

China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Security Challenges and Sequence of Processes of Domestic Resistance

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Abstract

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which envisages economic growth and development in Pakistan. This corridor faces some challenges especially related to its security. The first and foremost security challenge it has is nonetheless related to the Indian factor due to multiple reasons. The question arises that what are the dominant causes and sequence of processes of domestic resistance to CPEC in Baluchistan and other key areas of conflict around the project? This paper argues that New Delhi has always supported the insurgent group in Balochistan to interrupt this key project mainly to counterbalance the growing influence of China and destabilize Pakistan's economic growth. Previously India has been involved in various mysterious activities in Baluchistan such as supporting terrorist for killing and kidnapping of Pakistani and Chinese workers.

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Furthermore, the paper argues that weak domestic policies of Pakistan also encouraged and gave space to insurgent group to conduct such activities. Islamabad needs to strengthen the political Institutions and, should use the advanced method of intelligence gathering and sharing to secure CPEC.

Key words: CPEC, India's response, Insurgency in Balochistan, Pak-China Relation, Belt and Road initiative

INTRODUCTION:

China has taken an initiative to achieve economic goals by investing in infrastructure projects in the developing states.¹The foremost investment of China in Pakistan is CPEC which is the most important project between both sates, however, it also faces serious challenges. It has also increased the probability of conflicts between the interests of various regional actors. On the one hand, it will strengthen Pakistan's economy and will increase the influence of China in the region. It will resolve Pakistan's issue such as an energy crisis, lack of communication projects, and unemployment. On the other hand, India is concerned about the future of CPEC, and wants to enhance own political and economic domination in the region. However, "Chinese are relaxed about the rise of India' but 'the Indians are much more nervous about the rise of China".²They think that the domination cannot be possible without encountering the influence of China and the economic growth of Pakistan. New Delhi has supported insurgency in Balochistan to sabotage this project such as the ruin of the gas pipeline, killing and kidnapping of Pakistani and Chinese workers, it has been corroborated by Indian officials. It also confirmed by Pakistan top officials that India's intelligence wing RAW is vandalizing the CPEC project.³Some scholar argues that the Indian foreign policy main objective is to become a great power in the region and it can be achieved by any means.⁴We argue that India has tried to support the insurgent group in Balochistan to interrupt this key project to counterbalance China's influence and destabilize Pakistan's economic growth. We further argue that weak domestic policies of Pakistan also encouraged and gave space to insurgent group to conduct such activities. The Musharaf regime killed Akbar Bugti

while the civilian governments did not focus on social welfare program nor there a strong political institution to monitor the government's performance.

Recently scholars have begun to pay attention to the positive and negative impact of CPEC but approach to explore the underlying thinking of India's policy towards this economic corridor is rare. Some writers argue that the CPEC aim is peace and prosperity in the region and does not target any state nor have to promote conflicts with neighbors.⁵ While some argues that this project is primarily geopolitical rather than geo-economic.⁶ The main objective of this paper is that to date, sabotage of this project and its reasons have not yet been discussed in scholarly papers. It seems that this question "What are the dominant causes and sequence of processes of domestic resistance to CPEC in Baluchistan and other key areas of conflict around the project?" has probably become more salient because more have concentrated on the narrow topics of CPEC but they have ignored the underline issue. The aforementioned arguments are predicated by using the system and sub-system theoretical approach of neoclassical realism. The system-level approach focuses on India support of insurgent group while the sub-system focuses on domestic weak policies of Pakistan. Using this approach our analysis shows that the External factor is less dominant than internal one. We have used the case study of the Balochistan province of Pakistan. This paper aims to view the CPEC and its prospects in detail. Further, it will explain the security threats it has and possible solutions to the ongoing problem attached to it. This paper will help both China and Pakistan's policymakers and governments to understand the intention of India and to secure CPEC.

OVERVIEW OF CPEC

To understand the CPEC we have to know the Pak-China relationship. Both states' relationship began in 1950; Pakistan was the first Islamic state who recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC). The relation got strengthened by the time; Islamabad cast a vote in favor of Beijing to restore its right in the United Nations. In response, China did help Pakistan in the 1965 war when Washington refused to give aid to Pakistan. However, China did not provide military support to Pakistan against India in 1971, and Pakistan lost

East Pakistan (Bangladesh).⁷ However, after 1970 the all-weather relationship further strengthened. Beijing did help in a different kind of projects such as the Karakoram Highway (KKH), the Heavy Mechanical Complex (HMC) and Heavy Forge and Foundry (HFF) in Taxila, the Machine Tool Plant in Karachi, and the Gwadar port in Balochistan.⁸ To cement the economic cooperation and to remove the trade barrier by reducing tariffs and to increase the trade of goods and services with each other both states signed the Free Trade Agreement. The First time China and Pakistan signed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2006, it came being into practice on July 2007. It had contained the phase I and phase II, the first phase had ended in 2012 and the second had started in 2013. The total trade volume in 2006 was US\$ 3.5 billion, which speedily increased to US\$ 14.3 billion in 2013.⁹ Further, recently Beijing and Islamabad have been signed the second stage FTA agreement during Prime Minister Imran Khan's visit to China on 28th April 2019. Under this agreement, Pakistan will export goods to China such as leather, chemicals, auto parts, rubber, plastic, furniture, seafood, and meat. Due to zero percent on 313 tariff lines, it will increase the country exports earning by U.S \$500m within 18 months.¹⁰

Further, to invigorate the all-weather relationship, China started the CPEC project. It is an energy and infrastructure development project. It was launched in April 2015 when the president and chairperson of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping visited Islamabad and met with Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The Potential areas of development included Special Economic Zone (SEZ), to upgrade the existed railway line, new energy sector establishment, and construction of new roads and railway lines to connect the major parts of Pakistan. In simple words, CPEC is the name of regional connectivity, which will connect Beijing and Islamabad with the other Central Asian States. This project starts from China's autonomous province Xinjiang to ends at Gwadar port in Balochistan. CPEC have divided into three phases, short-term, mid-term, and long-term projects, the development of economic zones is the most important phase. The Initial value of CPEC was a \$46 billion package of Chinese aid to investment in Pakistan, although total had reached \$62 billion.¹¹

The total length of CPEC from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar port is 3000 KM. Geographically it is divided into five parts which cover all provinces of Pakistan means it passes through Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Balochistan, and semi-provincial Gilgit Baltistan. It starts from Gwadar port in Balochistan and goes toward Karachi and other parts of Sind province, and then passes through Punjab province and reaches toward the capital of Pakistan Islamabad. Then passes from Islamabad to other districts of KPK such as Abbottabad, and Mansehra and at last, it reaches to Gilgit Baltistan and where it connects with Xinjiang.¹²

Further; to get access to the natural resources in the region the CPEC will pass through Peshawar to connect the Central Asian Republic states with China and Pakistan. Afghanistan will be connected through Peshawar by Torkham border. The district Dir will be also the shortest way to connect Afghanistan with Pakistan because the distance from Dir lower to Kunar province is only 97.5 km and takes only 3 hours to reach Kunar in Afghanistan.

HOW CPEC IS ESSENTIAL FOR PAKISTAN:

The CPEC is an essential project to enhance Pakistan's economy and to overwhelm the energy crisis, and also for the economic influence of China in the region. The World Bank had mentioned in a report that Pakistan is losing annually US \$18 billion which had equal to 6.5% of GDP in the fiscal year of 2015, due to the power sectors unable to produce sufficient energy.¹³ In 2014 the power station was to produce 22,957.4 MW energy while the total demand was 17000 MW and the shortfall was 4000-5000 MW.¹⁴ In this section, we examine how CPEC have a positive impact on Pakistan's economy, energy, and how can increase the influence of China in the region. The CPEC is divided into three phases; short-term, mid-term, and long-term projects. We have selected short-term projects because it has already been completed and operational. The first project is the Zonergy 9 × 100 MW solar powers, which energized since March 2016 located at Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park in Bahawalpur in Punjab. It has created more than 3000 jobs for the local people and special training, have provided to more than 50 students of the University of Engineering and Technology (UET) and Islamia University of Bahawalpur (IUB).¹⁵

Further, “According to the statistical data, approximately 459 million KWH could be generated in 1 year. Official statistics from GOP (Government of Pakistan) show that the annual amount of electricity consumption in the region is 1,481 million KWH for 13 hospitals, 17 police stations, 7 railway stations, 554 secondary schools, 12 colleges, 4 universities, 130 factories (big and small) and 560,000 households in this region. At present, the electricity generated from Zonergy 3×100 MW solar power plants could meet 30% electricity demand of Bahawalpur region. In addition, Zonergy has paid PKR 1033 million of taxes and levies.”¹⁶ It will further improve the growth of industries and will overcome the energy crisis in Pakistan. It will encourage those capitalists who have shifted their industries to other countries due to the previous shortfall which have affected Rs.14 billion Pakistan’s economy.¹⁷The first priority of the CPEC project is to install energy projects to overcome energy shortfall, to do so the textile industries will achieve 60 % growth, and will produce valuable products.¹⁸According to the statement of the World Bank that Pakistan’s economic growth increased from 5.4 percent in 2017 to 5.8 percent in 2018 due to the CPEC project.¹⁹The CPEC has attracted foreigner investors the state bank of Pakistan have mentioned that due to CPEC the rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2016-17 has increased to 5 % (US\$2.41 billion) which was US\$2.30 billion in 2015-16.²⁰

CPEC has further improved the function of different industries due to overcoming the energy crisis, most industries have been normalized and exporting valuable products, due to which the rate of export has been increased to 12.0 % while the rate of imports has been decreased to 16.6 % which was 48 % at the start of the 2018 financial year.²¹The primary focus is to overcome the energy crisis, the working has expedited on 15 energy projects which can produce 11,110MW, among which 7 projects have already completed and 6 are under construction with a total capacity of 6,910MW. One of the positive impacts is that the tariff of power plants have been reduced from 16 to 1818 PKR to around 8 PKR per unit.²² Further, Gwadar has become a great hub for economic activities due to free zone policy approximately 30 companies have invested with direct investment of about \$474 million.²³ Special Economic Zone (SEZ) plays a very important role in economic development to attract foreign investment that’s the reason both state leaders focus on the development of the

SEZ. The SEZ has already played an important role in China's economy, the open door policy was attracted many investors from different states. Therefore, the government of Pakistan has decided to develop 46 SEZ projects, where four provinces will be 9 SEZ, and Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir for each will total four SEZ, and two for Islamabad capital.²⁴

Further in short term projects, four wind projects have already completed which have added 300MW to the national grid, which will encourage local industries to produce valuable products. The detail of these projects are Dawood wind power a project with the capacity of 50 MW, Sachal an energy wind farm with a capacity of 50MW, and three gorges second wind farm project with the capacity of 100MW, and UEP wind farm project with the capacity of 100MW.²⁵ Due to CPEC's completed projects, the rural population's one of the biggest issues of electricity has resolved somehow the access to electricity in 2015 was 90.3% which increased to 98.8% in 2016. Further, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that (due to CPEC) \$13 billion will be added to Pakistan's GDP.²⁶ The first phase focus was on the energy sector. "Meanwhile, in the second phase, under the incumbent government, agriculture, education, health, water, skill-based education, skill development, transport projects and upgrading of Main Line-1 will be done,"²⁷ Chinese senior official has mentioned that CPEC is beneficial for Pakistan and as well as for the whole region and no one can impair it. He further said that "Sometimes there are reports in the media (against the CPEC) and some people also give their opinion but a large majority knows it is for the betterment of the whole region,"²⁸

Our analysis shows that the CPEC project is not only important for Pakistan but also for China because of its national interest to save time and capital and to easily access to Eurasian states. For example, the shipments from Port of Salalah to Kashgar port by existence way takes 27 days while by CPEC it will take only 7 days, same Shuwaikh Port by existence way to Kashgar it takes 32 days while by CPEC it will take only 8 days.²⁹ It shows that China can easily save transport cost \$1350 (32.9%) to import and export to all of Europe and more than \$1450 (41.4%) in the Middle East.³⁰ Here the finding shows that CPEC will further boost the Pakistan economy and shows that CPEC will strengthen the influence of China in the region,

CPEC provides short access to China to reach Eurasian states in a cheap and secure way.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND TESTING HYPOTHESIS

The main research question is, “What are the dominant causes and sequence of processes of domestic resistance to CPEC in Baluchistan and other key areas of conflict around the project?”. For this purpose, we have developed two hypotheses, which we will explain in this section. To test the hypotheses we have selected neoclassical realism theory that is most suitable in this case. This approach tells us that what factor have more dominant than other, so we have find that the internal factor is more dominant then external one. Neoclassical realism is an approach to foreign policy analysis, and initially developed by Gideon Rose in a 1998 World Politics review article, it is a combination of classical realism and neorealist – particularly defensive realist – theories. The classical realism generally focuses just on 'hard' military power instead of relative economic power and considers international politics instead of domestic. The structural realist such as Kenneth Waltz focuses on the structure of the system instead of the subsystem. The system-level only gives us a complete and comprehensive image of the whole system but cannot give in-depth and rich information about the individual state. Gideon Rose explains, “Neoclassical realists argue that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country's foreign policy; they note, in Thucydides' formula, that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”³¹ The main actors in the process of foreign policymaking are state leaders and elite class; they perceive that relative power is important due to which every state react differently.³²

One of the important significance of neoclassical realism is; it deeply focuses on a unit-level variable purpose to achieve predictive clarity about state foreign policy.³³ And at the same time, it focuses on the system-level variable and argues that international pressure plays an important role in state foreign policy.³⁴ The Neoclassical realists claim to predict specific foreign policy or historical events which neorealist and other class of realist family can't predict, the neorealism has some limitation and can only predict and explain international politics instead of domestic.³⁵ The “Neoclassical realism,

an approach which combines elements of system, structure and domestic politics, of material and ideational factors, need to analyses international relations from a plural perspective. And further, the statesmen developing postures for their nations in often violent competition with others.”³⁶Which here we took the example of Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi’s assertive policies to impair CPEC.

CASE STUDY OF BALOCHISTAN:

Previously New Delhi has been involved in various mysterious activities in Baluchistan such as supporting terrorist for killing and kidnapping of Pakistani and Chinese workers and attacks on different projects. Furthermore, the weak domestic policies of Pakistan also encouraged and gave space to insurgent group to conduct such activities. It is traced with special emphasis given to domestic and international politics. The case of International politics means the involvement of India in Balochistan and domestic politics means the ignorant domestic policies of Pakistan. To test our first argument the primary and secondary sources data have collected from academic papers and contemporary media while the tenure of data is from 2015 to early 2019. To analyze the second argument the data is collected from contemporary media and the tenure of data is 2006-2017.

Testing Case: India Involvement

***Hypothesis 1:** External influences are instigating resource nationalism in Balochistan which is leading to opposition to CPEC*

India is not happy with CPEC, for example, the external affairs Minister of India Sushma Swaraj said that “Prime Minister during his the visit (to China) took up the issue very firmly and spoke very strongly that the CPEC going through POK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) is unacceptable.”³⁷Nicholas Kitchen explains that the state leader always tries to achieve their national interest and for this purpose, they use military and nonmilitary techniques to achieve it.³⁸ In this section, we will explain what is the reality behind the reservation of India and why they want to impair this project. India Prime Minister Narendra Modi has clearly mentioned that India will try to use all-out means to spoil this project which shows that the

intention of India is not positive regarding CPEC and can't see Pakistan as a strong economic state.³⁹ Modi returned back to India after his visit to China and asked the RAW official that how to damage this project, this statement is confirmed by an arrested RAW spy in Pakistan. Also personally confirmed by Modi in his Independence Day speech, as he states, "Today from the ramparts of Red Fort, I want to greet and express my thanks to some people. In the last few days, people of Balochistan, Gilgit, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have thanked me, have expressed gratitude and expressed good wishes for me. The people who are living far away, whom I have never seen, never met — such people have expressed appreciation for Prime Minister of India, for 125 crore countrymen,"⁴⁰ This statement gives a birth to the question that why people of mentioned areas thanked Narendra Modi, the answer to this question is only possible theoretically which support our hypothesis. Further, a question arises why did not Kashmiri people thank Narendra Modi, maybe the reason that the Kashmiri nation wants independence but India don't ready for this or maybe other reason, however, this question is not the part of our discussion.

Gideon Rose explains that the policymakers of each state will always respond according to what they understand about the situation.⁴¹ In response to Narendra Modi speech, the ex-adviser to Prime Minister of Pakistan on foreign policy Sartaj Aziz said that "[Narendra] Modi's reference to Balochistan, which is an integral part of Pakistan, only proves Pakistan's contention that India through its main intelligence agency RAW has been fomenting terrorism in Balochistan". He more said that "This was also confirmed by the public confession of RAW's active service naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav".⁴² Our analysis shows that the reality behind India's reservation is only to strengthen its relative power to achieve great power in the region. Neoclassical realism explains that the state always tries to achieve more influence abroad because of their relative power and pursue this is the best way to achieve the desired goal, and further whenever their relative power rises they will tend to seek more influence abroad.⁴³ This is the main reason behind India's reservation that why they want to impair the CPEC project. In previous literature, this important issue has been ignored, however, some scholars have mentioned but not more than in one or two lines, the primary sources data is only available in contemporary media.

The Indian government has assigned a special task to Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to impair CPEC project. "Secretary Defence Gen (retd.) AlamKhattak asserts, "RAW has established a special cell headquarters in New Delhi to impair CPEC project and the plan is carried out via Afghanistan." India further strengthens its relationship with Afghanistan by training the Afghan army and using them for the purpose of destabilizing Pakistan.⁴⁴

On March 3, 2016, Pakistan arrested Kulbhushan Jadhav Indian commanding officer during the investigation he has admitted his involvement in the impair and terrorist activities in Balochistan province of Pakistan, Jadhav mentioned in his confessional statement that Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is supporting various terrorist groups to impair CPEC, especially in Balochistan province, RAW is more lively which purpose is to economically destabilize Pakistan.⁴⁵ Further, he said that India is 'directly sponsored' "various financing which subsequently happened for the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and various other Afghan anti-Pakistani terrorist groups led to the attack by TTP on one of the Mehran Naval Base in which a lot of damage was the cost to the Pakistan Navy".⁴⁶ He further mentioned that another kind of attacks are "funded and directly supported by Anil Kumar (Chief of RAW)" included a "sort of radar installation attack, the Sui pipeline gas attack, then attacks on civilian bus stations where some, I suppose, Pakistani nationals were being targeted by sub-national and murdered and massacred".⁴⁷ The main purpose of these kinds of activities were to pressurize the government and to impair and impair this project by any possible tactics. Further Pakistan General Zubair Mahmood Hayat NI the 16th Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee stated that RAW has allocated \$500 million budget in 2015 for the purpose to impair CPEC projects.⁴⁸ The Chief of RAW is personally active and supervising its team to impair this project by any means and follow the guidelines of PM Modi because he is not happy with this project and feel a threat to its interest.⁴⁹ The RAW is also cooperating with other foreign Intelligence agencies to support and use the local group in Balochistan to impair CPEC.⁵⁰ The analysis of this evidence shows that India main objective is to strengthen its relative power which is required to achieve great power in the region. In 2015 after took office Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared its national interest and policy that we want to be a great power in the region.⁵¹

Further to support, our hypothesis we have quoted here the confession statement of the spokesperson of Tehreek Taliban Pakistan Ehsanullah Ehsan who has surrendered to Pakistan's security forces. He mentioned in his confession statement "When we moved to Afghanistan from North Waziristan, I saw that Taliban leadership fostered relations with Indian RAW agency that financed the Taliban and even gave targets. Taliban received a reward [from RAW] of every action in Pakistan. They left fighters to face Pakistan Army while they themselves sought refuge in secure hideouts".⁵² Here it confirms that RAW is supporting insurgent groups in Pakistan they have conducted impair activities in Balochistan; this statement is already confirmed by Kulbhushan Jadhav. To further support, our hypothesis in this section we have described those activities that are conducted by insurgent groups with the support of RAW to create uncertainty and panic to pressurize both China and Pakistan government to impair this project. In 2015 the RAW supported the local militant group attacked the air traffic control radar in Pasni area of the Gwadar district to put pressure on the government to impair and impair this project.⁵³ In September 2016 approximately 44 Pakistani workers had been killed by the insurgent group and further, two Chinese workers were kidnapped in June 2017 which were killed later.⁵⁴ Further, in August 2018 Chinese workers were targeted in Balochistan province in an attack on the bus these workers were working in Saindak mining project, which is controlled by Chinese state-owned Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC).⁵⁵

Further, the RAW spy confirmed that RAW has supported the local insurgent group in a different part of Balochistan to destroy the Sui pipeline gas. The Sui Pipeline gas attacks which are conducted in 2015-2018 are: DeraMuradJamali / Naseerabad District, and Sohbatpur /Jaffarabad District In January, DeraBugti, Peshbogi / DeraBugti District, PirKoh / DeraBugtiDistrict in the month of February, and PirKoh and Loti / DeraBugti District, Zainkoh / Loti / DeraBugti District, Dera Allah Yar / Jaffarabad District, March 2015. Further, PirKoh / Dera Bugti District, Per Koh / DeraBugti District in 2016 and Jalal /Bolan in 2017.⁵⁶ The targeting of Chinese workers and different kind of bomb blast main purpose is to panic among Chinese and Pakistani officials and to coerce them to impair this project, but China and Pakistan want CPEC to succeed at all costs. CPEC will change the fate of Baloch people and will enhance the economic

strength of this province; however, the stability of Balochistan province is very important for successful completion of CPEC. India worries about the CPEC and having a different kind of reservation and thinks that China may use the Gwadar port for military purpose.⁵⁷ India thinks that if CPEC successfully completed then India will be unable to achieve the desired goal of great power in the region. The neoclassical realism explains that the misperception is always driven by the weak information of intelligence and other sources, which state used during the policy-making process.⁵⁸

Here hypothesis yielding powerful evidence that India's main objective is to economically destabilize Pakistan and to strengthen own economic power. That is the main reason India wants to impair the CPEC project because CPEC will strengthen the economic power of Pakistan. It is not the first time that India can destabilize the economic strength of Pakistan but also we have an example of 1960 and 1970s. In these eras, Pakistan GDP was higher than India, the total GDP of India was 81.3% and while 82.5% of Pakistan. It had highly disrupted by India's wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.⁵⁹ India's foreign policymakers focus on isolating Pakistan in the world and to propagate the bad image of Pakistan (CPEC) in the whole world and economically destabilize it.⁶⁰ Pakistan and India are the rival states, from the starting of independence India are not happy with the independence of Pakistan, the first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru had mentioned that the independence of Pakistan is not on a permanent base and we will destroy it soon.⁶¹ This situation is explained by neoclassical realism that the state leaders always keep a strong focus on the relative power of another state when they making foreign policy and defining its national interest.⁶² That time their national interest was to make Pakistan a part of India, while now its national interest is to seek great power in the region and to economically destabilize Pakistan. The analysis shows that India sabotaging the CPEC project for the purpose to strengthen its relative power which is required to achieve great power. They think that China aids to Pakistan will strengthen Pakistan economic and strategic influence over India and will be a threat to its national interest.⁶³ They think if CPEC is not impaired and impaired on time, then India will not be able to strengthen its relative power to fulfill great power dream in the region.

Here, we further argue that the CPEC project is not important only for Pakistan but also for China; the most important is that after successful completion, China will get rid of the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Malacca is one of the major security concerns of China's sea route and during the time of conflicts, India can destroy China's energy-carrying ships.⁶⁴ While CPEC is the most secure route for China this is the reason why we argue that the impairment of CPEC will directly affect Chinese economic interests in the region. The total percent of China importing oil by sea route is 83 % while out of which 77 % are importing by Strait of Malacca, the piracy activities and geopolitics issues will badly affect the economic development of China.⁶⁵ A scholar noted that "about 60% of world pirate occurrences take place in the Strait of Malacca and presence of the Indian and US armada in the seaway raises serious security concerns and in case of any unforeseen actions can affect trade and economic supplies of China".⁶⁶ Other than oil product, 30 % of natural gas also imported by this 800km narrow route it is sure that during any kind of dangerous events will result to spoil the economy of China.⁶⁷ If India succeeds to impair the CPEC project then there will be no option for China to except to use the current route of Strait of Malacca. During any conflicts, India can easily destroy the energy-carrying ships and can counterbalance the influence of China. Gideon Rose explains that the state wants to control their environment for that, the state leaders seek international influence and engage in politics beyond their own state and focus to increase the strength and a number of armies.⁶⁸ India is increasing navy in the Indian Ocean and has capabilities of nuclear submarine and the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya with Mig-29 K fighters and Kamov helicopters.⁶⁹ Due to these capabilities, India can counterbalance the influence of China in the Indian Ocean Region.

Another reason that India wants to impair CPEC project is because of its past experience that due to the Gulf war in 1990-91 Indian overseas was unable to support their country economy which directly affected the Indian economy and compelled to take a loan from IMF.⁷⁰ Fareed Zakaria explains that the relative power such as relative economic power plays a very important role in history if we look at the Soviet Union expansionism policy failed while America's succeed because of US relative economic power and the technology was stronger than the Soviet Union.⁷¹ That the reason India wants to

strengthen its relative power and worries that if CPEC successfully completed, then it will badly affect on Indian economy once again. After successful completion of CPEC will directly affect on UAE's Jebel Ali port and UAE will lose approximately 70 % of its business.⁷²It will not only affect on the UAE's economy but will affect the Indian economy because of the Indian capitalist will lose business. Currently, 788 Indian companies are trading from Jebel Ali Free Zone India total trade India reached USD 3.4 billion in 2017, Jebel Ali port plays a fundamental role in supporting India's trade.⁷³Our theoretical approach shows that the state [India] always seeking hegemony and efforts to maximize own relative power and to gain power it will counterbalance another state [China].⁷⁴ Our evidence further shows that CPEC will strengthen the influence of China and the region by providing short and secure access to desired Eurasian states. At least it will resolve the Strait of Malacca issue, which is very dangerous for China. However, our hypothesis claims that impair of CPEC will directly affect the influence of China and India would success to achieve great power in the region. Our first hypothesis yielded a result that the external factor is less dominant than the internal one. This is true that India is clandestinely supporting the insurgency and has more resources to continuously support them. But the tense of insurgency directly depends on the internal factors if there are more domestic grievances with Islamabad than India will easily success to get the support of insurgent groups and it will increase the likelihood of sabotage activities. If the government once controlled on domestic factor then it is impossible for New Delhi to sabotage this project.

Testing Case: Pakistan's ignorant domestic policies

Here we test our second argument for domestic ignorant policies case; we will show only the abstracts because of the space considerations. Here we show that why the populace of Balochistan became the part of the insurgent group and take support from India to impair the CPEC, for this we have to test the following hypothesis/argument.

Hypothesis 2: *Domestic grievances with the Pakistani government and its management of the project are the dominant force in resistance to CPEC*

Here we argue that India is not only responsible for the impair activities because Pakistan's ignorant policies have created this environment. The issue of insurgency in Balochistan date back 1947 however; here we take three areas to find the reason and get the solution for how to secure CPEC from impairing. In On 26 August 2006, General Musharaf killed the Nawab Akbar Bugti because he was joined the militant insurgent group; he was the head of the Bugti tribe of Baloch people who served as the Minister of State for Interior and Governor of Balochistan Province.⁷⁵ That brought the Bugti tribe into the fifth round of the insurgency in Balochistan. Due to weak policies, the regime had taken the wrong decision; in fact, it was the time to focus on the education, social welfare, and unemployment issue of Balochistan. The issue could be resolved by dialogues and provide the legal rights to them instead of killing which had led the people into Inferiority. This had the main issue which compelled them to conduct sabotage activates. However, due to a weak institution and lack of interest, the Musharaf regime did not focus on the above-mentioned issue.

Same in 2013, President Zardari after took hold they move toward development programs such as NFC and 'Aghaz E HuqooqBalochistan' (AEHB) during his era but did not succeed to overcome on the basic issue because of corruption and ignorant policies. The fake job issue occurred instead to hire local people the job were provided to non-local people.⁷⁶ The literacy rate dropped by 3% to 43% in 2013-14.⁷⁷ While the unemployment rate increased from 3.9 to 4.0%.⁷⁸ Same Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took hold in 2013 to 2018 but did not take any interest in the developmental programs to overcome on above issues; he ignored the NFC and 'Aghaz E HuqooqBalochistan' programs.⁷⁹ These kinds of ignorant and weak policies compelled the people to join the insurgent groups and to take support from foreign intelligence agencies such as India to sabotage the CPEC project. This issue can be resolved by these policies; first, the present government of Pakistan needs to strengthen the political institution such as NAB, Judiciary and other institutes to monitor and keep check and balance on social welfare programs in Balochistan. Another policy could be the government need to meet the leaders of insurgent groups and resolve the issues by dialogues and should immediately resolve the legal and constitutional demand of them. The government should cross-check the NFC and AEHB and

ratifies the gray area if needed. Other than it the government should focus on education under CPEC the government should assure to hire the local residents in different projects and provide a platform for business and investments. Our analysis shows that the internal factor is more dominant than the external one because the weak domestic policies of Pakistan have encouraged and gave space to insurgent group to conduct such activities. The external factor is dependent on internal factor if the government improved the quality of political institutions and launches the social welfare programs then it will change the perception of Baloch citizens and will become pro-Pakistani instead of anti. If they failed to do so will increase the likelihood of Baloch people to get the support of any external third states to sabotage the CPEC.

CONCLUSION:

This article shows that although CPEC is an important project between Beijing and Islamabad, it also faces serious challenges. It has also increased the probability of conflicts between the interests of various regional actors. On the one hand, Pakistan is losing annually US \$18 billion, due to the energy crisis. The CPEC will strengthen the economy of Pakistan and China's economic influence in the region. The short-term completed project shows that CPEC is fulfilling the requirements; an example is the 30% electricity issue has been resolved in Bahawalpur. Further, Pakistan's economic growth has increased from 5.4 percent in 2017 to 5.8 percent in 2018, and also has increased 5% of FDI. It further has increased the rate of export to 12.0 % while decreased 16.6 % of imports. CPEC will also enhance China's influence in the region because CPEC is the shortest and secure route to save time and capital and to easily access to Eurasian and Central Asian states. Currently, the duration of the arrival of ships from different states to China is 27 and 32 days which will decrease to 7 and 8 days respectively. China can save US \$1350 and \$1450 on imports from the EU and the Middle East.

On the other hand India wants to enhance own political and economic influences in the region. They think it cannot be possible without encountering the influence of China and the economic growth of Pakistan. Narendra Modi and the RAW spy Kalbushan have confirmed the insurgency in Balochistan to sabotage the CPEC. Such

as the Sui Pipeline gas attacks, the killing of two Chinese and 44 Pakistani workers. Another reason, New Delhi has the misperception that CPEC will affect 788 Indian companies that work in the Jabel Ali port. These are possible reasons due to which India supports the insurgency in Balochistan to halt this project. Besides, the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi is rational and has assertive policies; one of the recent examples is India's attack in Pakistan on Feb 27, 2019. India violated the Line of Control (LoC) — undertook strikes across the LoC from Pakistani airspace. In response, "[The] PAF (Pakistan Air Force) shot down two Indian aircrafts inside Pakistani airspace.

If the issue of insurgency is not resolved on time it could be so dangerous in the future as "Thucydides wrote his famous history of the Peloponnesian War over 2000 years ago, to help those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past, and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future".⁸⁰ It will a bad effect on FDI the foreigner will not invest in Gwadar due to fear of losing money. Without resolving these issues the 'game-changer' will become 'game-tension'. Islamabad needs to strengthen the political Institutions and, should use the advanced method of intelligence gathering and sharing to secure CPEC.

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