
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Central Asian Region: Opportunities and Challenges

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Abstract:

The Commonwealth of Independent States gave basis for the establishment of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It has been playing an important security role in the Central Asian region. Russia is inclined to capitalize on the organization to maintain its sphere of influence in the energy-rich region. For Russia, the expansion of NATO and American sway may create some stumbling blocks in terms of security. This paper examines the emergence of Russian commanded security alliance, CSTO and gives brief overview (such as formation, structure and objectives) of CSTO. The research paper also examines the CSTO's role and opportunities in Central Asia and discusses the challenges created by the Unites States.

Key words: CSTO, Russia Central Asian region, military bases, US, NATO

INTRODUCTION

After Soviet fall of 1991 brought about the freedom of the five Central Asian states, which had constrained resulting Russian governments to discover better approaches to oversee security arrangement in Central Asia. After autonomy, this district had

been step by step infiltrated by American and Chinese impact and had turned into a point of convergence for some security dangers. Russian endeavors to facilitate the security motivation in Central Asia were overseen through two-sided understandings. After 9/11, the obligation regarding provincial security had moved to multilateral systems for tending to territorial security was the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It was shaped in 2002 under the Russian command that had resulted among ex-Soviet countries' security coalition of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) (Forest, 2009, 83-85).

The Minsk Accords and the Almaty Declaration from December 1991 laid down the base for a universal policy for security. The Tajikistan's civil war and the inability of the countries of Central Asia to protect their safety led to numerous accords concerning operations of peacekeeping and clash resolution. These documents secured the framework for the Protocol on the Temporary Procedure for the Development and use of Collective Peace-Keeping Forces in Conflict Areas amid or inside of Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) furthermore it prompted the Collective Security Treaty (CST) approved on 15 May, 1992 in Tashkent (Pop, 2009, 278-290).

FORMATION OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION

In the aftermath of the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and a few other former Soviet republics joined to establish a regional security organization. At that time, only the three Slavic former Soviet republics (Belarus, Ukraine and Russia) housed the bulk of the military forces and assets of Soviet, especially in terms of advanced equipment and weapon systems. That left very limited resources (personnel and assets) for other former Soviet republics, especially after the

withdrawal of many Soviet units from their newly independent countries. Russia was the only ex-Soviet republic with a full-fledged military force.

Belarus, Armenia and the Central Asian countries faced different threats. In view of these realities, and the needed for security, many former Soviet republics, now CIS states, found logical and practical the idea of a regional security organization of such states with many natural ties to each other. Russia had thus emerged as the main integrating force in the CIS's territory, and the only country that was genuinely being able to ensure the security of its partners (Hartog, 2010, 73).

Against this background, six CIS countries gathered in Uzbekistan's capital, Tashkent, on May 15, 1992, to sign a treaty by which they established the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST), also known as the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (Kaczmarek, 2006). The signatories were Heads the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Russian Federation (Организация Договора). They declared that the members would jointly guard in opposition to safety hazards and would not connect with other safety coalitions. A few other CIS states joined the CST during the following year: On December 9, Georgia and Azerbaijan and on December 31 Belarus. On April 20, 1994, the agreement came into force (Collective Security Treaty Organization).

Furthermore, it obligated the signatories to regard an aggression against one CST member as an aggression against all members, requiring their rendering to the affected member all necessary types of supports to neutralize the aggressor. Finally, the treaty banned its signatories from joining other military alliances or regional groupings of states.

The CST members agreed to extend the life of the military organization every five years. Hence, six of its original members: On April 2, 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan,

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Russia approved a protocol, to renew the organization for another five years. The other three members: Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan refused to sign and thus extracted themselves from the CST (Cornell, 2004, 70). Their withdrawal was the result of their gradual swing to the U.S in search of associates in the CIS region in the post-Soviet era, and of their growing wariness of Russia, which they saw as planning to restore its lost influence in its former republics, now independent states. In Chisinau, on October 7, 2002, the six CST members, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan approved a new contract, the Treaty of Chisinau, to reorder the CST and on April 2003 that was given new name as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Kaczmarek, 2006). In 2006, Uzbekistan joined CSTO and the Secretariat in Moscow (Haas, 2013, 441).

On internal security, CSTO has promised that it would not interfere in political clashes but only by harmony, to determine local, military and border clashes in addition to stop terror operations of groups that are armed and to prevent trafficking of drug. Additionally, utilization of them would be to accomplish exceptional jobs for instance defense of pipelines or catastrophe respite. On outer safety, the CSTO announced as the major tool that was designed to respond to the hazards and challenges of a military-strategic and military-political environment originating from beyond the member states (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation).

The powerful group intends to promote better resistance collaboration amongst the member states by performing as quick response strength for Central Asian countries, a general air protection organization and collaborated defense, safety and foreign policy (Nikitin, 2007, 35-36). For members of CSTO, Russia offered incentives, for instance, given the subsidy of behalf of prices of guidance officers from the militaries of CSTO by the Russian Defense Ministry. The offers included purchasing of the equipments for the defense of Russia at the

equal cost as it was paid by military of Russia (Weitz, 2006, 163).

Though, the priorities and concerns of the associates have regularly fluctuated. Collaboration amongst the associates has also been varying, and the stage of relationship amongst them in shape of the Combined Safety Agreement frequently relies over the motivation of Moscow to open its wallet (Rutland, 2006, 48).

The United Nations General Assembly, on December 2, 2004, approved a declaration conceding the CSTO status of an observer in the General Assembly of U.N (Collective Security Treaty Organization).

OBJECTIVES OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION

The CSTO was a regional association mandated to coordinate and expand collaboration amongst the associates in the domains of political and military matters. To meet that end, it provided for the growth of multilateral arrangements and means of collaboration for guaranteeing the national safety of its associates.

The main CSTO aims are terms of combined and national safety, rigorous collaboration and harmony between political and military segments, foreign policy harmonization on safety issues related with region and worldwide, foundation of polygonal collaboration methods including a forces part, growth of collaboration in the counter-action to current disputes and safety hazards i.e. global terrorism, trafficking of drug, unlawful migration, information and cyber safety, transnational planned offense and teamwork between military and technical fractions.

As per the accord, the member republics preserve their safety on combined basis. In the Article 2 of the Accord, it is claimed that If a hazard to safety, integrity of territory and

independence of one or many Member States or a hazard to global harmony and safety Member States would right away place into act, the method of united discussions with the intend to synchronize their situations and take procedures to get rid of the originated hazard.

Concurrently, in the Article 4, it has been stipulated that If an action of violence takes place against any of the member states; in that case, remaining member states would supply it with essential help, including the military assistance plus support with the resources at their removal in implement of the right to combined protection per United Nation's Charter's Article 51.

The major objectives of the combined safety agreement Organization are to guarantee supervision of the combined rapid operation forces in the Central Asian region and forces on additional combined safety theaters and to battle worldwide terrorism, trafficking of the drug, etc.

Membership

According to its charter, membership in the CSTO was open to any country sharing both its principles and purposes. Countries must also be arranged to take on the membership compulsions set onward in the charter of CSTO, as well as those international agreements and treaties falling within the CSTO mandate (Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 94).

The CSTO had six members: The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, when it was established in 1992. Its membership increased to nine in 1993, when Belarus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan joined the organization. Yet, it decreased to six in 1999 because of the withdrawal of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's successful bid to regain full membership in 2006 increased the number of CSTO member

states to seven. Uzbekistan, on 20 June, sent a memo to the secretariat of the CSTO, telling them that it was delaying its association of this organization and currently member of CSTO was six (Matusiak, 2012). The CSTO said just that as per its Charter's Article 20, association of a country can only be dangled by a choice of the Collective Security Council as penalty for collapse to obey with the Charter of CSTO (Litovkin, 2012).

Neither Turkmenistan nor Ukraine was party to the CSTO, nor the three Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). Georgia's and Azerbaijan's rejoining would be simply out of the question in the foreseeable future unless a major shift in their political systems ends their pro-U.S. orientation and reorients them toward Russia. At least in early 2009, there was no strong evidence for the likelihood of such a development soon, particularly in the case of Georgia, which fought a devastating war with Russia in August 2008. Having received the U.S. government's backing, as promised by Vice President, Dick Cheney during his September 2008 visit (Myers, 2008), Georgia's bid to join NATO as a full member removes the possibility of the Georgian government even considering rejoining the CSTO in the foreseeable future.

STRUCTURE OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION

The CSTO is an organization based on regional military/security issues built on the concept of collective security. It describes itself as a defensive military organization with no aggressive policy or plan toward any country. The Secretariat of Council of Collective Security with adequate working potential is formed and mechanism of consultations is organized at the level of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Defense Ministers, the Council of Collective Security as well as with participation of deputies of

foreign affairs' ministers, deputies of defense ministers, experts of Member States, their authorized representatives to the Standing Council with the CSTO.

The Organization's parts shall be:

- I. **The Council on Collective Security** (Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Art.13, 91-92) ("the Council"); It would be the uppermost part of this Organization and would comprise the Chiefs of the States of the members. It would regard as the major questions about the actions of the Organization, would decide intended at attaining its aims and reasons and would guarantee harmonization and combined act between member States to achieve these aims. Council would have the authority to set up enduring or provisional functioning and supplementary segments of the Organization.
- II. **The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs** (Ibid, Art.14, p-92); It would be acting as the executive and advisory fraction of the organization on queries of the harmonization of the combined actions of the member States in the discipline of foreign affairs' policy.
- III. **The Council of Ministers of Defense** (Ibid. Art.15); It would be acting as the executive and advisory fraction of the organization on queries of the harmonization of the combined actions of member States in armed forces policy, military arrangements and collaboration in military technology.
- IV. **The Committee of Secretaries of the Security Council** (Ibid. Art.16); It would be acting as executive and advisory fraction of the organization on queries of the harmonization of the combined actions of member States in the condition of their national protection.

All Councils relating to matters except practical issues would be taken by compromise. Every Member State would be able to cost just one vote (Ibid.Art.12, p-91).

The everlasting functioning part of the Organization would be the Organization's Secretariat. It situated in Russian Federation, Moscow. The CSTO Secretary General would be the Organization's uppermost managerial administrator and would be the Secretariat's Chief. It would be selected by choice of the Council for three years, on the suggestion of the Council of Foreign Affairs' Ministers, from amongst the nationals of the member States (Ibid.Art.11, 17-18, 91-93).

THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION AND CENTRAL ASIA

Amongst the other regional backgrounds, the Russia headed CSTO is of specific significance to Central Asian security, as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are members. Firstly, CSTO made for joint defense objectives, over the years it has established a wider security plan that comprises information security, environmental security, organized crime, human trafficking and drug trafficking (Kassenova, 2014, 18).

As a reaction to the 1999-2000 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) attacks into Central Asian region, the CSTO formed in 2001, the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) for Central Asian region with the aims of averting external aggression and countering terrorism (Pop, 2009, 278-290). The CSTO part states declared in 2007, the development of the association and its preparation to make its own Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF) (Kembayev, 2009, 163-165). In 2009, with a specific end goal to reinforce the military muscle of the association and made it more significant to the national security of part expresses, a Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) was established. Displayed on the CRDF, the reason for the CRRF is to handle dangers to sway and different

emergencies (e.g. terrorist assaults, technological and natural fiascos) inside CSTO part states (Collective Security Treaty Organization. Вооружение для защиты).

Every CSTO member state has agreed to contribute military contingents: Russia would contribute a division and a brigade, Kazakhstan would contribute a brigade, and the rest would contribute one battalion each. The total strength of the CRRF has been planned at about 16,000. The CSTO is also planning to set up a joint air defense system and a joint chemical and biological warfare threat identification system. Military and technical cooperation has been actively promoted, and a system for the joint training of military personnel has been developed (Yurgens, 2009, 22-23).

The center of exercises of the CSTO would be for the most part on the security of the states having a place with Central Asia, expanding their ability to fortifying their outskirts, fight drug trafficking, and enhancing their armed forces. In accordance with these objectives, Russia endorsed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan in September 2012, for the utilizing of military airbase at Kant until 2032 (Russia to improve, 2014). The airbase gave air backing to the CSTO's CRRF operations on the ground. A comparative treaty was signed with Tajikistan in October 2012. Under the treaty, Russia was permitted to hold and grow its 201st army installation in Tajikistan until 2042 (Russia Ratifies Central Asia, 2013). Currently, both bases were being extended and redesigned in readiness for the 2014 withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan.

For CSTO, the need is to spotlight on the largest safety hazard. Today, for majority countries of CSTO (for Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and, anyhow), the biggest safety hazards originate from sources of unsteadiness inside Central Asian region and in neighboring (Trenin, 2010).

The new meeting of the Collective Security Council of SCTO held in Sochi emphasized the necessitate for close up concentration to the reality that the extraction of alliance powers from Afghanistan would bring in a novel model of tests and hazards into the safety dynamics of Central Asian region and the liability part of CSTO on the whole (Kotanjian, 2013). The outcomes of the Sochi Summit CSTO supplied military and technical support to the Tajikistan's troops on border to fortify the border connecting Tajikistan and Afghanistan were to perform a significant contribution in guaranteeing the safety of the Central Asian member republics of CSTO.

THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The CSTO has since tried to turn itself into an active organization of relevance to its memberships needed as they face the growing Western military presence in the CIS countries, that of U.S. and U.S.-led NATO forces. The Russian-led CSTO has aimed at developing itself into an alternative to those forces. Suspicions about long-term American objectives in the CIS countries, and especially its alleged masterminding of the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, has created a more cooperative mood toward Russia in many CIS counties, despite their strong ties with Washington. The Central Asian countries have found motivations for improving and expanding their relations with Moscow.

Wiki leaked released a United Sates Diplomatic cable. On September 10, 2009, the cable, sent to Washington by U.S Permanent Representatives to NATO, Ivo Daalder said that it would become disadvantageous for NATO to connect with CSTO, the association established by Moscow to respond to probable influence of U.S and NATO in the earlier Soviet liberty. So far, the CSTO had confirmed unproductive in major parts of action and has been separated politically. NATO

involvement with the CSTO might augment the legality of what might be a fading organization” (Laumulin, 2012).

The CSTO may become a critical element of the European security architecture, due to several current and potential factors. The CSTO is the single polygonal arrangement around post-Soviet that is competent to conduct military actions. It may well have played an essential role in the effort to stop drugs being trafficked from Afghanistan to Europe. Moreover, supporting US and NATO efforts in Afghanistan could prove to be of paramount importance for raising the CSTO’s international political profile. More generally, the organisation’s focus on certain ‘new threats’ (such as drug trafficking and terrorism) could be interpreted as a move away from traditional approaches to providing security (Nikitin, 2010, 74).

The military interventions in a series of conflicts by the US, NATO and western countries on one side, and Russia’s involvement in certain conflicts (sometimes with CIS authorization) on the other, created the impression of two opposing camps. Each side has dismissed the other’s actions as having nothing to do with ‘true’ peacekeeping (Hartog, 2010, 77). Many witnesses out looked the CSTO as a mostly scheme by Russia to augment safety pressure over member-states and to oppose U.S. and other pressure from outside.

However, there is no question that the emerging and expanding disagreements between Russia and the United States over international and regional issues, particularly those related to the CIS countries, is setting the stage for blatant hostile relations between the CSTO and the Western countries and their military organization, NATO. The U.S. dominated alliance’s expanding presence in the southern CIS countries has been a major source of concern in Moscow. The growing wariness of Washington on the part of other CSTO members and the expanding suspicion in those countries about long-term American objectives in Central Asian region and the Caucasus

too suggest the creation of a consensus within the CSTO to oppose American military and political influence in their regions.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization's member republics are prepared for complete and widespread collaboration with the U.S. and other ally states to combat the regional terrorism. This battle is to be widespread and up to date and based on both political and military factors only this is the way to obtain a chance to succeed. The religious radicalism is a dilemma for the entire region and the symbols are seen in the states adjacent to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and these are probably due to the circumstances in Afghanistan and policies of U.S. in it.

Kyrgyzstan is not a huge country situated in the Centre of the region of Central Asia, but its position has formulated it striking for the giant actors in the politics of international arena. It is the single state in the globe that has on its region both a U.S and Russian base, only 30 kilometers away from each other. Moscow initiated conciliations in May 2005, with Bishkek for another military base in Osh. Russia, in year 2006, proclaimed arrangements for substantial investments related with military section in Kyrgyzstan and the government of Kyrgyzstan chose to lift the leasing cost of the Manas Air Base utilized by the U.S. (Laruelle, 2008, 15). \$65 million yearly were paid by Washington for the Manas Air Base which was set up in year 2002, whilst inserting another \$150 million via financial inducements (Bridge, 2009).

An accord was signed by Kyrgyzstan and Russia on February 3, 2009 valued \$2 billion, to represent support of Russia to the Kyrgyzstan's economy that was in disaster, and it was pursued by the declaration that Kyrgyzstan would enduringly shut the Manas Air base down (Huskey, 2008, 18). Bakiev said that he was emitting U.S forces after repetitive demands for augmented lease expense had been disregarded. In the result of the declared end of the Manas Air Base and the

predictable opening of the Rapid Reaction Forces of CSTO and main purpose was to join presented military services of Russia inside the country (McDermott, 2009).

After the tragic incident of 9/11, flight-over and base forming rights were presented by Uzbekistan to ally powers and the U.S. Nevertheless, in May 2005, basing rights for U.S. at Karshi-Khanabad were ended when U.S. censure and other acts associated to the Uzbek government's supposedly aggressive onslaught on turbulence in the southern city of Andiron. It fortified event supported by the U.S. as per the government of Uzbekistan (Akiner, 2005, 10). Decision of Uzbekistan was supported by China and Russia, through the Declaration of SCO issued on July 5, 2005. In addition, Reintegration was performed for Uzbekistan on June 2006 into the CSTO (Laruelle, 2008, p-17). A media impression was formed by Uzbekistan, on 20 June, 2012, a note was sent to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) telling them it was suspending its membership. For Uzbekistan, unluckily a verdict of the summit of CSTO made official in its lawfully obligatory documents specified that no any member republic might house the bases of military of a republic that was not member without the harmony of all the other member republics (Литовкин, 2012).

Extraction from the CSTO provided Tashkent space for contrive in its collaboration with the West (mainly the U.S.) in the Afghanistan's perspective. Uzbekistan has been a main associate of the NATO and U.S., equally as a transportation country in the Northern Distribution Network for the Afghanistan's allied powers. Extraction from the CSTO would have allowed Tashkent to collaborate with the NATO and U.S. with no requirement to agree with the terms with Organization's members, particularly Russia. Uzbekistan has been counting not only on economic expand (from fees of transportation, for instance), but also on main gains in the form of safety, for instance the transportation of arms from the

extracting power, or as has been considered the probability of an enduring U.S. existence on its region.

Afghanistan's factors have both internal and external features. Afghanistan turned out to be a resource of steady unsteadiness mostly because of crackpot operations of worldwide actors. The key factor is the outlook of a novel signal of Islamic extremism and Islamist movement resumed.

On September 23, 2013, Annual summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization was held and at the top of the program was safety in the room after the Soviet after the extraction of global troops (NATO and U.S.) out of the Afghanistan beginning in year 2014. Members of organization from Central Asia and Russia were concerned that unsteadiness from Afghanistan might fall over into their regions and they started doing work over increasing safety to the regions of border. But their endeavored to employ the NATO and U.S. in CSTO efforts a call that the CSTO repeated had aggravated just cynicism from Washington.

All contacts with NATO by Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were suspended because of Ukraine's calamity. Superlative rank of Russia as a CSTO head efficiently has ensured that CSTO would have to cut bindings with NATO, given the stalemate over annexation of Russia of Crimea and its present forced point on the eastern Ukrainian frontier. As per the verdict of the Secretary-General, NATO is blackmailed allies of CSTO and Russia. NATO is still blackmailing all the member states of CSTO, screening that they are tremendously disgruntled with actions of Russia in current months. NATO and its members are greatly engaged in the running of the crisis in Ukrainian and making efforts to stop the unsteadiness and separatism in Ukraine's eastern parts after flourishing takeover of Russia of Crimea. Then Secretary-General of NATO Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen pointed that NATO was going to prepare extra forces and tools to arrange for any battle actions

that could become essential in link with the crisis in Ukraine (Panda, 2014).

CONCLUSION

The formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization was an expansion of the Russian interests in Central Asian region, and Russia needs the CSTO to remain the main security partner of the regional countries. This organization performs the fundamental vital role of keeping up the Moscow-accommodating administrations in the Central Asian states and is significant regarding exhibiting a unified front in restricting the American nearness in the locale. Underlining the dangers originating from Afghanistan and NATO's issues in dealing with the circumstance, Russia endeavors to depict itself as a superior security answer for the Central Asian nations. NATO's action in the CIS has dependably been viewed by Moscow preferably as a danger than as variables of steadiness or security collaboration. Accordingly, restricting the association's exercises was Russia's consistent target. It has been aided by NATO's inward vulnerability: to start with, the association experienced issues in finding sufficient inspirations and exercises for the Central Asian states' security needs, and, second, the security help programs offered constrained budgetary assets.

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