

Kosovo Issue and the Foreign Policy of Italy

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Abstract:

The crisis in the Balkans, was the collapse of communist regimes, and the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, would find Italy, in the role of protagonist to face, stabilization of the crisis, and then to restore normal living conditions. Due to geographical proximity, which makes Italy a point of attraction for the Balkans, natural doors admissions, merchandise and Western Europe, the Balkans and the south of the Mediterranean, stability, peace, and development of those regions, represent a special national interest for the State. There are historical links that come as a result of a rule of practice since centuries from Italy. These links explain the reasons, why the Italian state, they introduce the work commitment to help rebuild the Kosovo society suffered from Serbian repression, as well as humanitarian aid. Although Italy, at the time of the Kosovo war, was preparing to experiencing deep political crisis.

Two main political parties, who had held the responsibilities of government, not less than 30 years, were distributed within a few months, bringing with it the devaluation of the names that had led the Italian foreign policy. But not long after, when Italy became a State Party, the largest contingent of NATO troops, to maintain peace in the Balkans. "Quartet" of NATO, became "Quintuple", including to Italy, and from this moment Italy was part of the Contact Group. This Italy, did not increase the prestige, or to display the foreign policy of a powerful state, but have sought and made, because share with the Balkans and in particular to Kosovo, human and civic values, not only

in humanitarian and economic field, but also in the military field. Taking liability, to the extent appropriate, Italy has taken its rightful place in the international community.

Key words: Kosovo, Italy, Serbia, crisis in Balkans, stability, political crisis, foreign policy, NATO, humanity, contact group, KFOR

Introduction

Milosevic after Dayton had attended as representatives of the Serbs in Bosnia, he has been in the eyes of the West a guarantor of peace in the Balkans, and this was why his government was preferable and had left in life¹. Despite Western preferences Milosevic was on the verge of collapse in 1996. Use of electoral fraud was not sufficient to maintain control of the municipalities of Belgrade and Novi Sad, the two largest cities in Serbia, after three months of protests and reporting irregularities by the OSCE, the Socialist Party should recognize the opposition victory. In 1997, Milosevic had reached the maximum number of seats, which had to settle for the presidency of the Federation and the submission of Serbia. After risk, it will pass after radical leader Vojislav Seselj (1954), vožd which was less nationalist.

In Montenegro, President Milo Djukanovic assumed the presidency, which, being one of the most fervent supporters of Milosevic's policy was recycled as a lawyer Podgorica autonomy from Serbia's pro-Western policy. The new president of the Federation can reach consensus only if it was the "sweeping" of nationalism, it was necessary to deal with the issue of Kosovo. In the region there was in excellent condition, parallel state created in the 90s by the time I.Rugova leader, though his methods of peace, not war, was cared to internationalize the

¹ TACCONI M., *Kosovo: la storia, la guerra, il futuro*, Castelvechi, Roma, 2008, fq. 79-80.

Kosovo issue in a peaceful manner, again they lost². Exemption from the table of negotiations Kosovo Dayton's argument, in fact, prompted many Albanians to join the UÇK (Kosovo Liberation Army - the National Liberation Movement), an organization that wanted to win independence by force. Urebels armaments that were smuggled from Albania after the collapse of the state, performs style terror against Serbs, but also against followers "Rugovist", Roma and other ethnic minorities. In the fall of 1997, the Contact Group old met to discuss the situation in Kosovo: September 24 they expressed their concern over the events that are happening, inviting Belgrade and Pristine dialogue, but dialogue was not realized³. In early March, in Drenica, in an area of Kosovo in the hands of the UÇK, anti-terrorist unit in Belgrade conducted a series of actions against rebels and their families. Murders of women, children and elders, and the flight of 17,000⁴ Kosovo's from their villages burned Serbs, urged Western public opinion, making Kosovo an international problem, opened a file on the matter to the Court for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. Contact Group condemned the Serbian oppression and terrorism of the UÇK and asked Milosevic to withdraw sanctions threatened, and units from Kosovo, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160-March 31⁵, which decreed arms embargo against Yugoslavia. Serb actions also gave a boost to the UÇK, of about 300 fighters to March 1998, rose to 12.000, from Albania and other parts of the world⁶. Ignoring the

² Suffice it to say that in 1998 the school system during Rugova had 266,000 students enrolled in elementary, middle and 16,000 58,000 universities. See *ibid*, p. 75.

³ KLA was repeatedly named as a terrorist group by Robert. S. Gelbard, Special Envoy of Clinton in the Balkans. see Pirjevec J., *Le guerre Jugoslave ...*, fq. 563 dhe TACCONI M., *op cit.*, fq. 102.

⁴ See Pirjevec J., *le Guerre Jugoslave ...*, fq. 564.

⁵[http://daccess-dds-](http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf)

[ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf](http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf)

⁶ See TACCONI M., *Op. Cit.*, p. 98; PIRJEVEC J., *Le guerre jugoslave...*, p. 564; RIFF D., *Kosovo perduto*, in *Sulla punta del fucile: sogni democraticie intervento armato*, Fusi orari, Roma, 2007.

warnings of the international community, the Serbs continued their offensive against the UÇK in the summer months, forcing the rebels, a step away from losing to announce on October 8, ceasefire and strategic withdrawal in the forest, along with a measure large Albanian population⁷. While Serbs performed their maneuvers, Europeans and Americans continue negotiations and proposals for an observer mission in the region. The real protagonist of the story was Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State: strong intervention in Kosovo, to give new purpose Atlantic Alliance. With the demise of the Soviet Union, in fact, had failed a little bit defensive nature of NATO, which is likely to be an observer in the new global reality: for Albright, can become the means with which to affirm the superiority of State United in the world and in Europe. After the mission in Bosnia, in Kosovo was offered the possibility of a new intervention outside the box to ensure the stability of the region. NATO action gave so a humanitarian sense, especially in public opinion, which was the only way to stop cleaning ethnic Serb, put an end to forced migration of Albanians and to prevent it, to have an ethnic balance in neighboring countries, the risk of new conflicts. Kosovo marked the birth of the doctrine of "responsibility to protect", which was debated in the international court⁸. Washington did this by dominated by its European allies: 24 September 1998 NATO Council appointed supreme commander Wesley Clark for his launch warning activation (ACTEARN), in which commanders are authorized in the Atlantic Alliance to identify all resources

⁷ << According to the UNHCR, 50,000 sought refuge in the forest, while at least 40,000 fled to Albania, Montenegro and Serbia same. [...] According to a report by Human Rights Watch, in this period were killed 1500100 Kosovars and Serbs, 45,000 homes were destroyed, about 500 villages and settlements were given >> flames. Pirjevec J., *Le Guerre Yugoslav*, p. 575.

⁸ [Http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/tema/wlgo/ajo/palmisan.htm](http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/tema/wlgo/ajo/palmisan.htm)), Jura Gentium I (2005), 1; ZOLO D., *L'intervento umanitario armato fra etica e diritto internazionale*,

(<http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/topics/wlgo/it/kosovo.htm>) Jura Gentium III(2007),1; RIFF D., *Op. Cit.*

needed for an air intrusion⁹. Meanwhile war threats were alternating diplomatic efforts: Holbrooke, the mediator in the conflict in Bosnia, negation an agreement with Milosevic, under which the latter would have to cease offensive in Kosovo, bringing troop levels as early as fighting, cooperate with the Hague Tribunal for war crimes, to enable the return of refugees home, allow access to international observers appointed to monitor compliance with OCSE Pact resume discussions with the Kosovo's for the peaceful settlement of disputes¹⁰. Milosevic agreed, and NATO, to avoid false promises of Belgrade, October 15 passed the order Activation order (ACTORD), which contained the Action Plan for air strikes against Yugoslavia. The threat brought results. Milosevic drew 4,000 people from the special police units from Kosovo and ACTORD remained frozen. The main investigations proceeded in early November, when NATO forces staged Extraction Force 1,800 people, who settled in the north of Macedonia, who had the duty to assist officials OCSE-that had been in a dangerous condition.

Italy, which after Dayton was riarfruar with Serbia, was actively involved in all phases, paying a high price in the inner part of the Atlantic Alliance guidelines. After the elections for the euro, enlargement of NATO and Kosovo issues, Prodi government lost confidence on October 7, 1998. In the days that followed, Italy had two new political formations of two divisions: From Communist PRC formed by Italian communists, while Forza UDEUR Italy. New groups of MPs supported, on October 22 the new government D'Alema, along with the rest of the Olive's coalition: This choice was motivated by respect and commitments from Italy in the international context and in the months that followed, the government moved on these guiding lines. The situation in Kosovo turned in weight in January 1999, when, in retaliation action KLA and

⁹ See Pirjevec J., *ibid*, fq. 570-572; Bozzo L., C. SIMON-Belli, *Op Cit*, Fq.. 63-63.

¹⁰ See the statement of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana on September 24, 1998 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm>)

Serbian police makes a massacre in the town of Racks. The Contact Group was keen then to recent diplomatic efforts, despite Washington preferred to take action directly in NATO. The forum was convened in France, in the town of Rambouillet, in a tense atmosphere, where the delegation of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci led by the head, and he refused to sit Yugoslav at the same table, forcing agents to conduct separate interviews. The aim of the Americans was to transform Rambouillet in case justifying the war: to propose a peace plan acceptable to the Albanians, but not for the Serbs, having the opportunity to accuse those who have violated the agreement and pass the word to NATO. In fact it was so¹¹. The plan provided for a period of three years, in which Kosovo, although it was subject to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, will be under the auspices of the Atlantic Alliance, the guarantor of self-Albanian and respect for minorities, at the end of three years, a conference International will decide the fate of the region. What I did was unacceptable plan "*outbuildings*" or annexes: NATO¹² will have immunity in the performance of his duties, freedom of movement throughout the territory of Yugoslavia and could use all the roads, railways and airports, without having to pay no taxes¹³. Americans must face two European allies, who crossed the floor against the proposal of Foreign Minister Dini, giving hypothesis NATO occupation troops, which the Kosovo's, refused to accept a plan. Albright then intervenes at the last moment, the demand for ratification of the agreement by the Security Council would give the possibility to combine the ranks of KFOR (the international military force in Kosovo) and troops from other countries, mainly Russia. Also, more

¹¹ See SCOGNAMIGLIO Pasini C., Il Governo D'Alema nacque per rispettare NATO The letter, written by former defense minister in June Corriere della Sera 7, 2001, ([Http :/ archiviostorico.corriere.it/2001/giugno/07/governo_Alema_nacque_per_rispettare_co_0_0106076045.shtml](http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2001/giugno/07/governo_Alema_nacque_per_rispettare_co_0_0106076045.shtml)). Shih gjithashtu D'Alema M, intervistë RAMPINI F., Kosovo: Gli italiani e la Guerra, Mondadori, Milano, 1999.

¹² Ibidem , fq. 592-593.

¹³ Pirjavec J., *Le Guerre jugosllave* fq.588-599.

importantly, it was proposed that at the end of three years, to determine the status of the region, from which received the "expressed will of the people". The conference was closed on February 23 and is updated after a period of reflection, March 15, the date on which the Albanians signed the plan, while Serbs not. On March 23, began bombing: Italy wanted to demonstrate the ability to honor its commitments, trying to forget the "Waltz" for which she was famous. Rome has participated in attacks by offering its bases, aircraft in flight, a decision that D'Alema has also taken without consulting Parliament, who later received the support of the parliament also. General Staff of the Atlantic Alliance had planned a "blitzkrieg"; however Milošević, << was convinced that air strikes NATO would have given up if Serbia would have the courage to stay for a few days, at most one month, allowing them to seize victory in spite of everything. >> Milosevic also tried to sow discord between Western allies, focusing on Rome and Athens, unlike other countries of NATO, he never withdrew its ambassador from these two cities and not loosen Italian diplomats and expatriates from Belgrade; when he pulled into oblivion Rugova, who commanded to fight against outbreaks, sent him to Italy, where during May D'Alema, also spoke in favor of the NATO mission, the hopes of Milosevic.

Despite these actions and public dispute, the two countries, the Greek and Italian, remained on NATO¹⁴. Meanwhile recovered ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, forcing hundreds of thousands of Albanians in Montenegro to emigrate, particularly in Albania and Macedonia, where Milosevic wanted to detonate the bomb ethnic conflict and thus turn the Balkans into a kind of Vietnam. Only in Macedonia in April were presented 250,000 Kosovo's, while the Serbian population, fueled by Belgrade, created a rift sparking cools. Then NATO should take *Extraction Forxe* contingent to 8,000 units,

¹⁴ Ibidem fq. 601.

providing security¹⁵. The same concern in Western countries, which failed was the annexation of Kosovo was to enable the era. Number in April amounted to 300,000 refugees, most of who were welcomed into private homes¹⁶. Italy, afraid of possible new wave of refugees, decided to act directly in the land of eagles. On 28 March the Presidency of the Council of Ministers gave way *Arcobaleno Mission*¹⁷ mission to create and provide humanitarian aid to refugees, for whom refugee camps were set up, with a receptive capacity for 25,000 people, and a hospital. The mission took place in northern Albania, near the border with Kosovo, to facilitate the return of refugees home¹⁸. Thanks to the insistence of the Italian government in early April NATO engaged in an operation in Albanian territory, called *Allied Arbour*,¹⁹ which ensured the safety performance of humanitarian missions in that country and has supported the Government in the management of refugee emergencies. NATO underestimated the resilience of Milosevic. Under pressure from some countries, including Italy, the Atlantic alliance²⁰ had a much targeted attacks, although they managed to maintain the reduced level of civilian casualties. In May rose in equipment; increased number of flights, the objectives were expanded, in which they returned machinery, power plants, bridges, highways and all other objectives that would enhance productive capacity and economic development. Contrary to general claims NATO, it was not just about bombing if

¹⁵ Unow claimed independence of the Serbian region, while Nano's Socialists thought Kosovo as an internal matter of Yugoslavia

¹⁶ Italy began offering 50 aircraft on 20 and hosted its bases 60% of all Air Force NATO, cf. Pasini SCOGNAMIGLIO C., *La Guerra del Kosovo*, p. 258-265.

¹⁷ SCOGNAMIGLIO Pasini C., *La Guerra del Kosovo*, fq.269-272.

¹⁸ According to the Commissioner of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the end of NATO bombing of 848,000 people had fled from Kosovo. In practice, almost half the entire population was përjashtua. TACCONI M., op cit., P. 141

¹⁹ ibidem, p. 265-269

²⁰ See General Clark's criticism addressed to Germany and Italy and the opinion of the then president Massimo D'Alema Minister in his work cited above., P. 50-51.

Milosevic, after 79 days of continuous attacks, was persuaded to deal with the West for Kosovo, and was forced to soften advice from the threat of an attack on ground potential, the lack of Russian²¹ support by rising protests in several cities, the cohesion of the Western Allies and non-ethnic bombing in neighboring countries.

Ahtisaari Plan was accepted by the Serbian Parliament on 3 June, and was similar to that of Rambouillet, however, does not envisage free movement of NATO in Yugoslavia and emphasized the central role of the UN in the interim government of the region. The plan also respect the territorial integrity of the Federation, demanding the demilitarization of the UçK, NATO presence in military contingent that would keep peace in the region, but in the end there was no reference to talk of Kosovo's independence. The bombing ended on June 10, when the Serbs and NATO generals reached agreement on how the forces evacuation of Belgrade, and replacing those of the Atlantic Alliance. On the same day he was adopted by the Security Council, with one abstention, China, in 1244²², the ex-post legitimizes military action and the presence of an occupying force. The same faith and to UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission) task of reorganizing the civil administration of Kosovo.

The war ended with the return to house 803,913²³ Albanians and flight from the region of around 165,000 Serbs and 70,000 Roma, who suffered their skin acts of revenge killings, burning of houses, looting and other atrocities by Albanian²⁴. Milosevic, meanwhile, was invited to appear in

²¹ Russia, despite its declarations times to warn the West of the actions in Kosovo and Serbia, was in constant contact with the Americans, it has become more interested in the vicinity Regone a look at the Balkans and get the IMF loan to support Milosevic, who, among other things, he was a supporter of Yeltsin rival nationalist

²² TACCONI M., op cit., P. 144

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[ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement](http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement)

²⁴ TACCONI M., op cit., P. 144,

court in The Hague to answer war crimes committed in Kosovo, the Americans had put a reward of \$ 5 million on his head. During the crisis, Italy found itself in a difficult position in both cases, as the international and domestic. In fact the first, D'Alema knew he could do no false steps and to shake off the label of "ex-PCI", which was raised in figure in Washington, in the second, had to deal with the resistance of the majority of its operations performance: more than once the government of D'Alema's endangered lose confidence, forcing Deen constantly to mediate between different parties. D'Alema had merit, according to Sergio Romano, is to accept war as a desire to participate in enhancing the role of the country and wanted to do some good²⁵. So, Italy participated in the bombing and not only active but put provisions in their sockets, and sent his men in NATO operations in Macedonia and Albania organized the mission "Arcobaleno"; did not fall into the trap of Milosevic; recently promoted during the war, dialogue and a peace plan that, although created some "stomach ache" as they called them among Alliance members, when it was proposed to pass then ended in facts. Italy, unlike the former Yugoslav wars, took full responsibility in connection with a crisis at the door of the house, becoming so successful in the management of one of the five areas that were occupied in important areas of Kosovo, becoming the country with the largest contribution to the numerical strength of the Balkan peacekeeping training, and also joined the group of states restricting foreign policy makers, that D'Alema called significantly club. This objective, written by Sergio Romano's, << Italy, despite its government has never ceased to pursue this case >>. Milosevic, as already mentioned, remained in power, and although in Serbia was requested by some parts, even the Orthodox Church, a renewal of the political class²⁶. The West tried to stir up these bad feelings, excluding Serbia by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and from any financial aid until vožd remained in

²⁵ ROMANO S., op cit., P. 270

²⁶ M. D'Alema, op cit., fq. 57-59

power. West knew what it meant Serbia stabilization stabilization in the Balkans²⁷: The only problem was represented by the presence of Milosevic, which, however, cannot rebuild the country, destroyed the economic and productive structure, relying only on their own resources. The biggest problems came after the September elections 2000. Milosevic led to the fraud to maintain power triggering protests: This time, however, was hatched a conspiracy against him, to which was also attended by representatives of Serbian nationalism, police military secret; Forces which in the past had supported. The role of the President of the Federation was replaced then by Vojislav Kostunica (1944), leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), which was the position of moderate nationalist and conservative. Democratic change continued in December, when the mayor of Belgrade, leader Đinđić Democratic Party (DS) European inspired Party, was elected prime minister. It was this which made the arrest Milosevic on 1 April 2001. On June 28, the day of San Vito's, now former vožd surrendered to the ICTY. The next day, Western countries agreed to give Serbia a loan of 1.37 billion dollar²⁸.

Conclusion

After fifty years, during which Italy has been able to benefit from the security provided in the first place by the force of its allies, the Italians realized they must participate in a fight that took place near the borders can say the joint, which came as a result of barbaric acts that violate human values, the consequences of which, more than other allies fell over Italy. However, Italy passed this test. In the military field, the contribution of Italy to create the force that fought and defeated Milosevic, has been the greatest contribution, after that which

²⁷ SCOGNAMIGLIO PASINI C., *La guerra del Kosovo*, fq. 67

²⁸ PIRJEVEC J. in *Le guerre jugoslave...*,fq. 639,

gave the US and France, adding the participation in organizational, logistical and security guarantee, which is dictated by circumstances, hosted on its grounds, most of the attack force. In the field of humanitarian aid which, given the nature of the Kosovo war, was no less important than the contribution related to the war, Italians, soldiers and volunteers supported by the masses of the people, made the largest contribution among separate states, showing among other things, an emergency preparedness and organization skills without imagining. In the diplomatic field, was what was possible that the war be avoided before taking the descent and events during the conflict was intended to gjeleshin shorter routes, without sacrificing the goals of the war, the latter also supports reinsertion of Russia, in the community powerful states, and the return of the UN in the role of guarantor of security? In the political field, was given greater freedom of expression, those in the Italian Parliament and the Italian society, disagreed with the policy for the outside of Italy, followed by the government of that time. Political forces that constituted the parliamentary opposition, showed an increased sense of responsibility.

In the events that led to Italy's participation in the Kosovo War, and during the conflict, D'Alema showed not only courage and skill in political leadership, but played the role of a leader, extremely innovative for the Italian left.

Supporting great Italian government gave NATO, has been crucial, Pee success in the Kosovo War, and creating opportunities to withstand other cases in Europe. Italy, reported a leading figure, large size, and larger throughout the period were in office, which are a reflection of the views and the political class intellectual and Italian foreign policy. For Kosovo, Italy has been and remains a true friend...

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