
Nuclearisation in South Asia with Special Reference to Cold Start Doctrine a Limited War Option : An Analysis

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Abstract:

The grave adventures of acquiring Nuclear weapon capability by the two hostile countries in South Asian region changed the security and strategic environment of the Region. The serious adventures by two hostile countries were showing that they were busy in action reactions processes. The perception of historical confrontation which lasted between Hindus and Muslims was still working during these ventures by Pakistan and India. Nuclearisation in South Asia seriously changed the security concern in the region. While knowing well the Strategic posture of Nuclearised South Asia, It is necessary in examing the Cold Start Doctrine a Limited War option in Nuclearised South Asia. That is to what extend it is challenging the security environment of the region.

Key words: NPT, Peaceful nuclear experiment, Security environment, Nuclearisation, Cold Start, Limited War, NWFZ, Proxy war, Strategic environment.

Introduction

The history of Pakistan-India's International Relations is full of

wars and mistrust. Pakistan saw dismemberment in 1971 with a deadly war against India. This incident firstly seriously compelled Pakistan to start its nuclear program; subsequently the 1974 tests by India brought a new dimension in the Pakistan nuclear program in making it in fast mood (Marie & Shinichi 2003, 64).

Subsequently, Pakistan after a long struggle for achieving nuclear weapon capability did a nuclear experiment in May 1998. Pakistan's nuclear Weapon experiment was a reaction to Indian nuclear program and in countering Indian hostility. After the tests of India nuclear experiment in May 1998 the international community was convincing the Pakistani government not to go for nuclear experiment, while threats of sanctions were also made, but Pakistan was never convinced and went for nuclear tests in the same month (Marie & Shinichi 2003, 66).

While talking about Pakistan going to nuclear options a reaction to the India nuclear experiments and Indian threat, Stephen Cohen says that Pakistan, like Israel, had been founded by the people who realized their persecution living as minority even though they had their own states and both the states remained under the shadows of powerful enemies. "Both countries have got similar history as their neighbors remained hostile to them. Both states have followed parallel strategies because they tried to develop good relations with major powers of the world but ultimately realized that they could not get any assistance from major powers in the times of severe crisis and this situation led them to construct their own nuclear weapons capability." (Salik 2011, 16).

Generally speaking the serious adventures by the two hostile countries in South Asia in going to nuclear weapon capability seriously changed the security and strategic environment of the region. The serious adventures by two hostile countries were showing that they were busy in action reactions processes. The perception of historical confrontation

which lasted between Hindus and Muslims was still working during these ventures by Pakistan and India. Nuclearisation in South Asia seriously changed the security concern in the region. The nuclearisation in South Asia brought a new shift in South Asia in bringing a new security paradigm.

Literature Review

From the very outset after the divisions of United India in 1947, Indian government is spending its energies in doing nuclear development. (Jauhari 2013, 43) The Chinese nuclear experiment in 1964 was a main factor in Indian government to have experiment of an underground nuclear experiment. (Hussain 2006, 120) The domestic environment of Indian politics and some technical factors affected the Indian government in going for nuclear experiment. Some segments including politicians of northern India having the bad history of 1962 was against China and scientists were trying to convince the government of India to respond to Chinese experiment. But unlike such thinking, the thinking of Gandhi non-violence and Nehru international cooperation stopped the Indian government in going to nuclear experiment in answering Chinese nuclear experiment in 1964. Having the logic that not going to nuclear experiment would be clear superiority of the international image of India as compared to China. In 1968 NPT gave China a nuclear weapon state status. In such scenario India went for security assurance from the two super powers of the cold war that is USSR and US in a case of Chinese nuclear aggression but India remained unfortunate as her proposal was rejected. India responded that India would not be a part of NPT. (Marie & Shinichi 2003, 59-64).

Subsequently in 1974, in the month of May, the Indian government went for nuclear experiment in Pokhran while advocating the nuclear experiment done for peaceful purposes naming it as “peaceful nuclear experiment”. (Khalid 2012, 316)

This very serious adventure taken by India government gave a serious dimension to security concerns in the South Asia. In this case Pakistan was the number one victim as Pakistan was disintegrated in 1971 with a deadly war with India. Pakistan's government perceived this serious adventure as a serious threat to Pakistan integrity. The situation demands a rational response from the Pakistani side. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called the nuclear experiment a "Grand strategy to intimidate Pakistan" (Khan 2005).

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto held a meeting of committee of the cabinet in June 1974 which aimed at starting nuclear weapons program, knowing the fact that peaceful nuclear experiment disturbed the security environment in South Asia. (Salik 2011, 11). In a letter from 6th June 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, while reminding the Pakistan and India relations since division of United India, described that Pakistan had reason for exclusive apprehension because no two among the five nuclear weapon states had been mixed up in the kind of conflict and unsettled disputes which spoiled the relationships between Pakistan and India (Salik 2011, 12).

An Indian nuclear test that is peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 was a serious shift in security concerns. While matching the situation and countering the challenge of strategic balance Pakistan responded in right course. Pakistan proposed an idea in front of the United Nations General Assembly in August 1974 to declare South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone. This idea was accepted by a huge majority of the votes of different countries but India opposed and ruthlessly rejected. Bhutto was continuing a threefold strategy to accommodate with the situation. Firstly, he gave a formal procession to his nuclear establishment to continue a nuclear weapons program. He was busy in taking nuclear guarantee from the major powers of the world. Secondly, by taking an aggressive stance he made it clear to India and the International community that nuclear program was the need of

the hour for Pakistan. In addition the nuclear programme was indispensable for Pakistan. Thirdly, India was making advancement in its nuclear establishment program and it was necessary for Pakistan to gain some progress in nuclear weapons capability to make balance in the region. He proposed the NWFZ to pressurize India against its advancement in its nuclear program so that Pakistan could take time to advance its nuclear weapon capability program. (Salik 2011, 13).

It is a strong fact that it was the nuclear programme on which no single regime of Pakistan's Government was ready to compromise in achieving nuclear Weapon Capability. Subsequently the Bahartiya Janata Party, after coming in office, had nuclear experiments in May 1998. In this regard India became nuclear weapon state and the ambiguity about nuclear weapon capability was abolished. Soon after the nuclear experiments, Atal Behari Vajpae wrote to Clinton that it was China which was trouble for India saying that India has a strong nuclear power on its borders and the same state took an aggressive adventure against India in 1962 (Marie & Shinichi 2003, 63).

This logic that China was the main threat was criticized. At length Indian government reversed this speculation that China was the main threat, as the nuclear missile technology sent by China to Pakistan disturbed the security situation (Marie & Shinichi 2003, 63).

The nuclear weapon experiment of India in May 1998 compelled Pakistan to answer in the same course; therefore Pakistan did the same in doing nuclear tests in the same month and it became a nuclear weapon state on the globe. Rightly after discussing the historical overview of Pakistan- India's mentality in acquiring Nuclear weapon capability, it is the time to discuss Cold Start Doctrine a Limited War with its all dimensions and considerations in Strategic Posture of Nuclearised South Asia.

Cold Start a Limited War: An Analysis

In April 2004 the Indian military came with new limited war strategy that is 'Cold Start Doctrine'. Indian military thought that the 'cold start doctrine' would guarantee quick mobility for Indian military in answering any challenge in the 'proxy war' of Kashmir sponsored by Pakistan. The cold start doctrine is fundamentally a change in the Indian military's old 'defensive orientation', which it had before (Ladwing III 2008, 158).

Conducting their nuclear tests in May 1998 both Pakistan and India came with their nuclear doctrines: Pakistan by perceiving India as a number one threat since 1947 called the 'nuclear doctrine' as India specific to counter Indian threat, while Pakistan's nuclear capability is for 'deterrence' in safeguarding its sovereignty and its integrity in any aggression. Unlike Pakistan, India's nuclear doctrine has offensive designs, while miscalculating the security environment of nuclearised South Asia. The Indian side advocated 'Limited war' under nuclear umbrella. In addition Indian Limited war is a war under nuclear umbrella with outing allowing the nuclear escalation in nuclearised South Asia. Generally speaking limited war strategy in nuclearised South Asia is a challenging task. Indian limited war strategy in nuclearised South Asia makes no sense by many as in nuclearized South Asia there is a possibility of nuclear escalation (Khan 2005, 1).

While discussing the limited war in South Asian context it is necessary to define it for better understanding. Limited war is that both the sides use limited weapons and restrict them to use nuclear weapons. In the war, the limited weapons are used against the enemy on selected targets (Holdorf 2012, 138). Osgood defined limited war as the war that has limited political objectives. (Holdorf 2012, 138).

In addition, according to Osgood, there are seven classes of possible restrictions, man power, geographical area, weapons, duration and intensity, target, number of fighters (Holdorf

2012, 139).

In the above it is difficult to think about the limitations of war without the presence of these three factors: geographical area, weapons, and target, which have great importance in this context (Holdorf 2012, 139).

Cold Start doctrine is a limited war strategy of Indian military for limited political objective in less time. The goal of Cold Start Strategy is to have the capacity to retaliate conventional attacks against Pakistan. These attacks will damage the Pakistan army before any foreign interference for help and forcing Islamabad to such narrow extent that it could not lead the fight up to nuclear level (Ladwing III 2008, 164).

According to Sannia, India prepared Cold Start as a limited warfare under nuclear shadow. According to Indian Military Cold Start strategy for nuclear neighbors, China and Pakistan represent a challenging adventure which needs advanced conventional war fighting military capabilities. Indian CSD is basing on NATO comes as you are war style, but in reality there is a clear difference between Indian military and NATO forces military capabilities. (Abdullah 2012, 18)

The limited war approach in nuclearized South Asia has critical consequences. According to Schaffer, in the strategic environment of nuclear South Asia India limited war option is irrational, which makes no sense. In Pak-India equation it is not possible to be limited in weapons, geography and political objectives while doing warfare. Pakistan may not consider limited war as limited which is perceived as limited by the Indian side. (Abdullah 2012, 19).

Indian activities in Post 9/11 showed that India was projecting Pakistan as a Terrorism hub. Interestingly without acknowledging the fact that Pakistan itself was the worst victim of terrorism. India advanced its Strategic motives using compellence in pressurizing Pakistan without understanding the regional dynamics. Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Kayani said the Indian military objective under nuclear

umbrella is a serious adventure which has severe and uncontrollable consequences and undesired results. (Abdullah 2012, 19).

Cold start strategy is a limited war strategy of India in nuclearized South Asia. So, it is important to examine to what extent it is feasible under nuclear umbrella. Unlike the strategic environment of cold war the strategic environment of South Asia is a different one. It is evident by studying cold war that under the stability or instability contradiction, a very small probability of sub nuclear clash strengthening to the nuclear entrance facilitates low level aggression. Making low level aggression more likely, the improbability of nuclear escalation reduces nuclear weapons ability to discourage conservative conflicts. The Soviets, the potentially revisionist power in cold war Europe and that low likelihood of nuclear escalation encouraged Soviet aggression because they were conservatively stronger than NATO. The conventionally stronger Soviet Union could have defeated NATO and apprehended West European territory without fear of setting off a nuclear conflict, that is why, the US nuclear acceleration was very unlikely. It would have been unlikely to succeed over the coalition in severely predictable conflict and a low likelihood of nuclear acceleration would not have confident belligerent Soviet behavior if the Soviet Union had been unadventurously weak comparative to NATO. (Kapur 2005, 134-135).

While comparing South Asia strategic environment with cold war strategic environment it is obvious that there is a clear difference between them. According to Paul the hazards are reserved in current South Asia due to the strategic conditions which accelerated cold war stability or instability. Pakistan, which is a revisionist state in Indo-Pak conflict, is a weaker country. The stable nuclear environment would undermine the nuclear escalation of Pakistan. It would make Pakistan weaker as compared to India and it would be dangerous for Pakistan. (Kapur 2005, 135).

It is important to know that nuclear doctrines of Pakistan and India can impact on limited warfare. India is of the view that it had 'no first use' option of nuclear doctrine. Pakistani side dismissed the Indian approach of no-first use as "a cost-free exercise in sanctimonious propaganda. Renunciation only of the first use of nuclear weapons seems like a subterfuge to camouflage the intention to resort to the first use of conventional weapons" (Ragavan 2001, 12).

Pakistani officials are clear on the use of nuclear weapons in a situation that would force Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons when the enemy would have occupied a large territory or important junctions of Pakistan (Ragavan 2001, 12).

In testing the limited war option in nuclearised South Asia it is very important to check the mentality of the Pakistani side. According to a senior military expert of Pakistan, if the situation is made more aggravated by India through military attack or breaching its defense, Pakistan would be left with no other option than to use nuclear weapons to save its territory and defense. Pakistan will have to spoil India's power of men and arms by the use of nuclear weapons (Ragavan 2001, 12).

According to another political analyst of Pakistan, Pakistan should go for a one-rung escalation ladder joined in firmly with a highly unified state- of -the- art- tactical conventional military. In this way, it should get complicated conservative technology at the strategic theatre level while sustaining a stance of one-rung escalation in case of all-out strategic war. It has become necessary that Pakistan requires spatial intensity and in a conventional war it should not waste its resources (Ragavan 2001, 12)

There is a strong possibility that limited war may become unlimited and uncontrollable in nuclearized South Asia. Raghvan described four points in which a limited war can become unlimited going toward nuclear escalation in nuclearized South Asia. First the political and military aims

which are considered limited by India may be thought unacceptable and limitless for Pakistan. Pakistan thinks that it should use its nuclear weapons in extremely worse military situations imposed by India. The depth of this situation will remain the same for both India and Pakistan. The command of Pakistani nuclear weapons is always in the hands of military so it can be thought that the chances of exploding a nuclear weapon from the side of Pakistan are much likely to happen. It is observed that there is always a danger of second strike of nuclear weapon from either country, which will make the situation worse and aggravated. This has been observed by the consistent threats and warnings from both countries. If India reviews its operational policy of nuclear weapons, it will encourage Pakistan to get more resources for nuclear weapons (Aneja 2002).

According to Raghvan, it is true that India would like to capture a large territory of Pakistan in the earliest of any war before any other military adventure and this will instigate Pakistan to use nuclear weapons in no more time to explode nuclear weapons (Aneja 2002).

Limited war option as advocated by Indian side has some problems which must be highlighted. According to Chari, if the assets of Pakistan are at stake in any military campaign against India, it will be difficult for Pakistan to keep the war non-nuclear and limited. It must be kept in view which policy will be opted by India in such situation. The objectives of India cannot be modest as it would not provide any political stance. The situation would be out of control if the concerns of India are too high. This is point to ponder for everyone if the military leaders will show responsibility during the war times (Chari 2002). Chari further concluded that in nuclearised South Asia any effort for limited warfare is foolish and irrational in all aspects (Chari 2002).

According to Walter, the main reservation about Limited warfare in Nuclear South Asia is that a Limited war may

convert into unlimited destruction. In addition, cry for Limited war in nuclear South Asia is a futile exercise. (Ladwing III 2008, 169).

In addition Walter also described that in nuclearised South Asia it is always a threat that any sort of limited war would lead to the explosion of nuclear weapons due to many reasons because there are many factors which are not under the control of policy makers and military leaders who start the conflict. India's strange national security policy, long history of aggressions and weak intelligence suggest that the Cold Start will be extremely risky for the peace of South Asia. (Ladwing III 2008, 158-159).

Discussing the limited war approach in South Asian case, Khurshid Khan described that the conflict between India and Pakistan is likely to happen because of poor intelligence, weak national security policy and small conflicts. Analyzing the present condition of the two armies he further says that India cannot achieve its goals by imposing small conflicts on Pakistan which could lead to the nuclear escalation. Pakistan can never think to lose its strategically important areas under any circumstances. That is why the army of Pakistan will fight with full zeal and zest to suppress Indian army at its position. (Khan 2005, 1-2).

In addition Khurshid Khan described that India military's exaggeration of its capability is a challenging task in nuclearised South Asia. Indian side is comparing itself with the American one, as America is busy in Iraq and Afghanistan that is targeting militants in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is necessary to know that India is not as strong as America in the same line as Pakistan is not like Afghanistan. (Khan 2005, 2).

Conclusion

In concluding all the above discussion it is evident that Indian limited war strategy of 'Cold start' is a dangerous venture of

Indian military in the strategic environment of nuclearized South Asia, in which Pakistan is much weaker than India in conventional warfare. In addition a limited war strategy may bring the two neighbors to the brink of nuclear escalation in nuclear South Asia. As nuclearisation in South Asia is a new Security paradigm, it is the need of the time to understand that Limited War option is a challenging for Pakistan and India's peace and tranquility. The nuclearisation in South Asia came as a new shift in the security environment of South Asia. It needs new security paradigm; the old policy orientation would be reversed by the new policy considerations in South Asia. A new security paradigm demands new thinking in defense and foreign policy formulation.

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