

## Sudan - South Sudan Relations and Regional Security

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### Abstract

*The study examined Sudan and South Sudan relations and regional security. The study was guided by two objectives and the theory that was used is the institutional theory as propounded by Meyer John and Rowan Brian. The study adopted ex-post facto research design while data for this study was through secondary source such as textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines and internet. The findings of the study showed that after the independence of South Sudan there has been relations with Sudan which has been close and these relations includes oil which has been transmitted through pipelines belonging to Sudan where it is supposed to be exported out, border demarcation which has also been contested has also made the two countries to have relations but these relations has not been harmonious all the time. The findings of the study also showed that the relations between Sudan and South Sudan which has not been harmonious has negatively impacted on regional stability which at most times manifested in armed proxies. Based on the findings of the study it was recommended among others; that the issue of border should be well addressed by the governments of Sudan and South Sudan so that there will be room for free movements and settlements in each other's country since the both countries were one before they broke up and the government of both countries should resolve all issues, participate while representation should be effective in all governmental institutions at various levels as this can strengthen their relationship which on the long run will impact positively on regional stability.*

**Key words:** Regional stability, interest, border, economy, military.

## INTRODUCTION

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan accomplished freedom by separating from the northern state of Sudan to turn into the youngest country in the world. The redoubtable test it faces is the continuance of the violent clashes, for the most part in the north, that is baffling any attempt to achieve harmony so necessary to continue ahead with the primary task of any new country's socio-economic development. After almost five decades of battle, two civil wars and the passing away of about 2.5 million individuals, Sudan has reached a pivotal moment in its history. The dictates of its current conditions emerge from its long history of mistreatment and the need presently to locate its own identity, as likewise the certainty of being an autonomous state. South Sudan's complex and associated relationship with Sudan will have a complete impact in its trajectory as a country, and on the prospects and difficulties it current encounters (Varma, 2011). The bilateral relations between South Sudan and Sudan started during the transition period have yet to definitively resolve significant issues (Belloni 2011; Blanchard 2014). The brutal confrontation between Juba and Khartoum over the Heglig oil fields in April 2012 and the perennial fights over Abyei have sapped the energies of Southern leaders, leaving them little space to concentrate on the matter of nation building. Khartoum may likewise have a stake in a dysfunctional South, particularly with regards to performing the delusion of independence and to avoiding the attention from the contention in Darfur and its own failure to change to a democratic order. All these bilateral issues with the North could have been overseen effectively if there was a government in Juba that has a national purpose. The Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) administration, in any case, has steadily become insular and authoritarian, precipitating the conflict within (Young 2012). Furthermore, the administration of incomes from its oil assets has been buried in wanton corruption. Without important endeavors to expand its economy from oil, the South has developed its reliance on donors who need to ceaselessly come to its rescue whatever point Khartoum shuts the oil pipeline to Port Sudan. With the Nuer

battling to hold on to the oil-rich states which they claim are their homelands, the renewed conflict has affected production of oil, fueling the economic woes of the South. In this manner, the mix of divided leadership, a divided country, and a delicate economy has fashioned the inevitable outcome of state failure. These bilateral issues between South Sudan and Sudan have left loopholes that has affected on the region. It is against this backdrop that this study is carried out.

## **RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

This paper addressed several objectives which includes to; (1) analysis the relations between Sudan and South Sudan; and, (2) investigate how the relations between Sudan and South Sudan has impacted on regional security.

### **Theoretical framework**

The theory that was utilized for this paper was the institutional theory. Major proponents of the institutional theory are Meyer John and Rowan Brian in 1977. Institutional theory attends to the more profound and stronger aspects of social structure. It considers the procedures by which structures, including schemas, rules, standards, and routines, become built up as legitimate rules for social conduct. It looks into how these components are made, diffused, adopted, and adapted over time and space; and how they fall into decline and neglect. Political institutional conditions may shape wide patterns of domestic governmental issues. Generally, authority in state political institutions may be brought together or decentralized. The legislative, executive, judicial, policing and other legislative functions within given political authorities may be situated inside arrangements of organizations or spread among various ones, each with their own independence and working methodology. Politics may contrast significantly in type, contingent upon how much state rulers had “oppressive power,” to utilize Mann’s (1986) differentiation or power “over” others (Lukes, 1974). State political institutions were dependent upon various levels and paces of democratization and political rights among subjects and inhabitants. Once democratized politics were dependent upon various and significant appointive principles administering the determination of political officials. States official organizations were likewise dependent upon various levels and

paces of bureaucratization and professionalization. Every one of these procedures may in a general sense impact political life. The other principle line of argumentation, second in extreme significance, was that states mattered as difference as actors. State actors were seen authoritatively, generally in a resource-dependence way. As organizations, various parts of states may have more noteworthy or lesser degrees of self-rule and various capacities. The autonomy of states or parts thereof was characterized as their capacity to define independent lines of action. State capacities were defined as the capacity to carry out lines of action, along the lines of Mann's (1986) "infrastructural power" (Skocpol, 1985). The ideas of state autonomy and capacity brought into the conversation the "power to" accomplish something, without ignoring "power over" on which political scientists and sociologists had centered on (Lukes, 1974). These distinctions in state self-governance and capacity in executive bureaucracies were contended as being significant in clarifying the political outcomes across times and places. The underlying state-centered hypothetical program has developed into a political-institutional one in the course of the most recent decade or so (Amenta, 2005). Tocquevillian contention was utilized about states in a logical manner and have included further argumentation concerning the development of other large-scale political institutions, including political party frameworks. In the hands of some scholars, the contentions turned out to be progressively basic and fundamental, with long-standing political institutions impacting on all groups and having significant impact over outcomes of intrigue. In the hands of others, political institutionalism has become more historical and concentrated on historical procedures. Here, researchers keep on arguing that political institutions in a general sense impact political life, yet concentrate theoretical devotion on the inter-action of actors at a medium-systemic, inter organizational, or meso level. These actors are viewed as working within institutional imperatives, just as with constraints on assets and different means of action, and endeavor to influence state policy. Changes in state policies thus set procedures in motion that influence the interests and strategies of actors that will decide if programs will feed back in a manner that fortifies the program or undermines it or leaves it open to changes sometime in not too distant future. The pertinence of the institutional theory to this paper is evident, given that the theory makes it feasible for us to analyze

Sudan and South-Sudan relations and its implications for regional security. Following Mann (1986) contention that state capacities were defined as the capacity to carry out lines of actions Sudan and South Sudan has failed institutions which cannot function properly and these have adversely affected regional security.

## **CONCEPTUAL REVIEW**

### **Concept of Regional Security**

The concept of regional security has a long custom in global relations and it is comprehended as adequately implemented to protect the system of shared relations between nations in the region against the dangers of insecurity, emergencies, armed clashes and regional wars (Malak, 2015). More recently, security at the regional level is built and dependent on a system or an alliance operating within the defined region, and “regional security institutions are frequently, yet not constantly, established based on geographical boundaries of the region, at the interface of functional cooperation”. Simultaneously, it is additionally significant that occasionally this geographic scope of regional security institutions can be unique, as the feeling of common security may go “across” functional interests (for example trade). Its moderately high event happens on account of military alliances, which in the post-war international system is frequently covered - and still covers an area bigger than the region in strictly economic or geographic terms (Malak, 2015). With regards to regional security, it is likewise important to recognize the principle dangers in this sphere. These principle dangers to security in the regional setting are indistinguishable from the catalogue based on the rules of a large number of contemporary security strategies. They attach specific significance to the components of threats, for example, the possibility of the break out of a war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and methods for their conveyance, universal terrorism, organized crime, uncontrolled movement, social strains, environmental disasters, defilement, scourges or demographic threats related with low population growth and aging of populations in the states of a given region (Beata, 2003).

### ***Criteria for regional security***

It is likewise essential to focus on criteria of regional security. With regards to the criteria of national security at the universal level, but in addition in regional terms, their generally substantive, evident viewpoints include:

- 1) the military capability of states of a region and its technical and innovative levels
- 2) the condition, technique and the size of the military of nations in a region
- 3) the nature of management of a defense sector in states of a region
- 4) the character of borders between nations of a region and of external ones (geographical and political)
- 5) political and military alliances of regional range; and,
- 6) the role of political elites and objectivity in picking partners within and beyond a region.

The components beneath ought to be demonstrated among other safety rules in the regional setting:

- 1) the condition of the universal system in the closest region of states and in the regional scale (continental, sub continental)
- 2) the intricacy and complementarity of the most significant qualities protected at the degree of national security and the regional environment, just as the purposes behind deciding these absolute qualities' in nations of a region
- 3) the nature and elements of techniques embraced by members of the universal system in a region; and,
- 4) the issue of clear and unequivocally significant territories which are subject upon specific protection during the process of building a model of universal security of states in a region.

Besides, the criteria of regional security ought to be considered from the point of view of the region's position in the world system. One of the most acclaimed system theories has been created by Immanuel Wallerstein asserting that when the economic criterion and the concept of a country (not a state) are utilized, in the world system there are distinguished as: the core, which incorporates nations that are the so called rule makers having the option to force their will to more vulnerable members, for example those situated in the system within the so called semi-peripheries and peripheries. The core

includes nations with the most significant level of advancement in terms of capitalist economy. A stable, the most often democratic, political system and the highest level of capital accumulation, consumption, development and producing cultural patterns are what distinguish them. This makes them assume the predominant political role in the world system. Thus, semi-peripheries are portrayed by the kind of advancement based on the inflow of foreign investments and capitals, own activities, as well as less expensive and relatively well-educated workforce. A democratic yet precarious or undemocratic political system is additionally typical for semi-peripheries. In the universal system, semi-peripheries fundamentally perform production functions and offer types of assistance, remaining under the political and economic influence of the core. While nations with the low degree of economic and social development, obsolete or the crude economic model, a significant level of debt and inflation have a place in the peripheries. Likewise, their political systems are regularly portrayed by precariousness and undemocratic character (Wojciech, 2008). In any case, alluding to Wallerstein's assumptions it ought to be borne in mind that, truth be told, the most significant measure of having a place in the core, not just and not generally, is the economic value, since nations of the high military position are likewise as often as possible situated in the center of the system (Escudé, 2002). Subsequently, there are in any event two fundamental world systems, economic and military, which are considered, and the hierarchy of nations operating in the cores of these systems here and there varies essentially. In addition, the position of the center of the two systems relies upon numerous elements absolutely economic or military, yet in addition social, political, intellectual, religious and mental also. What is more, frequently the nations situated in a region representing semi-peripheries have in actuality a more noteworthy effect on political decisions taken within the system than those situated in the core (for example the position of the Russian Federation in Central and Eastern Europe). From the perspective of universal security, likewise in the regional setting, the most significant is the structure of the universal military system, and the place a state occupies in it. Such a point of view in regional terms, and all the more explicitly: in term of regional alliance, brings certain risk. For instance, states, which are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, are every now and again and automatically situated in Europe, in the center of the

military system. This is done paying little heed to their actual military condition. Consequently, the membership in the Alliance causes an inclination regularly deceptive of having a strong position, frequently inconsistent with the real individual position of the Alliance members in the world military system. So, it is worth remembering that regional security ensured within the Alliance does not legitimately prejudice security of an individual state, and its fundamental significance keeps on being determined principally by the individual position of the nation in the universal military system (Beata, 2003).

### **Method for Data Collection and Analysis**

Given, the problem of the study, the study adopted the ex post facto research design. Materials for this study was sourced through secondary sources of data which includes; textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, internet materials, among others. Content analysis was used to analyse data so generated. This is with a view to identify logical sequence of data as well as trends.

## **DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS**

### **Sudan and South Sudan relations as regard oil pipeline**

Oil represents as much as 98 percent of South Sudan's public income. What is more, it is a huge contributor to the nation's GDP and the significant basis of its present battle with the Republic of Sudan. Since independence, all of South Sudan's oil has been transmitted through pipelines belonging to the Republic of Sudan, where it is likewise arranged and exported. In January 2012, South Sudan shut down all oil production and would not utilize pipelines and port facilities belonging to the Republic of Sudan to get ready and ship its oil to over-seas markets. They took this move to protest what South Sudan believed were over the top transport expenses charged by the Republic of Sudan for the utilization of the latter's pipe lines, as well as gossips that the Republic of Sudan was taking South Sudan's oil. South Sudan has dismissed both the African Union's and the Republic of Sudan's ideas to resolve the impasse (Financial Times, 2012). The loss of incomes from the exported oil has constrained the South Sudanese government to develop and actualize a 3.45 billion South Sudanese Pound (SSP) austerity budget, which, according to Finance



Minister Kosti Manibe Ngai, will bring about noteworthy cuts in government expenditure, including critical areas, for example, agriculture, local government advancement, education and health. The bulk of government incomes in the austerity budget are reserved for defense purposes (Government of South Sudan, 2012). The pipeline shutdown has extraordinarily exacerbated already awful relations between the two nations and will cost the two countries a lot. The lost oil receipts are required to cause depreciation of the SSP, increment inflation and result in a depletion of oil saves. Socially, inflation is probably going to prompt food insecurity in any event, for people who just take part somewhat in the cash economy. This is due to the fact that household food production just records for 53 percent of local consumption, with imported food items representing the rest (Government of South Sudan, 2011). Having access to oil incomes is essential to the two nations and it is to their greatest advantage to resolve the dispute. In spite of the fact that the greater part of realized oil reserves are in South Sudan, the pipeline through the Republic of Sudan will remain imperative to South Sudan for a long time to come. Albeit, South Sudan has begun plans for the construction of an alternative pipeline through Kenya, this is not a simple issue and will take a very long time before it is really operational. Indeed, even as border issues are negotiated, agreeing on the pipeline is of most extreme direness.

### **Sudan and South Sudan relations concerning border demarcation**

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) guided the relations between the two nations from the end of war to the referendum for secession. The established structure for secession included the issue of border demarcation, explicitly in profoundly challenged areas. Sadly, in their excitement to gain independence, the southern Sudanese states that would turn into the sovereign state of South Sudan did not demand full resolution of all issues related with their autonomy from the Republic of Sudan. Among the issues left unresolved was the border between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan. As indicated by John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., almost 20 percent of the border between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan remains to be demarcated. Abyei, Southern Kordofan which contains the contested Heglig oil field and the Blue

Nile regions are three of nine intensely challenged border sites and the two nations are battling for the control of these territories because of the amount of oil, mineral, and arable land assets they hold (USIP, 2010). As the expression goes, great wall makes great neighbors. For neighboring countries to live in harmony, it is important that there be shared acknowledgment and regard of the boundary that separates their domains. For South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan, the fringe stays contested and has been the fundamental factor characterizing the connection between the two countries. Since the referendum, there have been various episodes of threats propagated by the two nations and each has undermined the sovereignty of the other through continued support of dissidents in the opposing territory. With previous South African President Thabo Mbeki as middle person, the different sides finally consented to meet in April 2012 for talk to settle boundary related clashes and choose a perpetual boundary. Be that as it may, negotiation was suspended when viciousness erupted in a few border regions, bringing about the capture by South Sudan military of an oil field at Heglig in the Republic of Sudan. South Sudan has since withdrawn and expelled its soldiers from the Heglig oil fields, which represent 75 percent of all oil produced in the Republic of Sudan (Welle, 2012). At the hour of this report, negotiations have continued and delegates from the two nations are participating in African Union-supported talks in Addis Ababa. Unless the issue of completely settling the border is settled soon, the possibilities of pushing South Sudan toward a positive developmental direction are diminish.

### **Sudan and South Sudan relations and Its Implications for Regional Security**

The competition among Sudan and Uganda over the nature of South Sudan since a long time ago originated before the nation's independence in 2011, showing essentially in their support for armed proxies. This opposition developed as the relationship among Sudan and the regime of South Sudan's leader, Salva Kiir, compounded as a result not only of historic tensions but of continuous arguments about the common border, support for armed groups, and the distribution of oil incomes. Kiir has additionally increasingly reliant on Ugandan support to stay in power and to prosecute the civil war. The Ugandan People's Defense Forces, with tacit US support, protected Kiir's

regime from an opposition assault on Juba at the beginning of the civil war in 2013, and Uganda remains the principle transit point and facilitator for arms and ammunition to the regime. By consistently blocking censure of Kiir's regime, Uganda likewise functioned as South Sudan's main diplomatic supporter within Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). As IGAD's endeavors to protect the 2015 agreement slowed down in June 2018, the IGAD heads of state appointed Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir to convene the next round of talks in Sudan. Within days of these discussions getting in progress, the warring groups signed an agreement on security game plans, apparently after extensive pressure was brought to bear on Kiir by both Uganda and Sudan and various resistance leaders were coerced and threatened by the security service of the Sudanese. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni traveled to Khartoum to support the agreement. A number of South Sudanese and international spectators quickly criticized the accord as an endeavor by Sudan and Uganda to seize and separate South Sudan's oil income, giving a balance between Khartoum and Kampala's contending interest to the detriment of South Sudan's sovereignty de-facto if not de jure. This agreement was trailed by subsequent deals on power-sharing and governance that the United States and its European accomplices described as "not reasonable or sustainable," and, eventually, the signing on September 12, 2018, of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, which got lukewarm affirmation from the United States and Europe (US Department of State, 2018). In the interim, Ethiopia and Uganda have since quite a while ago competed for regional hegemony. The passing away in 2012 of the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi left an administration vacuum in the region that, combined with more recent domestic agitation and political precariousness in Ethiopia, prompted the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in February 2018 and the selection by the ruling party of Abiy Ahmed Ali as his successor. These developments had energized Museveni's desire to dislodge Ethiopia as the regional hegemon. Uganda's propensity for one-sided action on South Sudan is illustrated not simply in the deployment of the Ugandan People's Defense Forces in 2014 and 2015, yet by diplomatic activities to deter or act outside of the then Ethiopian-led IGAD mediation process. In spite of the fact that it is too early to predict the degree to which Abiy's energetic tact during

his initial few months in office will reorder the region's landscape politically, including the nascent however historic rapprochement among Ethiopia and Eritrea, Museveni's yearnings are probably not going to diminish (Schemm, and Bearak, 2018). South Sudan is likewise up front in the challenge among Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile basin. Ethiopia could start filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) whenever (Donnenfeld, 2017). A core account of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government, nonetheless, is that Ethiopia exploited Egypt's weakness during Mohammed Morsi's administration (2012–13) to tie down the acquiescence of the region's other states to the GERD project, isolated Egypt, and damage long-standing agreement on the utilization of the Nile's waters that date to British colonial rule. In excess of fifteen rounds of regional talks failed to resolve the stalemate, including an April 2018 trilateral meeting of the foreign minister, water ministers, and intelligent head of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. After that meeting, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry pronounced that "Egypt won't acknowledge the status quo...and keeps on guarding the interest of its people in regards to the Nile by several means (Aman, 2018)". In June 2018, be that as it may, Abiy's first visit to Cairo as prime minister culminated in a joint declaration with Sisi of a new push for an agreement that will oblige every nation's interests, including the establishment of an investment fund between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Reuters, 2018). Sisi has been reasserting Cairo's impact in sub-Saharan Africa since he took power, not exclusively to build his leverage vis-a-vis Addis Ababa but to restore Egyptian prestige on the continent following the year-long suspension of its participation in the African Union (AU) after Sisi deposed previous president Morsi in 2013 (Aman, 2017). In a momentous rebound, Sisi is slated to assume the chairmanship of the African Union in 2019. As the main upstream head of state not to have favored Ethiopia on the dispute, Kiir has misused these Egyptian-Ethiopian dynamics by playing his preferred position with Cairo. In exchange for Juba's help of its position, Egypt reliably utilized its seat on the UN Security Council (from 2015 to 2017) and the AU Peace and Security Council to deflect pressure from Ethiopia and others to accept an arranged settlement to the civil war. Egypt has additionally encouraged South Sudan's solicitation to join the Arab League and offered military help including arms, ammunition, and training to Kiir's forces. Besides, Cairo and Juba have talked

about restoring the long-torpid project to build up the Jonglei Canal in South Sudan so as to make up for Egypt's potential loss of water from the GERD, however such a noteworthy infrastructure project would require outsider financing and would confront a number of other obstacles, including ongoing insecurity in Jonglei. Sudan and Ethiopia have forged an undeniably close political and security accomplice partnership established in a mutual position on the GERD and the utilization of the Nile, among different issues. The two nations proclaimed the three-day visit of Ethiopia's then Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to Khartoum in August 2017 as a watershed in their improving two-sided relationship. On the other hand, Sudan and Egypt have been at loggerheads over a delicate border dispute just as the political future of Libya. In a lofty heightening of rhetoric, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir additionally openly reprimanded Egypt's provision of weapons to Kiir's regime and to Darfuri opposition groups that have launched assaults on Sudan from inside Libya and South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2017). In December 2017, allegations that Egypt had sent military counsels to Asmara and was plotting with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, potentially to oust Bashir, accelerated a regional crisis that incorporated the withdrawal of Sudan's ambassador from Cairo and the massing of Sudanese local army on its border with Eritrea. In spite of the fact that the crisis was defused through a progression of trilateral conversations on the margins of the AU summit in January 2018 and ensuing diplomatic endeavors, including the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement, the Sudanese-Ethiopian relationship stays a vital pivot in the region. Egyptian-Sudanese strains additionally appeared to ease somewhat in mid-2018 with regards to the rapprochement among Ethiopia and Eritrea. Sisi visited Khartoum in July, at which time he and Bashir declared another determination to defeat their disparities, and Sisi endorsed Khartoum's "vision" for ending South Sudan's civil war (Al Arabiya, 2018).

## **CONCLUSION**

The study concluded that since after the independence of South Sudan there has been relations with Sudan which has been close and these relations includes; oil which has been transmitted through pipelines belonging to Sudan to where it is supposed to be exported out, border

demarcation which has also been contested has also made the two countries to have relations although these relations has not been harmonious. The study also concluded that the relations between Sudan and South Sudan which has not been harmonious has negatively impacted on regional stability which at most times manifested in armed proxies been sponsored by other nations.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the findings of the study it was recommended that:

- 1) The issue of border should be well addressed by the governments of Sudan and South Sudan so that there will be room for free movements and settlements in each other's country since the both countries were one before they broke up.
- 2) There should be a good sharing formula that will make the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to benefit immensely from the oil and oil pipelines that belongs to Sudan.
- 3) The governments of Sudan and South Sudan should resolve all issues and participate while representation should be effective in all governmental institutions at various levels this can strengthen their relationship which on the long run will impact positively on regional stability.

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