The Legacy of Armenian Genocide and the False Promise of International Institutions

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Abstract:

Since most of scholars accept that the Genocide is the biggest international crime against humanity,¹ I would like to focus on the selective usage of international law and the role of the state when the issue of recognition enters into agenda of international organizations and individual state. The controversial aspect of international recognition is that there are organizations which recognized the Armenian Genocide but some or many states within these organizations didn’t do it or did partly. Partly in this case means that some state or provinces within the same country or some committees within legislative body accept a bill about the recognition of genocide but the country itself doesn’t do it officially. This article is not an Armenian Genocide study or its recognition process study per se. It is rather a case study of taking a united, common stand by different actors within the state or states within international organizations to defend an international norm or law when that step could harm their

interests. The main question here is not what it will give to the process of recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey, as their decisions are not binding. It has to be stressed that this article will focus mainly on political aspects of recognition.

**Key words:** Armenian Genocide, international institutions, international law, international recognition

**I. MAIN ARGUMENT:**

**A. The False Promise of International Institutions.**
The main argument in this paper draws its logic on the false promise of international institutions which first time J. Mearshimer proposed to underline the limited impact of institutions on state behaviour² (John. J. Mearsheimer, winter, 1994-1995). It means that Armenian genocide was not recognized by some states because the international institutions have a marginal influence also in the context of Genocide: the role of state and their interests are more important. The evidence of our argument is the internal or domestic struggle and disagreement in these organizations or states when they discuss the recognition of Genocide.

**B. Domestic discussion versus international recognition**
Our case studies are Council of Europe³, where Written Declaration No. 275 and Written Declaration No. 320 - Doc. 9056 were signed on April 24 in 1998 and 2001 respectively


were signed by PACE\textsuperscript{4} and European Parliament, where\textsuperscript{5} Doc. A2-33/87 on July 18, 1987, A5-0297/2000 on November 15, 2000, on February 28, 2002, Resolution Doc.: A5-0028/2002,\textsuperscript{6} were signed on Armenian Genocide but many of the states within these structures didn’t recognize it or did it partly. For example the senate in France recognized the Armenian Genocide and tried to define penalty if anyone in France reject the reality of Genocide. However, France’s constitutional court didn’t authorize and the bill didn’t have legal outcome for others.\textsuperscript{7} As a result, such a process didn’t have an ultimate outcome; instead it remains partly done because of domestic struggle. Consider another example when in 2007 the Parliament of the State of New South Wales passed a motion condemning the genocide and called on the Australian Federal Government to do the same.\textsuperscript{8} In March 2009 the Parliament of South Australia passed a similar motion to that passed in New South Wales in 2007. Very often such domestic struggle and practice also determines the behaviour of the states in international organizations. For the beginning we can take a look at declarations which underline the spirit of these organizations and their attitude to Genocide.

\textbf{Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly}

\textbf{Doc. 8091 2nd edition}

\textbf{10 July 1998}

\textbf{Commemoration of the Armenian genocide of 1915}

\textbf{Written Declaration No. 275}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{8} See Armenian Genocide recognition, find at http://shelf3d.com/i/Recognition\%20of\%20the\%20Armenian\%20Genocide, Accessed 29.11.2013
\end{itemize}
2nd edition, originally tabled on 24 April 1998
This written declaration commits only the members who have signed it.

1. The date of 24 April 1915 marked the beginning of the implementation of the plan to exterminate Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire.

2. Today we commemorate the anniversary of what has been called the first genocide of the 20th century, and we salute the memory of the Armenian victims of this crime against humanity.\footnote{http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=8530&lang=EN, Accessed 01.09.2013.}

C. Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly
Written Declaration No. 320 - Doc. 9056
April 24, 2001
This written declaration commits only the members who have signed it.

Commemorating today the anniversary of the first genocide of the 20th century -- the Armenian genocide -- and paying tribute to the memory of its victims;

The undersigned, members of the Assembly, appeal to all the members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to take the necessary steps for the recognition of the genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenians at the beginning of the 20th century.\footnote{Genocide recognition, http://www.anca.org/genocide_resource/recognition.php, Accessed 8.08.2013. See also http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=9280&lang=EN, Accessed 01.09.2013.}

If the reader noticed the first sentence let us know that, institutions, in short, call for the "decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of
command".\textsuperscript{11} It means that the functionality of international law lacks efficiency when the roles of the state and international organizations or institutions are in controversial camps. The consistency in behavior of the states with the international institutions is manipulated through domestic different parties and bodies. Consider, for example the case of Great Britain which is the member of Council of Europe. Great Britain or maybe more correct, London didn't recognize Armenian Genocide but three of the four countries of the United Kingdom - Wales,\textsuperscript{12} Scotland\textsuperscript{13} and Northern Ireland - have formally recognized the Armenian genocide.

D. Interests of Controversial Positions
It is proper to ask how the international institutions can promote peace in the world and defend human rights if they don’t take a common firm stand and condemn the biggest crime known as Genocide, in this case the Armenian Genocide. Moreover, the process of recognition is likely to fail whenever the interests of states acting under world anarchy are in controversial positions. There could be a question about who and how efficiently raises this question, how effectively is it proved to meet the criteria for Genocide. We can argue here that all the countries and bodies which have recognized it by


now could be on a wrong way, which could hardly be the case, we would say not possible.

Consider, for example, one additional case out of Europe when the attempts of Israeli 'leftist' and 'centrist' parties like Merets and Kadima to put the discussion on Armenian Genocide on Knesset's agenda were fervently attacked by the Israeli right-wing nationalist parties. Far-rightist party Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home) claims that Genocide discussion would jeopardize Israeli-Azerbaijan and Israeli-Turkish relations and hurt its close economic and military cooperation.\(^\text{14}\)

The international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other.\(^\text{15}\) Large numbers [of states in international organizations] raise questions about how to share both the costs and benefits of cooperation, especially when some actors are richer, bigger, or more powerful than others.\(^\text{16}\) If we follow this logic then it is not hard to understand the opportunity of many states to manipulate and use Armenian Genocide in order to pressure Turkey, threaten by recognition when they need it. In this context the states and the people of the world face an additional risk when many states can get benefits from the issue known as a Genocide, exaggerate or affect the negatively the process of recognition or dialogue noticed between the supposed victim of Genocide and the perpetrator of crime.

The issue of genocide and the absence of punishment throw a doubt on the logic of human rights protection. How can states cooperate and strive for protection of human rights and


fundamental freedoms, which are to be protected by Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms\textsuperscript{17} if they cannot reach an agreement on punishment of Genocide? Otherwise, it can be perceived as a collective insecurity. When Winston Churchill, speaking as a member of the Assembly in August 1950, had proposed a European army, the Committee of Ministers had reacted sharply,\textsuperscript{13} reminding the Assembly that this was a matter which it had no right to discuss. The Assembly responded by asking it to abrogate Article 1, paragraph \textit{d.} of the Statute. This it refused to do – but it did suggest, in 1951, that defense issues might be covered when the Assembly discussed ways of securing peace “founded on justice and international co-operation”, thus taking the Preamble to the Statute as a basis for Council involvement in this area. It has since been agreed that the Assembly may discuss the “political aspects” of security and peace in Europe, provided that it steers clear of military issues in the strict sense.\textsuperscript{18}

There is a will to cooperate but there is also a reason to defect whenever the state feels that the recognition of Genocide can even threaten its security because the punishment requires return of territory to the victim that was forced to emigrate from its motherland or the huge financial penalty that the perpetrator of crime has to pay as a compensation. In the Statute of the Council of Europe we read among the purposes:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a. The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and
\end{itemize}


realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.

b. This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’19... The Committee of Ministers is the Council’s decision-making body and is made up the ministers of foreign affairs of each member state or their permanent diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. According to the Statute Article 14, “Each member shall be entitled to one representative on the Committee of Ministers, and each representative shall be entitled to one vote.”20 The Committee of Ministers decides Council of Europe policy and approves its budget and programme of activities.21 On 14 May 1993, at its 92nd Session the Committee of Ministers adopted a Statutory Resolution (93) 27 on Majorities required for decisions of the Committee of Ministers.

II. COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VOTING AND SIGNATURE PROCEDURES

It says: ‘Having regard to the Parliamentary Assembly’s proposals for institutional reforms within the Council of Europe;

Bearing in mind the increased membership of the Council of Europe and the need to strengthen the Organization’s capacity for action;

Considering it therefore desirable to reduce the number of cases where unanimity is required for the Committee of Ministers.

A. Opening of Conventions and Agreements for signature

Decisions on the opening for signature of Conventions and Agreements concluded within the Council of Europe shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote and a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, as set out in Article 20.d of the Statute.

B. Partial Agreements

In accordance with the Statutory Resolution on Partial and Enlarged Agreements decisions authorizing certain member States to pursue an activity as a Partial Agreement shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote and a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, as set out in Article 20.d of the Statute. We can see from here that after strengthening CoE’s capacity for action, decision needs two-thirds majority, which still makes collective action rather ineffective.

C. Voting aspects in the PACE

The Assembly is one of the two statutory organs of the Council of Europe, which is composed of the Committee of Ministers (the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting usually at the level of their deputies) and the Assembly representing the political forces (majority and opposition) in its member states. The

Committee of Ministers adopts recommendations to member States, while the Assembly votes numerous recommendations to the Committee of Ministers, as well as resolutions stating its views on matters of policy. However, none of these texts is binding on member States. Although the human rights norms outlined in the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Human Rights Convention) are supranational, as is the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that interprets them, the Council of Europe itself remains an international, as opposed to supranational, organization.

D. Written declarations

According to the rules of procedure of the Assembly about written declaration,

Rule 53 - Written declarations

53.1. Written declarations not exceeding 200 words on subjects within the competence of the Council of Europe may be tabled provided they have been signed by at least twenty representatives or substitutes of four national delegations and two political groups. They shall be published unless the President has ruled that they are inadmissible in accordance with criteria outlined in paragraph 2 below. Written declarations shall neither be referred to a committee nor debated in the Assembly.

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24 53.2. Written declarations shall not contain propaganda for commercial purposes or on behalf of persons of associations whose ideas or activities are incompatible with the Council of Europe’s principles. They shall also not contain racist, xenophobic or intolerant language or words and expressions whose meaning bears an affront to human dignity.
53.3. Any representative or substitute may add his or her signature to a written declaration up to the close of the next part-session, after which no further signatures may be added. The declaration shall be issued with the names of all members who have signed it. No signature may be withdrawn.\textsuperscript{25}

Written declarations allow members of the Assembly to give formal expression to their views on matters of European interest. If judged by the President to be in order, it is printed as an Assembly document and distributed.\textsuperscript{26} It is in documents and working papers category with motions, committee reports and questions, while Resolution is among Adopted Texts along with Recommendations\textsuperscript{27} and Opinions.\textsuperscript{28} As written declarations shall neither be referred to a committee nor debated in the Assembly as mentioned above (Rule of Procedure of the Assembly 53.1), pursuers of Armenian Genocide recognition should strive for Adopted Texts as Recommendations and Resolutions, rather than other official documents. (Rule 23 - Official documents).\textsuperscript{29}

Rule 24 - Tabling of motions for recommendations and resolutions

24.1.a. A recommendation is a proposal by the Assembly addressed to the Committee of Ministers, the implementation of which is beyond the competence of the Assembly, but within that of governments.

\textsuperscript{27}Contain proposals addressed to the Committee of Ministers, the implementation of which is within the competence of governments.
\textsuperscript{28}\url{http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/Documentguide_E.asp}, are mostly expressed by the Assembly on questions put to it by the Committee of Ministers, such as the admission of new member states to the Council of Europe, but also on draft conventions, the budget, the implementation of the Social Charter. Accessed 10.12.2013.
24.1.b. A resolution embodies a decision by the Assembly on a question of substance which it is empowered to put into effect, or an expression of view for which it alone is responsible. In addition, a resolution may deal with a question of form, transmission, execution or procedure.

24.2. A motion for a recommendation or resolution not exceeding 300 words shall be signed by at least twenty representatives or substitutes belonging to at least five national delegations or be adopted with the requisite quorum by a committee, as defined in Rule 46.3., provided that the motion comes within the committee's specific terms of reference.[...]

24.3. The President shall decide whether such a motion is in order. He or she may consult the committee concerned and possibly the Bureau. A motion which is in order shall be printed and distributed as soon as possible.30

Voting Rule 40 - Majorities required
40.1. The following majorities are required:

40.1.a. for the adoption of a draft recommendation or a draft opinion to the Committee of Ministers, for the adoption of urgent procedure, for an alteration to the agenda, for the setting up of a committee and for the fixing of the date for the opening or resumption of ordinary sessions, a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast.

40.1.c. for the adoption of a draft resolution and for any other decision, a majority of the votes cast in the case of a tie the question being rejected.31

III. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

A. EU relations with South Caucasus

Section pertaining to the Armenian Genocide:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

15. Calls on the neighboring countries Russia, Iran and Turkey to contribute constructively to the peaceful development of the South Caucasus Region; in this respect especially calls upon Russia to fulfill commitments to downgrade its military presence and calls upon Turkey to take appropriate steps in accordance with its European ambitions, especially concerning the termination of the blockade against Armenia; reiterates in this respect the position in its resolution of 18 June 1987 recognizing the genocide upon Armenians 1915 and calls upon Turkey to create a basis for reconciliation.\(^{32}\)

This kind of motion for a resolution is very interesting in terms of representation. European Parliament is a body of European Union but it doesn’t reflect the whole position of European Union because there is also a European commission which represents the interests of the Union as a whole.\(^{33}\)

It means that there are differences in different bodies of the same organization about events, and the states cannot reach joint conclusion what exactly they think about. For example, the President of the European Parliament Martin Shultz announced Monday that Turkey’s integration into Europe is preconditioned by the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, reiterating the body’s 1987 decision.

“Turkey should recognize the Armenian Genocide and it would be considered as a precondition to enter the European Union,” said Shultz whose remarks were posted on the official


Web site of his Left Party of Germany, which also welcomed the position.\textsuperscript{34}

In contrast to realism, critical theory assumes that ideas and discourse are the driving forces that shape the world, although it recognizes that structural factors have some, albeit minor, influence (John. J. Mearsheimer, winter, 1994-1995). However, ideas don’t cause the same outcome and they can also be the cause of failure for agreement. Even Turkey would like to recognize Armenian Genocide (notice “I Apologize” campaign in 2008) and delete the label of “perpetrator”. However, very often the states think more about consequences rather than benefits because consequences can be terrible. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal’s basic presumption, grounded in the broad tradition of rational-choice analysis, is that states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly. This might seem obvious, but it is surprisingly controversial.\textsuperscript{35} To explain variation in institutional design, they focus on the following independent variables: distribution problems (DISTRIBUTION); enforcement problems (ENFORCE-MENT); number of actors and the asymmetries among them (NUMBER); and uncertainty about behavior, the state of the world, and others' preferences (UNCERTAINTY ABOUT BEHAVIOR, UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE STATE OF THE WORLD, and UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PREFERENCES).\textsuperscript{36}

In case of European Parliament, initiative under Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

On the basis of a report by one of its committees, under Article 225 TFEU, Parliament, acting by a majority of its Members, may request the Commission to submit any appropriate legislative proposal. Parliament may, at the same time, set a deadline for the submission of such a proposal. The Parliament committee responsible must first ask the Conference of Presidents for authorisation. The Commission may agree or refuse to submit the proposal requested.

A proposal for a Union act on the basis of the right of initiative granted to Parliament under Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union may also be proposed by an individual Member of the European Parliament. Such a proposal shall be submitted to the President of the Parliament who refers it to the committee responsible for consideration. It may decide to submit it to the plenary (see above).

B. Legislative process
A Member of the European Parliament, working in one of the parliamentary committees, draws up a report on a proposal for a 'legislative text' presented by the European Commission, the only institution empowered to initiate legislation. The parliamentary committee votes on this report and, possibly, amends it. When the text has been revised and adopted in plenary, Parliament has adopted its position. This process is repeated one or more times, depending on the type of procedure and whether or not agreement is reached with the Council.

In the adoption of legislative acts, a distinction is made between the ordinary legislative procedure (codecision), which puts Parliament on an equal footing with the Council, and the special legislative procedures, which apply only in specific cases where Parliament has only a consultative role.

On certain questions (e.g. taxation) the European Parliament gives only an advisory opinion (the 'consultation procedure'). In some cases the Treaty provides that consultation
is obligatory, being required by the legal base, and the proposal cannot acquire the force of law unless Parliament has delivered an opinion. In this case the Council is not empowered to take a decision alone.

**C. Parliament: Power of political initiative**

It can ask the Commission to present legislative proposals for laws to the Council. It plays a genuine role in creating new laws, since it examines the Commission's annual programme of work and says which laws it would like to see introduced.\(^3^7\)

Plenary sittings are chaired by the President of the European Parliament. The President of the European Parliament is assisted in this task by the 14 vice-presidents, who can take over the chair. The President opens the sitting, sometimes with a tribute or a speech on a current topic. Parliament is in fact constantly concerned to respond to the latest developments in any major issue and has no hesitation in changing its agenda in order to call on the Union to act. The President's influence can be decisive in this respect.\(^3^8\)

**IV. STIMULATION FOR SOLUTION?**

In above-mentioned discussion you can notice that there is a collective action problem for individual states within the international organization for recognition of Armenian Genocide. In this context there are questions how to stimulate the recognition and how to make these states to cooperate more and do more for the final outcome. Therefore, we need something to reduce the opportunity of manipulation by states and the opportunity to detect. What can actually determine their behaviour? But when we try to find solution we must


know that the solution will be different from democracies to non-democracies or less democratic countries. In democracies the public opinion can make pressure on all bodies of authority including government, court or parliament. In this case the reliance on public diplomacy in order to shape the public opinion for recognition of Armenia genocide is an important stimulation. Does it matter? The answer is ultimately positive since it can raise the domestic cost of non-recognition for domestic actors. Public diplomacy is different from traditional state diplomacy by its non-state actors but ultimately it is able to make tremendous pressure on domestic authorities. However, public diplomacy itself will not work for recognition of Armenian genocide if it doesn’t find domestic supporters. It means that public diplomacy has to be connected with Armenian communities which can support or even carry on the public diplomacy.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper concludes that international institutions have only a marginal effect on international recognition of genocide and its impact on state behaviour for recognition of Genocide is also limited. The central role belongs to the states that are acting according to the logic of anarchy and often choose to defect. Very often states become a member of certain collective organizations no act within and prevent potentially harmful positions of that organizations from within. Another case is that bigger states try to and use international institutions to legitimize their actions on international scene. International institutions are very often platform for dialogue, help to solve certain problems by lower cost, but when it comes to national interests, they are domains where states pursue their goals. The same we can see in case of different political actors within the state. The opinion is that Armenia has to bring together al the work done by now, consolidate Armenian Diaspora
resources, Armenia-EU Parliament friendship group, EU member states who have recognized the Armenian Genocide and strive for EU joint position. The aim should be to pressure Turkey to open Armenia-Turkey border and use Genocide question for moving forward, not only uniting factor in diaspora through policy of mourning. Considering Armenian-Turkish protocols, Armenian side says the ball is on Turkey’s side, but it’s necessary to pressure them to play. EU says it is a normative power, not hard one and can’t ensure hard security for Armenia. If EU wants to show its role as a normative power in this case, it should at least make the border opening with Armenia a precondition for Turkey in negotiations for EU membership. Dialog and relations can develop with open borders only, and Turkey in hinderind that potential by preconditions.

LITERATURE


http://blog.1in.am/blog/38090.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21wHZ_ROl0&list=PL0E5177C4C34D0E7B