
Theory of Disarmament in Contemporary Period

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Abstract:

Disarmament is seen as one of the important models of international peace and security, particularly after the Second World War. After Second World War, there was a major shift in international power politics. Power rivalry between the USA and USSR, with different kinds of ideology, resulted in various alliances. These alliances were based on the concept of arms race. It made an international system a fragile one because of the development of nuclear weapons. Instead of balance of power, a new theory emerged, i.e. the theory of balance of terror. This balance of terror, based on nuclear weapons, balances each other and it resulted into an unstable world order. In order to reduce the danger of deadly and sophisticated weapons, the advocates of disarmament came out with various theories. The authors have made an attempt to discuss the pros and cons of each theory so that the world could be saved from unhealthy competitions amongst the major powers. They have visualized that an importance of defending national security lie in disarmament.

Key words: arms race, arms control, cold war, political theory, use of force, strategy, cost and risk, gun vs butter model, NATO, defence expenditure, welfare expenditure, Non-Aligned Movement, non-proliferation treaty, survivability of nation and deterrence.

INTRODUCTION:

The interest in curbing arms race is not hard to understand. The race in arms technology has a destabilizing effect on state's security. Each new invention in offensive and defensive weapons leads to instability and, hence, could be cause of unwanted conflict. First and second world wars are notable examples. It is generally accepted by strategic analysts that more "total wars" and more "lethal weapons" have enhanced tremendously the attraction of peace. In the search for a peaceful world, nations have turned to measures to control or elimination of armaments. Therefore, under contemporary circumstances a real possibility to find a common interest with a potential opponent is to be found in the area of the stabilization of the military balance by means of limiting the arms race.¹

Many attempts were made towards the attainment of peace and security. Of these attempts, the Holy Alliance, Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907, the League of Nations and United Nations are the outstanding examples. This search for international peace and order have been carried on three different media : (a) limitation of the destruction and anarchical tendencies of international politics; (b) transformation of international politics by eliminating its destructive and anarchical tendencies altogether; and (c) accommodation of divergent interests by depriving the destructive and anarchical tendencies of international politics of their national objectives.² Of these attempts to achieve peace through limitation the most persistent approach has been disarmament.

Disarmament:

Disarmament or the control of armaments has become the most critical issue of contemporary period. The nations soon engaged themselves in this effort after Second World War when they established the United Nations Organization (UNO). Disarmament, then, was to be a consequence of the UN

structure maintaining peace and security. Disarmament is the means for the abolition, reduction or control for the purpose of ending the arms race. Today, disarmament means everything from total elimination of all the weapons to the regulation or control of offensive and defensive weapons. Before examining the various theories of disarmament it is essential to mention various terms related to it. These terms are general disarmament, local disarmament, quantitative disarmament, qualitative disarmament, conventional disarmament and comprehensive and general disarmament. All these terms indicate the inherent tendencies of nations to establish such international order where all human and material instrumentalities of warfare would be abolished. As a consequence, the world would a weapon-ridden world. It also rejects the well accepted view “if you want peace, be prepared for war.” The advocates of disarmament visualize that the growing armament race would lead to an unhealthy trend in curbing the most destructive element of war. Hence, it works for the establishment of a stable and harmonious condition of peace through disarmament and not by increasing arms. The necessity of peace against war, prosperity, morality against violence, social-political order against anarchy and confidence against terror weapons (nuclear weapons) enhance a positive step to obtain the goal of disarmament. In fact, there are well established theories of disarmament in international relations.

Political Theory of Disarmament

The theory depends upon nations perception about war. To the political decision makers, the important issues are: (a) the cost of nuclear war; (b) the cost of a conventional war if nuclear weapons are outlawed; (c) the cost of defence in peace time and (d) the probability of a break out of a nuclear war. These issues depend upon the decision makers how carefully strategies have always influenced the character of war in the contemporary strategic environment. The formulation of strategy is more or less, based upon three basic assumptions:

- (a) Political objective behind military forces:** The political goals of different nations have always varied widely. Every nation wants to secure cherished national traditional and distinct ways of life, sovereignty, status and wealth. Security ensures protection of values previously acquired, and the degree of security rises or falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack or to defeat it. Security in an objective sense, the absence of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.³ In its widest sense, security comprises every action by which a society seeks to assure its survival to reassess its aspiration internationally.⁴ Though a highly variable concept, it is difficult to divorce security from other political designs like conquest, domination, economic sway, religious and political evangelism, and the reform of the international system itself.
- (b) Deployment of forces to realize objectives:** There is an intimate relationship between the first and second assumptions i.e. political goal and the deployment of forces are closely inter-related. The pursuance of political goals largely influences the military deployment of a state i.e., where military forces are to be located and what forces are available for deployment.
- (c) Use of force in case of hostilities:** This involves some general considerations. Can a scientific theory of the political objectives of military forces or of their deployment be built up? According to Clausewitz, it is not possible to do so. But simultaneously, he provided a list of categories where wars may be analyzed and compared. Clausewitz's view did not confine war merely to a struggle between two political communities of groups of communities but extended it to a contest between violence. As he saw it the violence involved in war had three ingredients. The first was physical force. Before the industrial revolution, physical force was

related to manpower i.e. the military strength of a nation depended upon the size of army it deployed in the battlefield. The second ingredient was morale. Clausewitz stated that the better motivated an army, the better would be its performance in the field. The third, ingredient of violence was what Clausewitz called the commander's genius for war. By that he meant the commander's skill in choosing the proper moment to fight and inspiring and maneuvering troops.

- (d) Strategy:** The appearance of nuclear weapons has forced urgent rethinking on all these aspects. No doubt military innovation influenced the conduct of war even before 1945, but the nuclear revolution has come much more swiftly and the degree of destructive power that nuclear armaments have placed in the hands of political leaders is far greater. This consideration has immensely influenced the traditional strategy, which could not be adopted to nuclear weapons leisurely through trial or error. In the words of Harkabi, in the nuclear age, "strategy has been transformed into the art of non-war, of prevention of war. Formerly, defined as the skillful use of violence, it has become the skillful non-use of force. Prevention of war is achieved by the threat of violence, i.e., by the threat of retaliation in response to a provocation. Strategy has changed from the art of employing violence into the art of threatening violence, which is the art of deterrence."⁵
- (e) Costs and risks:** There is a vast difference between the traditional strategy and the nuclear strategy in relation to the political and military costs and risks involved in war. The cost of the conventional battlefield is a function of military causal ties, equipment lost or damaged, civilian casualties that result from fighting and the expense of mobilizing, deploying and maintaining the force. Although cost is an important variable at the conventional level, it is not as paramount as it is at the

nuclear level—simply because there is no possibility of annihilating an entire civilization in a matter of days or even hours. History clearly demonstrates that decision makers are willing, under the right circumstances, to accept costs associated with conventional war. One reason for this is that the conventional war accumulates in a gradual manner and is therefore difficult to anticipate in advance. The classic example of this is World War I, where there was little appreciation beforehand of the losses that lay ahead.⁶

The risk which deters conventional war is the “fear of being beaten”. In other words, at the conventional level, the deterring risk is that of victory going to the other side. The difference between this and the risk at the nuclear level is considerable; nuclear destruction inevitably affects both sides in varying degrees but conventional victory must go to one side only.⁷ Since victory is dependent on the capabilities of offence and defence, risk at conventional level is a function of the capabilities of both the attacker and the defender.⁸ Therefore, conventional deterrence is a direct function of specific military strategies.⁹

Given nuclear war’s immense destructive potential, one cannot imagine that there will be a victor. The concept of victory in such a war has no meaning as both sides will be humiliated. In the words of Brodie, “everything about the bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantastically great.¹⁰ Because of the immense destruction involved in a nuclear war, it can no longer be regarded as the continuation of policy by other means. In other words, nuclear weapons have made nuclear war unviable. Hence, the advocates of disarmament perceive that the only political solution to solve the military problems among nations is to abolish the very instrument of war, i.e. weapons.

(f) Diplomacy: Another important feature of this debate centres on the relationship between war and diplomacy. While the two are not wholly separate, diplomacy i.e., the management of international relations by negotiations has usually been preferred for resolving conflict situations. The possibility of war bends diplomats to their task. Negotiations are often carried out with the threat of violence lurking in the background. Diplomacy has the same root as strategy. The “anarchic” international system that gives all its members a measure of independence and confers upon each a corresponding measures of insecurity.¹¹

Three basic requirements are essentials for successful diplomacy. The first is a common frame of reference. The parties concerned must agree on what is negotiable and on how to proceed in the matter. The second requirement is that a diplomatic settlement must be beneficial to the parties involved. The third is the political will to agree. But even with a common frame of reference and terms that affect all parties equally, agreements do not come automatically. The diplomatic process, in this respect is like a piece of machinery no matter how good the working order of its parts, it requires a source of energy to run. Political will is the gasoline, or the electricity, of diplomacy.¹² With the passage of time, three different approaches have emerged in finding solution to the problem of peace.

i. Traditional diplomacy: This approach spanned the decades between the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The most important principle on which traditional diplomacy was based was the immutable sovereignty of the nation-state. Traditional diplomacy worked successfully after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. At the Congress, the principal members of the international system emphasize that the main objective of their foreign policies was maintenance of

international equilibrium so that war would not engulf the whole of Europe. The supporters of this approach received a setback when, at the beginning of the 19th century, Napoleon's continental theory plugged Europe into the largest conflict it had been ever seen.

- ii. **Liberal diplomacy:** The advocates of liberal diplomacy argued that the greatest of problem could be solved by political reforms. The emphasis was on reduction and even abolition of national armament. In their view armaments led to liberal diplomacy was most clearly reflected at the meeting held in the aftermath of the Second World War.
- iii. **Nuclear diplomacy:** Both of the above approaches were alive in historical memory at the dawn of the nuclear age. But as the advent of nuclear weapons began to influence the course of national strategy it also became necessary to re-examine the role of diplomacy. Today, diplomacy and strategy have become mutually inter-dependent. As President Kennedy stated. "Diplomacy and defence are no longer distinct alternatives, one to be used where the other fails. They must complement each other. Accordingly, strategy is no longer implemented as in the past i.e. after the diplomatic efforts have failed. Its principal task is to stand behind diplomacy, to aid and support it. Strategy, today, is primarily an instrument of diplomacy in times of peace and not only an instrument of war. The non-use of military force implies that its use lies mainly in diplomacy."¹³

This proximity between strategy and diplomacy is also reflected in the influence of frequent technological changes on the means of warfare as well as on diplomacy. Innovations in weaponry and changes in international situation create new problems for diplomacy. Indeed, technology probably influences diplomacy

more than diplomacy influences technology. Diplomacy must, therefore, strive to keep pace with technological change, adjusting to it and utilizing it both for its general needs and in solving the problems created by technology itself.¹⁴ Thus, diplomacy acts as an important tool in curbing political tensions among nations and then works for the secured international environment. This could be possible when nations are disarmed.

Economic Theory of Disarmament

The theory stresses on the assumption that humankind can secure a very large amount of funds which is wasted on the dangerous production of armaments. History indicates us there emerges considerable rise in defence expenditures before great conflicts but during peacetime defence spending tends to decline. The debate is on defence spending versus welfare or development expenditure. In other words, the theory is stated in the form of gun and butter model. Studies in this context reveal that defence and welfare expenditures literally present competing budgetary priorities for getting a bigger slice out of the cake to the detriment of other.¹⁵

Defence expenditures generally mean public expenditures which can be utilized for military purposes. Globally recognized bodies such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization yields the payments made to the military and civilian personnel of armed forces, military health, education, infrastructure, acquisition, operations, maintenance and sustainment, research and development as well as military aid to other countries, civil defence, border security and the expenses for official paramilitary organizations as the accepted defence expenditure.¹⁶

Welfare expenditure takes into account the social nature and structure of nation. It generally consists of education and health expenditures, social security expenditures, expenditures for supporting the children and the family, transfer payments

and the expenditures made in the context of public support for the low-income mass against the unfair distribution of income.¹⁷

In the words of Wolfe and Coloumbis, a reduction in nation' armaments release sizeable funds, which could be transferred to programmes designed to improve the general welfare of nation's subjects. In the timeless dilemma of choosing between "gun and butter" or "defence and welfare", the advocates of disarmament opt for the latter." In macroeconomics, the gun versus butter model is an example of a simple, production possibility frontier. It reflects the relationship between a nation's investment in defence and civilian goods. Here, the nation has two options. It can buy either guns or butter or a combination of both. This can be seen as analogy for choices between defence and welfare spending in more complex economies. The "gun or butter" model is generally used as a simplification of national spending as a part of gross domestic product.

Robert Gilpin carries the discussion of guns versus butter to a different level of macroeconomics, i.e., the indifference curve. According to him, an increase in the resources of a nation shifts the production possibility frontier outwards while the change in the relative prices of two items (guns for defence and butter for welfare) changes the form of the indifference curve. In other words, how the nation allocates its resources among two items? Econometric and statistical studies verify that defence and welfare budgets are rival figures¹⁸ but it is quite difficult to properly state a universal optimal balance among two.

Still then, defence expenditures influences economic performance through three ways. Ram has classified them as demand side, supply side and security effects.¹⁹ What is important to note that each unit of defence expenditure brings an alternative cost due to the abandoned investment opportunities in the framework of scarcity theory generates supply side effects similar to guns and butter debate. Most of the economists supporting that defence expenditures influence

economy through demand side rally around the Keynesian multiplier effect. It shows a rise in defence spending causes a rise in aggregate demand. Scarcity of resources enhance a rise in aggregate demand which causes a decrease in unemployment through the rise of capital utilization. Hence, an increase in defence spending results in economic growth. The supporters of this view ignore the supply side effects considering the assumption that there are always idle resources in a given economy. Security effects channel refers to the economic value of national defence service yielded by defence expenditures which is a public good economics²⁰ in sense of This case is particularly true for those countries which are more industrialized, developed and modern.

The best known actual usage of the gun versus butter model was applied during Second World War On January 17, 1936, the German Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, said “we can do without butter but, despite all over love for peace, not without arms. One cannot shoot with butter, but with guns.” In the same year Herman Goring echoed the same feeling that “guns will make us powerful and butter will only make us fat.” Guns became more important than butter not only to Germany but also to other European nations because they felt war was imminent and hence preparation for war was necessary.

After Second World War intense rivalry between the USA and the USSR has made the strategists to reconsider the debate on guns versus butter. The fragile strategic international environment was responsible for it. The ideological differences led to Cold War which in turn led to the development of military power. This could be seen from the developments that took place in both the countries. In the words of former US. President, Eisenhower, “every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who are hungry and are not fed, those who are cold and unclothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone, it is spending the sweat of its labourers,

the genius of its scientists, the hope of its children.” The expenditure on battleship and planes may well be more profitably and usefully spent for building hospitals or increasing food production or factories. Similarly, the former United States President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society Programmes in the 1960s is an example of the guns versus butter model. While Johnson wanted to continue New Deal programmes, but at the same time he was too much preoccupied with arms race during Cold War and Vietnam War. These put strains on the economy and hampered his great Society programmes. Similarly, Margaret Thatcher said that “the Soviet put guns over butter, but we put almost everything over guns.” One thing was clear that the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a nation was the development of the military power to such a stage where the people and the development sectors suffered heavily. Thus, what one can infer from the disarmament approach that overall development of a nation should be a first priority and military power should be a part of the developmental process. In other words, the every increasing defence budgets of various nations need elimination through disarmament and thereby release funds for development purposes.

The evaluation of gun versus butter model is more necessary for developing countries. For a developing countries the defence expenditures should be kept at a level so as to provide the minimum necessity of military power until that time when the economic progress and qualified human capital formation is matured. Till then, a nation should aim to prioritize welfare expenditures, particularly the education in order to reach a human capital formation, national technology and defence industry that would create a multiplier effect over defence resources.

The development problems faced by the developing countries were how to cope with new strategic international environment in the form of Cold War. The answer was provided by Jawaharlal Nehru, Yasser Arafat and Marshal Tito. They

emphasized that the economic development was more important than military power. With the passage of time their view prevailed over other developing nations and in due course we say the emergence of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a third force, focusing on welfare expenditure rather than on defence expenditure. Promoting welfare planning can ensure a nation against the possible danger of economic depression. By simulating world public opinion in favour of welfare development one can ensure the use of extra available funds for other developmental purposes.

This lead to an important question how nations perceives security? Security is a feeling and an attitude. It would be a wrong assumption that armaments alone provide security. Security without prosperity really tantamount to human existence without life. In the words of Pandit Nehru and Robert Mc Namara, “security is development and development is security.” They are the two sides of a single coin. One cannot exist without the other.

Thus, it can be said that the advocates of disarmament school believe that real economic prosperity can result after disarmament when nations do not waste their resources for the sake of developing military powers. Keeping the defence cost low will boost the nations to use extra resources for developing purposes. Even disarmament adjustments alone can secure real economic and development gains that the advocates of disarmament hope to secure.

Moral Theory

The third and philosophically effective arguments in favour of disarmament is the moral theory. It holds that war and also the preparation for it are morally wrong. It is an evil and immoral and hence armament as the means of war are evil. Armaments, particularly weapons of mass destruction, are threat to humankind. Advocates of peace movements view that nuclear weapons are source of threat to human community with catastrophic consequences. One cannot easily forget the atomic

bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Thus, the World Council of Churches, the International Peace Bureau and other communities of faith have consistently called for nuclear disarmament on moral and ethical grounds. There is much speculation among the public that nuclear weapons have not and will not bring complete security. Nuclear weapons and human security cannot co-exist. Thus, the advocates of this theory believe that the use, threat to use or even to possess nuclear weapons by nations is unethical.

With the advent of cold war, it was widely speculated by strategic critics that in nuclear war there will no victor and one will see the end of civilization. The same view is reflected in various peace movement, organizations, particularly the Catholic Church and World Council of Churches. These organizations believe in the dignity of every human life, value of creation and intrinsic interconnectedness of the two.

Moral obligation flows from the following factors:²¹

- the obligation for governments to provide for genuine, inclusive human security-at the very minimum-to ensure the survival of the human community and of the earth.
- a prohibition on the use of or threat to use weapons so powerful that they put at the risk the very survival of the human species and the rest of creation – the willingness to inflict massive destruction on civilian populations and on future generation undermines our deepest human and ethical values; and
- a prohibition on the expenditure for weapons that threaten the very existence of life, of financial resources necessary to meet the basic human needs or to restore the integrity of creation from an ethical perspective. This massive expenditure would be seen as a theft from the poor and a violation of our obligation to protect the environment for the sake of all life.

Furthermore, the advocates of this theory believe in just war theory to nuclear weapons. The emphasis is on the following:

- wars must be fought with right intention, i.e., restore peace or to defend violated rights and must be fought with a view to negotiated peace, not unconditional surrender.
- there must be strong probability of success;
- conduct in war must be just and civilians cannot be deliberately targeted;
- proportionality-the good accomplished must outweigh the evil.²²

The moral obligation is also quite implicit in Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Article VI states that nuclear nations promise to undertake good faith negotiations on “effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” In 2005, in the NPT Review Conference, Archbishop Migiliore, the Vatican representative, said “The Holy See has never countenanced nuclear deterrence as a permanent measure, nor does it today, when it is evident that nuclear deterrence drives the development of ever newer nuclear arms race, thus preventing genuine nuclear disarmament.” The nations on various occasions violated the provisions of the treaty. Thus, the possession of nuclear weapons, their development, modernization and testing have been immoral and ethically untenable.

Twenty-five years ago, when the cold war was at its peak, the US Catholic Bishops issued their historical pastoral letter on war in a nuclear age, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response”. “The peaceful pastoral” reaffirmed the condemnation of nuclear weapons by the Second Vatican Council. The nuclear arms race is one of the greatest curses on the human race; an act of aggression against the poor and a folly which does not provide the security it promises.²³

As such, the moral argument constitutes indirectly an extension of the peace theory of disarmament. Peace, sustainable human development and the integrity of the nation must be given priority over arms industry because it creates insecurity. The human community must be fully prepared for the pursuit of national and international security.

But the above theory is met with certain criticism. The critics argue that war in self-defence is always moral and hence production of armament is also moral. The International Law or the UN Charter permits the nations to keep weapons for self-defence. There is also a practical limitation of this theory. Moral theory suggests unilateral disarmament as the ultimate goal to secure disarmament. But, the critics regard unilateral disarmament as an utopian idea. As such, moral theory in favour of disarmament is undoubtedly philosophically sound but practically it is not possible. The only positive feature is that it can prepare the nations for a future general and comprehensive disarmament.

The Peace Theory

There is co-relation between the peace and moral theories of disarmament. The advocates of peace theory believe in the elimination of weapons as the instrument of war and the moral theory emphasizes the elimination of weapons as the immoral means of immoral war.

The history of elimination or control of weapons have been linked to the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The increased destructiveness of weapons, coupled with their relatively even distribution between two hostile camps, seems to improve prospects for extended peace. The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons suggests that they will not be employed on a large scale since the retaliation would be too high. In this thought, there was an element of reassurance for both the USA and USSR during the Cold War period. It was, therefore, felt necessary for the United Nations, to take step against these highly destructive weapons and to save the world

from the holocaust of a nuclear war. In fact, Article I of the UN Charter states that the primary purpose of the body is the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 26 goes on to state that this purpose should be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

Disarmament, like collective security and balance of power, has been regarded as the alternative model of international peace and security. But disarmament constitutes the direct approach to peace and in this sense is more developed concept than collective security. Collective security seeks to limit war or aggression after its occurrences through the collective efforts of all the nations. In the words of Benjamin V. Cohen "armament aggravates tensions and fear among nations. By releasing tension and fear, disarmament should facilitate and strengthen the process of peaceful settlements."

Strategic experts believe that armament leads to war and disarmament can lead to peace. Arms race also leads to militarism and is regarded as one of the important causes of war. Thus, arms race causes tension among nations and nations are imbued with a feeling of insecurity. World War I and II are notable examples of this. Armament also influences the military doctrines of these nations. For example, during the cold war period, there was much difference in their strategic or military policies. This is stated as follows:

US Arms Control Doctrine	Soviet Military Doctrine
Retaliatory of Second Strike	War and Victory
Strategic Parity	First Strike
Stability	Equal Security
	No reference to stability

With such different doctrines, disarmament had totally different meanings for the two parties.

The advocates of peace theory emphasize that there has been considerable change in the attitude of USA and the USSR. In the 20th century, they have moved from competition to

collaboration. The impact was clearly visible in the disarmament field. In early 1954, Premier Georgi Malenkov echoing President Eisenhower, stated that “the availability of thermonuclear weapons on both sides meant that the world war would lead to the destruction of world civilization.”²⁴ In 1956 Khrushchev enunciated the principle of peaceful co-existence. Similarly, in an attempt to reduce the military risk of nuclear power and improve the climate for East-West negotiations, President Eisenhower proposed the Atoms for Peace plan in the spring of 1953. As a result, disarmament discussion continued to centre on comprehensive agreements which included prohibition on the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons as well as restrictions on non-nuclear armed forces. Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence also coincided with President Kennedy’s strategy for peace policy. In 1961 Kennedy warned that “within 60 days of an atomic attack 500 million to 700 million people could perish” and concluded that “sober calculation of the inevitable consequences of nuclear war is an indispensable requirement for pursuing a consistent policy of preventing war.”²⁵ It was widely felt that there could be no gain and no victory for the power that provoked a thermonuclear exchange.

The peace theory, further, lay stresses on the public perception or role of citizens. Citizens, today, not only need information but also they need empowerment. They must feel that they can properly assess the utility or non-utility of weapons. In the era of globalization and emergence of more and more democratic institutions, citizens require much more information than they have had in the past and, hence, able to participate in difficult nuclear decisions. There is little doubt that citizens have the right to express their views and make pressure on the governments to get rid of nuclear weapons – weapons which are antithesis of peace. Hence, by exercising that right they can turn the peace theory of disarmament into practice.

Thus, one can agree with Columbis and Wolfe that “arms and arms races can itself be the cause of bloody and costly wars. The possession of arms definitely increases the probability that they will be used. Consequently, an arms race heightens the psychosocial insecurity of nations rather than providing them with a sense of security against attack.”


There are certain critics who argue that theoretically the peace theory looks convincing but in reality one finds difficult to implement the various provisions of disarmament. They argue that political rivalry and not weapons leads to war. Weapons are only tool and no amount of dialectical fitness has yet been able to prove that weapons cause war. Many feels that weapons can act as a deterrent force. Equally important is the tendency of the nation’s will to war and hence, weapons can lead to war. History is full of example of ambitious king of extending their territories and destroying the resources of the enemy by indulging in war. In the ultimate analysis, the critics argue that disarmament cannot alone provide peace and security. International harmony can be a source and not a product of disarmament.

CONCLUSION

The various theories of disarmament indicate one common fact that in the given present political and military realities of international politics, weapons cannot be completely eliminated. What is possible, however, is reduction and neutralization of the danger of nuclear weapons. Still, these theories form a formidable thesis in favour of disarmament. All these arguments are inter-related and interdependent. World public opinion fully recognizes the need of a sustainable theory. All the statesmen, philosophers, jurists, scholars and scientists had accepted the need for securing an elimination or at least a reduction of weapons. Armaments do not constitute the main cause of war and disarmament alone can never lead to enduring international peace and security.

Disarmament has been closely linked to the technological development race. There are two different opinions on this issue. First, it is true that real economic prosperity will be possible after disarmament when the nations may accept complete civil technology and do not attempt to waste their resources by monitoring the actions of each other. Further, disarmament can keep the defence cost low and nations can use extra resources for development purposes. Second, weapons have become technologically so sophisticated that it is difficult to fully comprehend the intricacies of their performance. The high intensity of technological innovation had greatly influenced the security doctrines of the nation's participating in various negotiations. Technological developments have encouraged more and more states to possess the technical know – how to make at least rudimentary nuclear weapons.

One basic question is why do nations enter into disarmament negotiations. As articulated by the advocates of disarmament, they feel the survivability of human being and nations are of utmost importance. This could be possible in a secured and stable international system. Survivability of a nation could be seen from the following chart.



The above thesis contains two proportions:

- 1- In case of arms race, international security is in a delicate position and hence it can lead to war if differences among nation are not sorted out.
- 2- In the second case, the fear of arms race or development of the weapons and intention of the nations can lead to disarmament and will provide stability and security.

Thus, the advocates of disarmament believe that one of the goals of disarmament is to reduce the risks of war. The goal remains as valid as ever. What it requires on the part of the

major actors is that they should give some coherence and structure to an inter-state relationship that involves the risk of war. Disarmament can occur in a tension ridden situation because contrary to the various theories of disarmament, armaments are a consequence, not a cause, of political tension and so disarmament can occur only in the wake of political agreement. Overall, disarmament is possible only when power rivalry is expressed in political rather than military terms. Therefore, the option is restricted to a political rather than military solution.

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