to accept the political and territorial reorganization Imposed by the peace treaty of 1947, with the loss of much of the Venetia Giulia, the exodus of the local Italian population and expulsion from the Balkans, refused for a long time to Recognize definitively the situation actually created in Trieste with the substantial partition between Italy and Yugoslavia as the forthcoming Free Territory, hoping to regain possession of the territory and not only Entire Zone A, occupied by the Anglo-American in 1945 and passed under the Italian administration

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<sup>4</sup> S. B IANCHINI, *I mutevoli assetti balcanici e la contesa italo-jugoslava (1948-1956)*, in *Roma-Belgrado. Gli anni dellaguerra fredda*, cit., pp. 11

<sup>5</sup> I. BANAC, *Sa Staljinom protiv Tita*, Zagabria, 1990; J. PIRJEVEC, *Il gran rifiuto. Guerra fredda e calda tra Tito, Staline l'Occidente*, Trieste, 1990; ID., *Mosca, Roma e Belgrado (1948-1956)*, in *Roma Belgrado. Gli anni della guerra fredda*, cit., pp. 85

with the London Memorandum of 1954<sup>6</sup>. In the following decades following two territorial disputes, the political relations between the two countries continued to be difficult and cold, unlike economic ones, who went blackberries and more Intensified and growing, making Italy "the greater Western presence in Yugoslavia" behind the Federal Republic of Germany. Only in the early seventies, at a Particular stages of international politics characterized the process of detente in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, dale territorial sacrifices made by the Federal Republic of Germany under the Ostpolitik and the signing, after a long preparatory work, of the Helsinki agreements on cooperation and security in Europe, Which established the principle of respect for existing borders, Italy agreed to start taking into account the opening of Negotiations for the final arrangement of the dispute with Yugoslavia. The Reasons That prompted the ruling class of the time, especially some Christian Democrats, Aldo Moro: such as (Prime Minister and Foreign Minister more occasions between 1963 and 1978) and Giuseppe Medici (Foreign Minister in 1968 and in 1972 to 1973), to take the initiative were manifold: the growing interest in Italian, Especially in light of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to the internal stability of neighboring and international Yugoslav Federation, again shaken by the crisis intestine caused by ethnic and national conflicts<sup>7</sup>, to preserve the role and function of "bulwark" anti-Soviet; the now widespread political awareness of the lack of alternatives to the territorial arrangement established in 1954, Which, as pointed Moro, was "not editable by force" and "cannot be changed with the consent"; the pressure from the Italian socialist supporters of the Yugoslav system and interested in Strengthening the regime of Tito, and the will to give it to Moro are e collaborated with the Italian

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<sup>6</sup> D. DECASTRO, *La questione di Trieste. L'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954*, Trieste, 1981, 2 vol.;

<sup>7</sup> A. CILIGA, *La crisi di Stato della Jugoslavia di Tito*, Roma, 1972, pp. 27

Communist Party, in favor of improving on relations of Italy with a communist and were, at the same time, not aligned<sup>8</sup>. The Negotiations, despite many Difficulties and setbacks, led to the conclusion of the agreements signed in Osimo Italy-Yugoslav November 10, 1975, Which Was Recognized de jure Planning of 1954 established the protection of Their Respective ethnic groups, line with what was Already September out in the Memorandum of London, and the basis for Strengthening economic cooperation through the establishment of a free zone for Trieste (Which, However, it was never Realized two to the Italian resistance locally<sup>9</sup>). The policy of friendship and cooperation with Yugoslavia, based on complete surrender to the zone B of the FTT, was back to being one of the main options available to the Italian ruling class to revive and Strengthen the international role. The goal of the Italian government, in Particular of Moro and how many shared the policy, was to initiate a collaboration with a communist country, but not aligned, like Yugoslavia, for making Italy a sort of "bridge" between East and West Able to dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe and able to actively Contribute to Overcoming the division of Europe into opposing military blocs. With the agreements of 1975 in Italian<sup>10</sup> politics Seemed to have prevailed definitely the line he saw in Yugoslavia a key partner for the protection and realization of the strategic, political and economic; Which partners were Defended the territorial integrity and political independence, Strengthening the internal stability against any centrifugal thrust and enhancing the role of non-aligned country.

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<sup>8</sup> A. VARSORI, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali*, cit., p. 190; S. ROMANO, *Guida alla politica estera italiana*, p.201.

<sup>9</sup> G. W. MACCOTTA, *Osimo visto da Belgrado*, cit., pp. 55

<sup>10</sup> S. ROMANO, *I rapporti italo-sloveni e italo-croati*, cit., p. 19

## **Albania, Serbia, Kosovo: the return of Italy in the Balkans (1996-1999).**

Temporarily stabilized the Balkan region with the end of the war in Bosnia and normalized relations with Slovenia and Croatia, Italy returned to play in Eastern Europe to policy blackberries active and enterprising. In the period 1996 -1998, the Prodi government, with Foreign Affairs Lamberto Dini, Launched a series of Initiatives Aimed at making Italy the partner of choice for area countries and their main "sponsor" in Europe, a sort of "trailblazer integration AEST" , with all the political and economic benefits That would be achieved. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the communist regimes, Eastern Europe Had become "a huge construction site, engaged in a gigantic modernization and transition to the market"; Necessary was, Therefore, to ITS consolidated presence in the Italian and seize the great opportunities That Danube Balkan post-communist Europe could offer, to boost the economy of the country and to Strengthen the political role internationally. He tried, in essence, to implement a real Italian *Ostpolitik*, fully Corresponds to the interests of the country and capable, at the same time, to play with it "an essential and recognized role in building the new Europe<sup>11</sup>." Within this overall strategy, between 1996 and 1997 was inserted Italian military and political intervention in Albania, aiming to promote " 'stabilization and democratization. Already in 1991, with the operation "Pelican", Italy Had gone to the rescue of the Albanian population, freed in the early nineties by the ten-year communist regime, That Had forced international isolation, reducing it in a state of poverty, backwardness and

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<sup>11</sup> P. FASSINO, *Per passione*, cit., pp. 298-300; ID., *Che cosa significa Ostpolitik* ; in «Limes», 1998, n. 3, pp. 263-269

under development<sup>12</sup>. To tackle this humanitarian emergency, as determined by the total collapse of the economic and administrative structures Following the collapse of the communist regime, and groped for curbing the arrival on the Italian coast of Thousands of Albanians fleeing from hunger and poverty, the Italian Government DECIDED to send a military contingent to distribute aid in all districts of the Albanian been in the grip of famine. The humanitarian operation Italian allowed to go to Albania the winter 1991 -1992 and difficult to reach, in a situation of greater peace and stability, the elections of March 1992, which saw the affirmation of the Democratic Party and the rise of Its leader, Sali Berisha, the office of President of the Republic. However, the new leadership of Albania not proved Able to manage the country's transition to a market economy and democracy, as the results of the elections in May 1996, still favorable to once Berisha and his party, were Contested by the opposition Socialist, heir to the political formation That Had led Albania for almost half a century. The Socialists, who accused the government of electoral fraud and abuses against Their candidates and their voters, refused to sit in Parliament and threatened to boycott the elections administrative autumn next<sup>13</sup>. To prevent relapse of Albania in a situation of dangerous instability, the Rome government DECIDED to take action to promote 'the opening of a dialogue between government and opposition and to bring the Albanian political life "in conditions of full democratic normality" .The Foreign Minister Dini sent in Tirana Ambassador Luigi Vittorio Ferraris as a "Special Representative", with the task of Bringing the political forces and help the recovery process democratic. Ambassador Ferraris was Able to convince the government to pass to the electoral law, enabling the smooth conduct of voting under the

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<sup>12</sup> B. MUSTAJ, *Albania tra crimini e miraggi*, Milano, 1993, pp. 157 ss.; R. MOROZZO DELLAROCCHA, *Albania. Leradici della crisi*, Milano, 1997, pp. 35-40

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem.



administrative monitoring of Italian observers, and the socialist opposition to give up the boycott. Unfortunately, the proper conduct of voting in October 1996 and the new democratic victory of the party not reported tranquility<sup>14</sup>. A few weeks later, the failure of financial companies "pyramid" (That companies collected money by offering high interest rates, in order to collect more money and then disappear into thin air), in cui lost savings were part of the large Albanian population, opened in new serious internal crisis, which resulted in March 1997 A LIVE armed revolt. Once again, the Italian government was forced to intervene to help the forces policies Albanians to form a national unity government, Able to restore the authority throughout the country and to organize new elections. Executives English, not without some internal Difficulties for the opposition Communist party member who at the time supported the Prodi government, undertook the main responsibility of an international mission, authorized by the Security Council of the UN on 28 March 1997<sup>15</sup>. Aimed at restoring a climate of security, that would allow the flow of humanitarian aid and the proper conduct of elections under the supervision of the OSCE observers. The operation, called "Dawn", was entrusted to an international contingent, under Italian command and Consists of 6000 men, for most other Italians. The military mission ended in August 1997, after the conduct of elections won by the Socialist Party, but the political commitment, the Economic and Financial government of Rome continued, fielding an Extensive program of assistance and reconstruction in all areas (police, judiciary, customs facilities, school system, health care), Which made Italy the main landmark of the Albanian ruling class.

As part of the Italian Ostpolitik of the biennium 1996-1998, Also returned the resumption of traditional ties with

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<sup>14</sup> L. V. FERRARIS, *Diario di una missione a Tirana*, in «I quaderni speciali di Limes», supplemento al n. 1 del 1997

<sup>15</sup> R. MOROZZO DELLARocca, *Albania*, cit., pp. 7

Serbia, in an attempt to facilitate the rehabilitation of Belgrade in the international community after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the Government of Serbia Had returned to Considered to be a valid and reliable interlocutor for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Balkans. During 1996, many European countries Resumed normal diplomatic and trade relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Consisting of Serbia and Montenegro in 1992, after the separation of the other republics. The sanctions ADOPTED by the United Nations were revoked, except Those Specifically DECIDED by the US Congress, Which Prevented the Belgrade government to once again become a member of international financial institutions and political Organizations, like the United Nations, the OSCE, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, limiting the inflow of foreign investment and the resumption of international trade. The Italian government tried to contribute to the gradual normalization of economic life Serbian encouraging the return of Italian firms in Belgrade, Also at the request - According executives was - the same American administration, as well as the European Union. The most significant investment was made by Telecom Italy, Which, together with OTE, the Greek telephone company, acquired 49% of Telekom Serbia, for a figure of 880 million dollars. As Has Been Noted, "the calculation" of managers and executives Italian Telecom was not all wrong. The Slovenian economy and the Croatian Seemed now definitely gravitate toward the German world; Among the major countries in the Balkans, the only economic area still open for the initiatives of Italian companies was Serbia, blackberries than ever in need of aid and investment, the revitalization for productive activities and for the modernization of the economic and administrative<sup>16</sup>. The Italian government tried to encourage the normalization of

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<sup>16</sup> S. ROMANO, *Guida ala politica estera italiana*, cit., pp. 266-267

political life and the start process democratization<sup>17</sup>. In the winter of 1996-1997, in Serbia Took place numerous mass demonstrations, to protest against the Authorities' decision to cancel the result of the elections, Which Took place in November and they had seen the victory of a coalition of opposition parties. On that occasion, both Dini, who Fassino, in Belgrade to convince Serb leaders to accept the entry of a commission OSCE order to audit the election procedures and the Reasons for the cancellation<sup>18</sup>. In February of 1997, in front of the opinion of the OSCE favorable to the opposition, Milosevic resigned to accept electoral defeat, giving the illusion that even in Serbia could verify democratic development of the political and institutional. However, both the economic modernization and the democratic transformation of Serbia, as the economic policy initiatives and Italy, were interrupted by the explosion of the Kosovo crisis, the last Yugoslav Remained unresolved issue. After the constitutional Reforms of 1989, Which Had Eliminated all forms of autonomy in Kosovo, the Serbian Authorities tried to "recapture" the region, pushing the Albanians public and entrusting to the Serbs the most seats in the police, the judiciary and the local institutions. The goal was not to overthrow the demographic balance, impossible now to change since the Serbian community represented only 9% of the population, faced with an overwhelming Albanian Majority with the highest annual rate of the fastest-growing population in Europe. The Serbian leaders Aimed rather to restore political dominance, making the Albanian population no longer the Majority group Within a Kosovo self, but one of the many national minorities in Serbia at centralized and centralizing.

The Albanian guerrillas, defeated by Serbian troops in the field, However, succeeded in Their main objective the internationalization of the Kosovo problem, made possible by

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<sup>17</sup> J. PIRJEVEC, *Le guerre jugoslave*, cit., pp. 553-554; L. SELL, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*, cit., pp. 274-275.

<sup>18</sup> S. ROMANO, *Guida ala politica estera italiana*, cit., pp. 266-267

the news and images, though sometimes exaggerated and manipulated, burning of villages and rural populations on the run; images and news, they did greatly Increase the sympathies and favors in international comparisons of Kosovo Albanians and, above all, against the KLA, Which in a few months was no longer considered a terrorist group but a national liberation movement . I Contact Group countries, Particular in the United States, mindful of What Had Happened in Bosnia, DECIDED to take immediate action to prevent the spread of the conflict and the involvement of the civilian population. In early 1999, after a failed attempt at mediation, operated by US Ambassador to Macedonia with Holbrooke, Christopher Hill, and after yet another news of a massacre by Serbian troops, of Which, However, subsequently did not managed to clarify procedures and Responsibilities, the Group of Contact summoned in Rambouillet, France, to "conference of the last chances", from Which Serb and Albanian leaders irresponsibility would have to come out with an agreement on the future of Kosovo<sup>19</sup>. The decision of the Contact Group, taken at a meeting in London on January 29, the next day was accompanied by a statement of the Council of the Atlantic Alliance, where he made it known to the Belgrade government That NATO was ready to take any measure necessary, for prevent a new humanitarian catastrophe, and to That end, the general secretary of the Alliance, the Spaniard Javier Solana, could authorize the bombing of targets inside of Yugoslav territory. Once again, it was the American administration, always guided by President Clinton, re-Elected in 1996 to press for the Atlantic Alliance was Involved in crisis management, outside of the ITS area of intervention and completely foreign to ITS original purpose. According to the "new strategic concept" developed by the government of Washington, dissolved the Soviet threat, the Alliance would have to adapt "to the new challenges and new

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<sup>19</sup> R. MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, *Kosovo* , cit., pp. 93 ss.; J. PIRJEVEC, *Le guerre jugoslave*, cit., pp. 575

threats to the security of the West<sup>20</sup>." "From a mere instrument for the common defense," NATO Had become a factor of stability and security, not only for the members of the Alliance, unimpressed The entire international community, Participating in operations other than Those provided by the North Atlantic Treaty, to Contribute to conflict prevention and management of international crises. In the eyes of the American administration, the political leaders of the nationalist Serb leaders of the Yugoslav wars of the nineties, was the biggest factor of instability in the Balkans. It made Necessary, Therefore, the involvement of the Atlantic Alliance, blackberries agile instrumented flexible Compared to the United Nations, in cui Russia and China could have Stated The veto, to dramatically reduce the potential for the Serb military and political role in significantly downsize the region; involvement, Which, on the basis of the experience in Bosnia in 1995, would be resolved in an air campaign of short duration, can bend the Serbian resistance. On February 23, the Contact Group presented, under pressure from Washington, a proposal of agreement, which would greatly limit the sovereignty of Belgrade not only on Kosovo, but also the remaining Yugoslav territory. While reaffirming the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, responsible for defense and foreign policy, monetary and customs of Kosovo, the agreement Drafted in Rambouillet guaranteed wide autonomy to the provinces, through the establishment of legislative bodies, executive and judicial, local . All Yugoslav troops would withdraw from the region, except strictly Those Necessary (about 2,500 men) to border control. Within one year of the entry into force of the Agreement, the Serbian police forces would be replaced by new local forces. The implementation and compliance with the conditions Set by the Contact Group would be assured of submission, in Kosovo, an international military force (KFOR), composed mostly of troops belonging to the

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<sup>20</sup> *Dichiarazione del Consiglio atlantico*, 30 gennaio 1999, ivi, pp. 477-478

members of the Atlantic Alliance and placed under the command military and political leadership of the Atlantic Council. Yugoslav federal Authorities Should Have ensured the NATO troops access "free and unrestricted" entire Yugoslav territory, including the airspace and territorial waters. The solution shown in Rambouillet was temporary, because, after a period of three years, a new international conference should have determined the final structure of the region "on the basis of popular will." Basically, we asked the Serb leaders to accept a kind of protectorate transient NATO on Kosovo, in preparation for the final separation from Belgrade<sup>21</sup>.

On the occasion of the Rambouillet Negotiations, the Italian foreign minister, Lamberto Dini, tried to differentiate the position of Rome Than That of the United States, Britain and Germany, now strongly determined to act against Serbia, in hopes of finding a solution intermediate, acceptable to the government in Belgrade and able to avoid the use of force. In Those Days, the foreign minister kept in close contact with the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Milan Milutinovic, who led the Serbian delegation in France, "to understand how you could to push Serbia to reach an agreement." The leaders said they Yugoslavs willing to accept autonomy for Kosovo and to engage "to ensure respect of national identities" in the region; However, they were absolutely opposed to the presence on national territory of foreign military forces under the aegis of NATO. Dini proposed to change the text to propose by the Contact Group, Eliminating the term "military" in reference sending of a multinational force responsible for ensuring the agreement. The initiative of the Italian minister, Criticized by the American delegation and met with little support from other members of the Contact Group, was not Followed. The talks, Which broke

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<sup>21</sup> V. KOSTUNICA, *Entre la force et le droit*, cit., pp. 89 ss.. Per alcune considerazioni critiche sui negoziati di Rambouillet: A. G. DEROBERTIS, *Una prospettiva inquietante sulla guerra del Kosovo*, in «Affari Esteri», 2001, n. 129, pp. 180-182

down in late February, Resumed twenty days later in Paris, where March 18 The Albanian leaders, not without strong resistance for failure independence of Kosovo, signed up to accord transient Drafted in Rambouillet. Faced with the refusal of the government in Belgrade to do the same, March 24, 1999 began the NATO air strikes against Serbia. Armed intervention was decided by the Atlantic Alliance without the prior permission of the United Nations and pressure on not only the US, but the German government, led by Social Democrat leader Gerhard Schröder, and the one Ingles, chaired by Labour Tony Blair, Both convinced of the centrality of human rights in international politics and the legitimacy of the use of force to impose respect and punish the violation. The NATO military operation was attended the Italian Air Force, despite the discontent and restlessness Within the public and the new Majority government. As is known, in October 1998, the Prodi government Had Been forced to resign, after Which the support of the Communist PRC Had failed, Both For Reasons of economic policy and financial, for Both foreign policy issues, and after that 'executive was beaten in Parliament on the vote of confidence. The task of forming a new government was entrusted may love D'Alema, then secretary of the PDS, who managed to find a Majority of center alternatives, thanks to the support of two new political parties, the Union of Democrats for the Republic, created Francesco Cossiga with a group of parliamentarians from the opposition benches from centrist, and the Party of Italian Communists, born of a internal split in PRC. The foreign policy positions Within the Majority, called time immediately to deal with the difficult crisis in Kosovo, were quite heterogeneous. The greens, Italian Communists, a part of the PDS and the Catholic world were against the use of force against lateral Serbia, Especially in the absence of a decision of the United Nations. Even a moderate as Dini, Whose presence at the Foreign Ministry was confirmed by D'Alema, Expressed some Doubts about the decision of the Atlantic

Alliance, Which he defines as an "unprecedented", he deserved That "further efforts" to be avoided. Conversely, Cossiga and parliamentarians close to him, including Carlo Scognamiglio, the new Minister of Defense, as well as being Concerned about the fate of the Albanian population of Kosovo, saw participation in NATO operations opportunity to Demonstrate, to the partners of the Atlantic Alliance, fidelity and reliability of the new government, led by a member of the former Communist Party<sup>22</sup>. Once you have DECIDED the intervention, the prime minister was Able to hold together the coalition government, Overcoming the Objections raised by some ministers of His government and some exponent Majority, and the protests of some of the public sectors to closer to the center, pacifist leanings to anti Atlantic Emerged Those strongly in weeks; Objections and protests that Became Particularly insistent as soon as it was clear That the air campaign would last few days and not soon Began arriving in Italy the news and images of Damage caused population and civilian targets. The determination of D'Alema, deploy in Italy alongside the Atlantic Alliance, originated by two beliefs: The Importance of safeguarding human rights and the need to participate on in an operation, Which would have Given the country Importance and role equal to Those of the other powers of the Contact Group. According to the President of the Council, the war against Serbia for the autonomy of Kosovo was "a new war", fought not by a desire for power, but to "affirm an ideal international order based on human rights, freedom, tolerance"; an ideal "so hard o national sovereignty." The use of force was justified by violent oppression of the Albanian minority by the Serbian authorities, the mass Expulsions, the destruction of villages and ethnic cleansing<sup>23</sup>. D'Alema believed that, within the international community, was being gradually asserting the right / duty of humanitarian intervention against those states

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<sup>22</sup> S. ROMANO, *Guida ala politica estera italiana* , pp. 269-270

<sup>23</sup> M. D'ALEMA, *KOSOVO* , cit., pp. 98-101



and Those People who are found guilty for failing to respect fundamental human rights and oppression of national minorities. "The world today - Stated the leader of the PDS - Has a new sensitivity, does not tolerate That Are oppressed the weak, does not admit the genocide, torture, rapes ethnic". Apart from emergency humanitarian assistance, the Italian participation in the military operations was based on the need to "take direct responsibility" in managing the crisis, for not weaken "international prestige" of the country, not to be alienated from the big decisions and to have the international policy "ability to count" in an area, the Balkans, of paramount Importance for Italian interests. "To have a political weight - Explained D'Alema -You must take on tasks that can become costly and sometimes painful. But there is an alternative route." The Kosovo crisis in fact gave rise to "a kind of club", formed from the five countries of the Contact Group; a club, Which now belonged Italy, thanks to the direct involvement in the diplomatic and military operations Negotiations. Basically, the country recovered Had That role and That status, were lost During the war in Bosnia, a when Italy was excluded from the political and military Entirely management of crisis. After 78 days of bombing, on 3 June 1999 the Belgrade government accepted the plan peace processed by Russians, Europeans and Americans, during the meetings of the G8 countries held companies in Germany in early May. The plan called for the immediate cessation of hostilities in Kosovo, the immediate withdrawal of all military and paramilitary Serb, and demilitarization of the KLA. The region would be Subjected to an interim administration direct dale United Nations, under Whose "auspices" would like to see on the "presence of international forces the safety switch," Mainly composed by NATO troops.

## Conclusion

The international administration was supposed to bring the Kosovo autonomy under the agreements of Rambouillet, but not independence from Belgrade, Whose sovereignty over the region was repeated .In short, the Serb leadership, at the cost of heavy losses and great sacrifices, Had Obtained the requested changes to the text of Rambouillet: any reference to the independence of the region was been deleted and management of post-war would be entrusted to the United Nations, and not Exclusively to the Atlantic Alliance, Whose troops would no longer have complete freedom of Within movement Yugoslavia. Ending of the war against Serbia for Kosovo and reported, even amid Difficulties and Tensions, peace in the former Yugoslavia, was and still is Necessary to encourage the political stabilization and economic growth the Balkan region. Italy Has Always Been Particularly interested and sensitive to what happens beyond the Adriatic, cannot have a leading role in supporting the democratization of political life and the modernization of the economic structures of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. That is in doubt Those countries Represent the politics and economics Italian "in significant strategic area", in cui Italy is called to "project stability", to Contribute to the economic and democratic growth, and give precedence to "the logic of cooperation and of 'integration', first of all at the regional level, to resolve political issues and outstanding territorial.

Italy has a "vital interest" in the peace and development of the Balkans; otherwise, the Adriatic, far from becoming a bridge capable of Strengthening political, cultural and economic between the two sides, will be increasingly considered "a vector of continuing Tensions".

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