

History of the Money between Mali and France

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Abstract

Former French colony of Africa, Mali, a country rich in history, began with empires, then kingdoms, up to the resistance against French penetration, before being colonized in the 1800s. It is located in the heart of West Africa bordering neighboring countries such as Algeria to the north, Mauritania and Senegal to the west, Burkina Faso and Niger to the east, and End Guinea and the Ivory Coast to the south. As a landlocked state, Mali is largely occupied by the desert. Despite these constraints, Mali is an important country for the history of West Africa. While in 1959, at the beginning of African independence, it formed a federation with Senegal called the "Mali Federation", it was one of the first member states of the Franco-African Community to demand political independence and monetary. With his strategy, he obtained his political independence on Thursday, September 22, 1960 following the break-up of the federation in 1959, then monetary on July 1, 1962, by creating his own currency "Malian francs. Indeed, this devise "Malian Francs" will not last; Mali will eventually join the colonial currency on July 1, 1984 with Moussa Traoré as president of the republic who worked hand in hand with the colonial power after many years of torpedoing by the colonial power "France. In this article we will try to show the genesis to the end of the Malian franc and the prospects for a new monetary creation in Mali or French-speaking Africa.

Key words: Mali, currency, Malian franc

1. INTRODUCTION

Mali, part of the French colonies of West Africa, is a country that comes from the Mali Empire from which it derives its

name. At the time of the empire it made his economic exchanges with product against product between members in the empire. France, having made its penetration into Africa, which it colonized in the nineteenth century, created a monetary zone, of which Mali, taking the name of French Sudan at the time, was part of this zone. The monetary unit was the CFA francs linked to the French Francs which is still in these French-speaking countries of Africa. In the franc zone, member countries share the same currency, the CFA franc (French colonies in Africa). After 1958, the privilege of the issue was conferred on West Africa to the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and Central Africa to the Central Bank of the West African States Equatorial Africa and Cameroon. There is also an issuing institution for Madagascar and the Comoros. So from this moment France was strong of its imperial thought and because of the commercial volume destined to these colonies to then impose this common currency whose convertibility is related to the French Francs since the first moments of independence. Mali after being shocked by the break-up of the federation of Mali that it formed with Senegal in 1959 of which France made no effort went towards the socialist countries with in its head Modibo KEITA. At this turbulent time, Mali asked France her completely liberty; Which will be carried out not only politically but also on the military economic and even monetary level, being directed towards the socialist countries, Mali strikes its own currency in July 1962 which will not last as long because of the economic and political influence from France. Since the disappearance of this national currency that was struck by Mali from 1962 to 1984, the Malian economy has faced problems that do not end. This article will allow us to briefly explain the genesis at the end of this currency and the prospect of a new creation that will allow us to revive the economy.

2. THE CREATION OF THE MALIAN CURRENCY

Mali, a socialist country since its independence first sought a third route between the Guinean decision and that of other member states, the Malian government wants complete control of credit policy. It does not want to submit to the controls that France imposes on members of the franc zone. Its choice is thus to leave the West African monetary union, to create an issuing institution and a national currency, while seeking to maintain a link with the franc zone. Its purpose is to open an advance account with the France Bank. While the French Treasury guarantees the CFA franc in full, the advance account provides for a limited guarantee up to a certain level. The first measure is accompanied by strict French controls; On the other hand, in the second case, the case of our country Mali, Paris has a much more limited role. This choice of Mali was a choice, which in economic terms privileged the development of the state sector. It is within this framework that the State has through its Economic Steering Committee, which in January 1961 became the National Committee of Planning and Economic Direction had set up, with the help of economists like the Egyptian Samir Ammin and the French Jean Bernard, a four-year plan that envisaged an investment of 65 billion CFA francs. This first plan is then revised and replaced by a five-year plan. The first Malian five-year plan was adopted in August 1961 by the National Assembly and promulgated by decree on 1 September 1961, provided for an investment of 105.4 billion CFA francs. The currency as well as all the financial and banking institutions that operated in our country was directly attached to the money and to the French banking financial institutions, of which they were only extensions with a CFA franc managed practically by Paris.

Institutions such as the Central Bank of West African States (WASCB) or the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) are just one mechanism for French monopolies to control currencies. The issuance privilege, the fiduciary circulation, the discount rate, the determination of the terms of bank credit,

management etc., exclusively reveal France. The manipulation of this essential economic instrument, which is money, was out of reach of African countries. As for the particular case of Mali, which was then blocked by France and facing serious exchange problems for its purchases on the world market, Mali had decided to create its own currency. On June 30, President Modibo Keita, in a speech he made to the deputies on money, said: "The national currency is above all a necessary instrument for real economic development, for socialist-oriented planning.

As experience proves, development planning cannot be carried out by a government without monetary power. Having its monetary autonomy, it is at the internal level that it can regulate and control, as it is understood, the issuing of metallic and fiduciary money, the management of credit to private and public enterprises as well as to the State ". On the night of June 30, 1962, President Modibo KEITA declared in his speech that the country currency would be in circulation on 1 July 1962; President Modibo Keïta announced his government's decision to carry out a monetary reform. Mali thus left the West African Monetary Union within which the CFA Franc was operating.

As a result, Mali developed its own currency called "Malian franc". A state bank was responsible for issuing the national currency and at the same time supervising the other banks operating in the country. As soon as the local currency was introduced, the CFA franc was no longer in circulation on the national territory.

3. THE DIFFICULTIES RELATED TO THE NATIONAL CURRENCY OF MALI "THE MALIAN FRANC"

Since the creation of the Malian currency, Mali has been confronted with problems of securing its currency. Most of these foods were imported from France, which considered it a rebellious country because of these demands. At that time, Mali

does not have much money on which it can rely to guarantee its national currency.

France frustrated then put pressure under the neighboring countries to which Mali should have access to French products that the population was already accustomed to consumed. However, it was pointed out that this reform did not affect Mali's membership of the franc zone. Some close associates of President Modibo KEITA in the 1960s acknowledged that Mali was quickly in need.

According to them, any currency needs a solid base and it was not with peanut or cotton that a national currency could be guaranteed. Russian engineers were already present in our country for oil prospecting; we could expect the results before creating our currency because oil is a more solid economic base than our groundnut and cotton. And faced with the lack of understanding of the Malian population, he revolted by rushing to put pressure on the government.

The question that should be asked was that the Malian Franc was born dead? Yes by the non-information and the lack of framework of the first government it could be considered like a dead born face a population that had not understood anything about what the government wanted to do as such. All in all, the wine was drawn and it was necessary to drink it. The government of the young Republic of Mali had just entered the unknown. With the help of monetary advisers from the countries of the East and the French Communist Party, models of the Malian franc were developed here in Mali.

Then these models were sent for printing to Czechoslovakia (communist country of Eastern Europe at the time). After their printing, the packages of Malian franc notes were well arranged in boxes on which had been written: "Explosive dangerous warning" a way of deceiving the vigilance of the curious. These boxes full of Franks Malians were then sent to Conakry to Ahmed Sékou Touré. It was from Conakry that military trucks from the Malian army transported these cargoes to Bamako.

These boxes full of money on which were written "Dangerous explosive cautions" were sent to the chief places of circle and arrondissement with formal prohibition to open them until D-day. This day "J", was the 1st July 1962 Thus, delegations were dispatched from Bamako to the chief places of circles and precinct to open these boxes and in place of the dangerous explosives, and the Malians discovered their new currency, the new Malian franc. The populations had until July 15, 1962 to exchange their CFA francs in Malian franc. The traders, totally disoriented, did not know which saint to devote to. That is why, on Wednesday, July 18, 1962, the traders held a general information meeting in the large meeting room of the House of Veterans of Bamako.

The political-administrative authorities, represented at the highest level, had taken their seats in the presidium. Several participants intervened in the debates to express their surprises and concerns about the creation of the new currency and the deadline for the exchange of the CFA.

As the meeting unfolded, El Hadj Kassoum TOURE entered the meeting room. He was greeted with a thundering applause from the shopkeepers in the room. When calm returned he asked the merchants to postpone the meeting to Sunday, July 22, 1962, and finally to allow the delegates from all the regions of Mali to participate so that the decisions could reflect the opinion of the majority of economic operators Of Mali.

The arrival of El Hadj Kassoum TOURE in the meeting room and its spectacular reception were considered a provocation by the presidium made up of senior officials of the State. In business circles, the tension began to rise. So for the authorities, at this rate, it was necessary to do everything possible to avoid the large meeting of traders of July 22, 1962.

The new government of the young Republic of Mali was about to begin its first showdown. Following the great meeting of the merchants of Bamako on 18 July 1962, on the proposal of

El Hadj Kassoum Touré, it was decided to convene another meeting this time of all the traders of Mali for July 22, 1962.

However, in view of the tension which was mounting on the merchants' side from the meeting of 18 July 1962, authorities believing in a plot to prepare them against the regime had decided to take action. Thus, on the night of 19 to 20 July 1962, El Hadj Kassoum TOURE was arrested at his home at 4 am the news that spread in the city like wildfire provoked surprise and anger among economic operators.

Early on Friday, 20 July 1962, small groups of traders formed immediately and began to march on the central police station of Bamako to convince themselves first of the arrest of El Kassoum Touré and then protest and demand his immediate release. Faced with the scale and determination of the protesters, the police demanded reinforcements from the other companies to disperse the demonstration with tear-gas grenade, crosses and even the use of firearms.

According to some testimonies, at the end of this first confrontation with the forces of the order, one counted numerous victims. After this violent clash, the protesters regrouped, very quickly, to march towards the French embassy chanting, according to testimony of the slogans against the regime US RDA, against the Malian franc. According to testimonies, these leaders of these demonstrators would have in front of the embassy of France torn and burned the Malian flag. Let us recall that these are historical testimonies that remain to be verified.

On July 21, 1962, militants of the ruling Sudanese Union of Democratic Republics (GDR) organized a counter-demonstration to assure President Modibo Keita of their loyalty and support for monetary reform. The president, for his part, appealed to the nation assuring him that he would punish the traffickers of the new currency. For a brief historical review, the counter-demonstration of the US-RDA in 1962 was evoked as the march against the UDPM of Moussa Traoré in 1991. On Sunday, July 22, 1962, the order was established in Bamako

and sanctions were announced against traders who would keep their stores closed.

The Sudanese Union GDR appointed a National Commission with a mission to carry out a thorough investigation into the origins of the riot and the responsibilities that they entailed. Very quickly, the commission of inquiry discovers the responsibility of two important political figures as the main instigators of the riots.

They were Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hammadoun Dicko. El Hadj Kassoum Toure was already in prison since July 20, 1962. On Monday, July 23, Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hammadoun Dicko were arrested. A week later, on Monday 30 July 1962, Mamadou Niang was arrested in his turn. He was accused of being present at the home of El Hadj Kassoum Touré, so to be aware of certain things.

After a muscular interrogation, Mamadou Niang was released on 7 August 1962. The arrest of Fily Dabo Sissoko had shocked the national and international opinion. Both had been deputies to the French National Assembly and had held ministerial portfolios in the French government: Fily Dabo Sissoko had been Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry in 1948, while Hammadoun Dicko had been under-secretary of in 1956 and 1957.

In the elections to the National Assembly of Bamako on March 8, 1958, Fily Dabo and Hammadoun Dicko were leaders of the Party of African Regrouping Which were opposed to the Sudanese GDR Union. At the beginning of August 1962, President Modibo Keita named Fily Dabo Sissoko, Hammadoun Dicko and El Kassoum Toure as the main leaders of a conspiracy that had been prepared for a long time in conjunction with some foreign governments against the government of Bamako and replace it with another more docile government from outside. The President concluded his speech by stating that it would be up to the Malian people to decide the fate of those arrested. In 1963, the decolonization of French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa was completed.

Paris signed with its former colonies co-operation treaties defining the framework and modalities of the French presence on their territory. In this context, Mali represents a special case: Without fully aligning themselves with the positions of the most "progressive" countries such as Guinea or Ghana, it does not belong to the group of "moderate" countries considered closer to France. Bamako seeks to establish new relations of cooperation with Paris, particularly in the economic and monetary field. The Malian government's attempt will not be successful, but it deserves to be taken into consideration. Indeed, in Mali, as in other Francophone African states, if political independence has been proclaimed and officially recognized, economically decolonization is far from over. From this point of view, the new States must choose between economically-monetary systems, partly adapted, but still under the preponderant influence of France and a monetary independence which risks not having much significance, given their State of underdevelopment. The choice of almost all the French-speaking states is in favor of a system of colonial origin, which, however, offers them economic guarantees - but also political ones - very important.

4. THE END OF THE MALIAN CURRENCY "THE MALIAN FRANCS"

Mali after so many years of suffering because of the policy of France and these allies, the Malian franc will not resist for long time. At the beginning of 1964, Modibo Keita, in a letter addressed to the French Prime Minister, envisaged the possibility of an association with the West African monetary zone. After a first moment of euphoria, economic constraints took over in Mali. Indeed, following the monetary reform, Bamako finds himself in a very weak position. Not only has the domestic economic situation not improved, but it has also lost all pressure on the French government.

At the international level, there is also a change: Mali adopts more moderate positions compared to previous years.

First there is a certain rapprochement with Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the President of Côte d'Ivoire, and the African Union and Malagasy, an organization created by the Francophone African States. Meanwhile, Mali is moving away from the Casablanca group and is approaching Mauritania (with which Morocco has rather bad relations) and Senegal [41] [41] MAE, DAM series (Mali), file 2520, note, 28 December.

In October 1962, the representative of Mali in the United Nation Assembly made rather moderate remarks [42] [42] MAE, DAM series (Mali), file 2525, telegram 2580-82, Early 1963, Bamako Put an end to the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian aid and asked France to intervene in their place the international shift in Mali, which is abandoning the extreme positions typical of previous years, is explained by several motives. In the first place, from the end of 1962, communist aid reveals its weaknesses everywhere. [43] [43] I. Roubinski, "The USSR in Africa (1960-1990):

In Guinea, at the same time, the Soviet ambassador was expelled, and American aid replaces that of Moscow. Mali considers that aid from the communist countries is expensive and poorly adapted to the conditions and needs of the country. [44] [44] CHAN, Foccart Public Fund, file 52, note to the attention.

Economic situation deepens, leading to a rapprochement with the Ivory Coast and the reopening of borders with Senegal: these two countries represent a traditional outlet for Malian exports.

The resumption of contacts with the former partners is encouraged by the international meetings which, between 1962 and 1963, led to the creation of the first pan-African organization. At the same time, after 1962, France's international position vis-à-vis the Third World was strengthened. Algeria has become independent and Paris is no longer questioned at the UN.

General de Gaulle's policy of assuming his country's role as mediator between the North and the South attracted him

great sympathy among the States of the Third World. In this context, Mali can calmly consider closer cooperation with France and reintegration into the West African monetary union. On the economic side, the same considerations that convinced the member countries of the franc zone to keep the CFA franc are also valid for Mali.

These include the myth of African unity, the awareness of limited economic resources, the need to protect against the risk of hyperinflation and currency crises (frequent in Development), the idea that only a stable area from an economic and monetary point of view can attract foreign investment. Mali, which in 1962 is in a very ambiguous situation compared to the franc zone - it claims to be a member of the latter, even if it does not respect its rules of operation - will eventually reintegrate it into 1968.

For Paris, the evaluation of its relations with Mali is obviously different. Before the Malian monetary reform, the priority of the French government is to preserve the balances of the BCEAO. Paris fears that if Bamako abandons the West African monetary union under conditions similar to those of Guinea, the franc zone will not survive. For the French leaders, the importance of the Franco-African monetary zone is considerable. Not only is it a useful instrument for safeguarding French influence against attempts to infiltrate foreign powers, but it also represents the concrete manifestation of the non-European interests of France.

Thanks to the Franc zone and the links that Paris has with its former colonies, France can still consider itself a great power that cannot be reduced to the European level. In this context, we understand the precautions taken with regard to Mali, as well as the attempts to boost the negotiations for the signing of bilateral cooperation agreements. The unfortunate Guinean experience had taught Paris to be more flexible with regard to the demands of African countries. After finding that the Malian reform is under satisfactory conditions and does not

endanger the franc zone, Paris regains all its freedom of maneuver.

From now on, French policy towards Mali will consist in granting its aid to Bamako, but always in a very limited way and in exchange for specific counterparts. This policy is entirely in keeping with the wishes of General de Gaulle, who wants to liberate France from colonial constraints. The French Government is thus prepared to grant substantial aid to African States, but it is also careful to maintain its autonomy in deciding the amount of economic and financial aid and not to stipulate automatic defense intervention clauses. "

In any case, we must keep our hands free," de Gaulle had said at the conclusion of a meeting with his closest collaborators. [45] [45] CHAN, Foccart Private Fund, file 119, Committee of....

5. PROSPECTS FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW NATIONAL CURRENCY IN MALI

Mali, whose policy had created its own currency in 1962, a currency which, due to natural, political and social difficulties, would last only 22 years, that is from 1962 to 1984, returning to the franc zone on the 1st July 1984. The national currency, seen in its importance in the development of a country, requires thinking of processes which might envisage its creation in the Republic of Mali.

Mali needs to concentrate its economy on agriculture and prospecting for mineral deposits and miniaturized industries that can guarantee the currency. Also it must be vigilant in the framework of a monetary integration with the sub-region dominated by Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal if not it can end up with a policy of austerity.

Many of these mineral deposits have already given satisfactory results, such as the existence of oil in the north towards Tessalit from uranium to Faléa and many gold mines to almost all parts of the country. But somebody contrary to my vision as the Honorable Mody N'diaye are not favorable. He

says that has the question of the feasibility for our country to hit its own currency, Mody N'diaye has indicated that our country has had experience in this area. However, he says he does not support the idea that our country is hitting its own currency.

"Today, Mali has no interest as a single country to take its monetary sovereignty, but if the whole of our economic union (EUMWA) decides to free itself from the French financial yoke, I believe that it will be a good thing". He added that what is important at the moment is to have our autonomy in the implementation of our monetary policy. "Issue, are the central banks that refuse. Our authorities can do nothing without France's approval.

This lock, it must jump. Abundant in the same sense, Pr. Abdoulaye Niang added that our country is extremely rich and that we have the solution. More over, he felt that our country has no interest in beating its own currency alone. "In the context of globalization, Mali can and with ECOWAS member states create their own currency.

In this sense, we will skip steps, we must go beyond WAEMU. For WAEMU is still under the diktat of France ". To the question of the countries that have created their currency without going through an economic system such as Ghana, Nigeria, Mody N'diaye will say that they are countries with intermediate economy. At the ECOWAS level, three countries are classified as intermediate economies: Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire. Thus, it will reveal that there has been a lot of difficulty with these countries in the negotiation of the economic partnership. For the least developed countries have much easier access than countries with intermediate economies in international trade.

Concerning the three hundred million Euros promised by France to revive our economy, Abdoulaye affirmed that if aid could develop a country, Africa would be the richest continent on the planet. "France invests to have the gold of Mali," he said. Contributing to the debate, Prof. Oumar Bouaré will add that

most executives in Francophone countries have not recovered from colonial trauma. Here is what we can say about the feasibility of creating a national currency.

6. CONCLUSION

The Malian franc was a currency set up by the socialist regime since the first years of African independence, the aim of President Modibo KEITA was to give financial autonomy to the young Republic of Mali but unfortunately because of the misunderstanding between the government and the people. The population was accustomed to food from France and also Mali did not at the moment have a product that could guarantee a national currency. It should wait for results as oil prospects that Russia was leading to the north of the country.

France also did not want Mali to succeed in this adventure of economic policy. It was worried that if Mali succeeds in establishing economic prosperity that the community using the CFA Franc will not last that it used to put pressure on its African colonies. The French and the Malians had negotiated that relations had never cracked between the two countries but as we just saw if the French governments were making financial aid but in ways very calculate for Mali that She considered as a threat. Mali, like all the countries in this zone of West and Central Africa, and Cameroon, have criticisms of this currency, which makes news today.

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[3] Sur le fonctionnement du compte d'opérations, voir Michel Lelart, « Le compte d'opérations : création et mise en œuvre », *La France et l'outre-mer : un siècle de relations monétaires et financières. Colloque tenu à Bercy les 13, 14 et 15 novembre 1996*, Paris, Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, 1998

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[5] Cf. A. Lewin, « Le "non" de Sékou Touré », *Géopolitique africaine*, n° 17, hiver 2005, p. 179.191.

[6] P.-M. Durand, *Alliance objective, méfiances réciproques : les États-Unis, la France et l'Afrique noire francophone dans les années 1960*, thèse dirigée par P. Melandri, Université de Paris III - Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2003, p. 222-227.

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[8] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, dossier B 0062 206/2, séjour de M. Julienne à Bamako, 3 octobre 1960.

[9] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, dossier B 0062 206/3, note sur les encaisses de la BCEAO à Bamako, 29 décembre 1960.

[10] Le directeur de l'agence de la BCEAO au Mali fait un rapport de sa rencontre avec le ministre du Commerce : « Lui ayant exprimé notre inquiétude devant l'importance injustifiée que les autorités maliennes attachent à ces opérations [les destructions de billets] et qui peut nous faire craindre la répétition du coup de force de la Guinée, le ministre m'a répondu que jamais les Maliens ne procéderaient ainsi et que leur préoccupation est seulement d'éviter une contraction de la circulation fiduciaire comme cela s'est justement passé en Guinée avant la réforme monétaire... J'ai tenté de lui faire comprendre une fois de plus que les destructions n'avaient aucune influence sur le montant de la circulation fiduciaire. Sans être convaincu, il m'a paru cependant sensible aux argumentations avancées » (CAEF, Répertoire 1018, dossier B 0062 206/2, lettre au directeur général de la BCEAO, 3 novembre 1960).

[11] Cf. M. Michel, *Décolonisation et émergence du Tiers Monde*, Paris, Hachette, 1993.

[12] Cf. J. Kestergat, *Du Congo de Lumumba au Zaïre de Mobutu*, Bruxelles, Paul Legrain, 1986 ; C. Young, T. Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

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[14] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, dossier B 0062 206/3, note pour le directeur général de la BCEAO, 21 janvier 1961

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, dossier B 0062 206/3, compte rendu du séjour de M. Julienne à Bamako, 13 février 1961.

[17] MAE, DAM (Mali), dossier 2519, télégramme de Bamako à Paris, 6 mars 1961. L'ambassadeur conclut son télégramme en soulignant que, « malgré les pressions (certaines) dont il fait l'objet, M. Modibo Keita est disposé à rester dans la zone franc mais compte marchander cette appartenance ».

[18] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, dossier B 0062 206/3, lettre au directeur général de la BCEAO, 21 avril 1961.

[19] Les Français ne se font pas d'illusions sur les intentions de Modibo Keita. Dans une note du Quai d'Orsay, il est écrit : « C'est moins susceptibles de pallier leurs difficultés que nos interlocuteurs ont engagé les conversations. La situation économique du Mali est en effet assez délicate et ce malaise accroît l'opposition à la politique gouvernementale sans qu'il faille le surestimer » (MAE, DAM [Mali], dossier 2519, note sur les négociations franco-maliennes, 28 juin 1961).

[20] MAE, DAM (Mali), dossier 2530, note, 12 octobre 1961.

[21] « Cette solution (...) aurait (...) l'avantage pratique de lier l'ensemble des problèmes et de nous assurer des positions favorables, et l'avantage psychologique et politique de manifester aux yeux de l'opinion publique malienne la reprise du dialogue et les perspectives d'une nouvelle coopération, manifestation que certains dirigeants préféreraient dissimuler au maximum » (MAE, DAM [Mali], dossier 2530, télégramme de l'ambassade française à Bamako, 3 novembre 1961).

[22] MAE, DAM (Mali), dossier 2531, note du général de Gaulle à MM. Foyer et Gorse, sans date.

[23] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, dossier B 0062 206/3, situation de la Banque centrale au Mali et perspectives d'avenir, 7 novembre 1961.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] MAE, DAM (Mali), dossier 2531, télégramme circulaire, 1^{er} février 1962.

[26] MAE, DAM (Mali), dossier 2535, lettre du président de la République du Mali au général de Gaulle, 2 avril 1962.

[27] Sur les négociations pour la réforme de la BCEAO, cf. R. Julienne, *Vingt ans d'institutions...*, *op. cit.*, p. 184-205.

[28] MAE, série DAM (Mali), dossier 2538, télégramme de l'ambassade de France à Bamako, 30 juin 1962.

[29] « En effet, la circulation au Mali d'une monnaie différente de celle des pays voisins rendra plus difficiles les transferts illicites à destination de l'étranger. Paraissent spécialement

visés les transferts de bénéfiques effectués vers les pays d'Europe occidentale par les grandes compagnies françaises et étrangères implantées au Mali » (CHAN, Fonds public Foccart, dossier 52, note du SDECE, 26 juillet 1962).

[30] CHAN, Fonds public Foccart, dossier 52, note à l'attention du secrétaire général, 9 juillet 1962.

[31] MAE, série DAM (Mali), dossier 2506, lettre du chargé d'affaires de France à M. Gorse, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, 24 juillet 1962.

[32] Dans un télégramme adressé à Paris, l'ambassadeur français explique : « Le but des Maliens est de faire croire que le gouvernement français n'a pas d'objection au principe de cette mesure et qu'il entend dès à présent en faciliter l'application pour que la situation économique et financière du Mali n'en soit pas affectée. En procédant de cette façon, les dirigeants du Mali visent à mon sens à rassurer leur opinion publique qui depuis la réforme monétaire attend avec une certaine anxiété les réactions du gouvernement français » (CHAN, Fonds public Foccart, dossier 52, télégramme de l'ambassade de France à Bamako, 4 juillet 1962).

[33] MAE, série DAM (Mali), dossier 2531, télégramme n° 373/79 de l'ambassade de France à Bamako, 1^{er} juillet 1962.

[34] Le ministère de la Coopération envoie un télégramme aux ambassades de France dans les pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest pour préciser la position française : « J'ai reçu les ambassadeurs et chargés d'affaires des États autres que le Mali signataires des accords du 12 mai pour leur indiquer que le souci de la France est de se concerter avec leurs gouvernements avant d'engager l'avenir de ses relations monétaire avec le Mali. Je leur ai demandé d'indiquer à leurs gouvernements que, contrairement au bruit qui semble vouloir accréditer le gouvernement du Mali, l'opération monétaire réalisée par le gouvernement n'avait donné lieu à aucun échange de vues préalable avec le gouvernement français » (CHAN, Fonds public Foccart, dossier 52, télégramme du ministère de la Coopération, 9 juillet 1962).

[35] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, B 0062 206/4, télégramme pour l'ambassade de France à Cotonou, 5 juillet 1962.

[36] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, B 0062 206/4, télégramme de l'ambassade de France à Bamako, 4 juillet 1962.

[37] CAEF, Répertoire 1018, B 0062 206/4, procès-verbal de la réunion du conseil d'administration de la BCEAO, 11 juillet 1962.

[38] « Il refuse de disposer d'un compte d'opérations qui apporterait des garanties très grandes à la monnaie malienne mais impliquerait un certain nombre de contrôles de la part de la France » (CHAN, Fonds public Foccart, dossier 52, note à l'attention du président de la République, 20 juillet 1962).

[39] *Ibid.*