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The role of the opposition in the justice reform implementation in Albania during 2016

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The need for a reform of the organization and functioning of the judicial and accusatory system, has long been evidenced in Albania not only by the doctrine and discourse of political actors, but also by the general public in the country. The problems that the justice system had long displayed with corruption, corporatism and its independence, had unified as rare times not only the public perception of the need for intervention and reform of the system, but also political and constitutional actors, including the actors themselves or governing bodies of the justice system.

Ever since it was in charge of the country, the opposition of the time when the constitutional changes were undertaken to reform the justice system, had also declared the urgent need for radical reform of the justice system. Its leaders, who at the beginning of the efforts for the realization of this reform, openly expressed their need and guaranteed that the opposition would help to carry out the reform in the Albanian justice system as soon as possible and as well as possible.

Not only the political leaders spoke unanimously about the need for constitutional and legal changes to reform the system, but the President of the Republic himself as the chairman of the High Council of Justice took the initiative to reform the justice system in the country. On 06.10.2014, President Nishani gathered in a joint roundtable the leaders of justice institutions and the highest political representatives, including the leader of the majority and the opposition, where it was unanimously declared the urgent need for a comprehensive reform of the justice system.

In this very favorable climate for deep and radical constitutional interventions, the legislative process for the establishment of a special commission for justice reform began, which will be the body where the constitutional debate on this reform would

take place; it would intervene radically not only in the Constitution of the country, but also in a series of important laws that determine the organization and functioning of the system, including all the organic laws of the governing bodies of the justice system, which according to the Constitution require a qualified parliamentary majority for their approval or amendment. For this reason, the composition of the special commission on justice reform, the representation of the parliamentary opposition in this commission, as well as the role that would be left to the latter in the constitutional debate and in the legislative process for changes would be of special importance. constitutional and legal, given that the special commission would be the body charged with the task of proposing the adoption of a complete package of draft laws necessary for the reform of legislation, which regulates the organization and functioning of the institutions of the justice system, including those constitutional.

The involvement and role of all parliamentary actors in this process took on even greater importance if we take into account that the parliamentary majority did not have the required majority for constitutional changes. At that time, the majority had 84 deputies due to the passage of some deputies to form an opposition force in the elections alongside the majority. These votes were enough only for the adoption of organic laws. While the amendment of the constitution required a minimum of 94 votes, in this context justice reform that required constitutional amendments, was impossible to achieve without the support of the parliamentary opposition, which at that time consisted mainly of Democratic Party deputies and some small allies of this political force.

But of greater importance was the involvement of the opposition in this process because of the vital importance of this reform. A profound reform of the justice system without the consent of the parliamentary opposition will in any case be an incomplete work. A reform without the participation of the opposition would greatly reduce public confidence in that process. And in these circumstances its product would be much less valuable if it were approved only with the support of the majority. That reform and its results would be prejudiced if undertaken without involving the country's opposition. And it would further damage the process if the reform was approved with the votes of only a few opposition MPs without obtaining the consensus of its

main party which was the Democratic Party of Albania which at that time controlled the vast majority of opposition MPs.

However, in decision no. 96, dated 27.11.2014, the parliament with the opposition voting against votes against, approved the establishment of a special commission for justice reform which had as its object: "The proposal for approval of a complete package of draft laws necessary for the reform of legislation, which regulates the organization and the functioning of the institutions of the justice system, including the constitutional ones, drafted with the contribution and support of the institutions of the justice system, local and international experts, other interested subjects and the public opinion.) "point 1 of decision no. 96, dated 27.11.2014 of the Assembly and a composition of 11 members, of which 6 representatives of the parliamentary majority and 5 of the opposition where the chairman of the committee would be the representative of the majority and the deputy chairman of the opposition. In the same decision of the Assembly, it was determined that the commission in the realization of its functions would be assisted by a group of local and foreign experts, as well as a technical secretariat would function to assist them. The Commission was tasked with appointing local experts and setting up a technical secretariat, while international experts would accept proposals received from OBDAT and EURALIUS as technical bodies representing the United States and the European Union in Albania. A role was also defined for the expertise of the Council of Europe in this process (Venice Commission), whenever requested by the commission itself.

The group of experts had a special role in the quality of the reform and the constitutional debate that would precede this reform. From the aforementioned decision of the Assembly and other decisions of the special commission, this group of experts would be charged with the task of carrying out all technical acts such as the analysis of the problems of the justice system, the strategy of judicial reform and the drafting of amendments. of constitutional and legal changes for justice reform. These experts were also called "High Level Experts of the Special Commission for Justice Reform".

The parliamentary opposition not only voted against decision no. 96, dt. 27.11.2014, but she did not nominate her five representatives in the special commission and boycotted the work of this commission until the acceptance of her demands, which consisted of a balance in the constitutional debate that would precede the constitutional changes

of justice reform. Specifically, the country's opposition demanded that in the parliamentary commission, as the body where the constitutional debate would take place and that would lead this debate, the parties be represented with equal numbers of members as a precondition for equal opportunities in the constitutional debate. the special commission to become with two co-chairs with the right of veto of each. It also sought its representatives from the group of experts who would also have a special role in the constitutional debate that would precede justice reform. For its part, the majority argued that an equality in the special commission for justice reform not only upset the balance of power between the parliamentary parties in the constitutional debate that would take place, but could also cause the process to be blocked by the opposition due to of the absence of the majority of votes in the special commission by the parliamentary majority.

For over 9 months, the commission functioned without the presence of the opposition and unilaterally proceeded with the establishment of a group of high-level experts who, by July 2015, had prepared 3 strategic documents for justice reform; 1) analysis of the justice system, where the problems of the justice system were identified; 2) The justice reform strategy, which defined the needs for constitutional and legal intervention for the implementation of the reform; 3) The Action Plan which defined the steps that would have to be taken until the drafting by experts of the constitutional amendments and legal changes that would be approved by the parliament as the finalization of the justice reform.

The majority claimed that the high-level experts of the commission were not proposals coming from it, but high-ranking figures in the domestic and academic justice system, selected by Euralius and Obdat, the two expert missions that assisted the proposed commission respectively by the European Union and the government of the United States of America.

On 16.7.2015, with the decision of the Assembly no.78 \ 2015, after a wide political and public debate in the country, the parliament decided to reconfigure the special commission of justice reform with an equal participation between the political parties in the special commission, provided that in case of impossibility of the decision of the commission due to the equality of votes, the vote of the chairman of the commission representing the majority has more value and determines the decision of the commission. Just a week later, the Assembly

approved a group of experts proposed by the country's opposition to be attached to local and international experts in their work on justice reform. The adoption of these decisions paves the way for a full and genuine constitutional debate that would precede the adoption of justice reform.

It should be borne in mind that by this time, the commission had proceeded in the absence of the opposition and its experts with a good deal of work, including the current Analysis of the justice system, the Strategy for its reform and Action Plan, including a variant of draft constitutional amendments for the reform of the justice system. All these important documents had passed without a full constitutional debate if we take into account that the opposition was not involved in the implementation of these documents.

In a short time, the opposition experts worked on the documents prepared by the commission with the methodology of analyzing and identifying the problems of these documents drafted up to that moment by the commission. On a very voluminous document, the representatives of the opposition in the commission argued that despite agreeing on the stated goals that the reform should achieve, where the three main ones were singled out; 1) the formation of a system that did not allow corporativism in the governing bodies of the justice system; 2) a justice system that did not allow its corruption and; 3) a system that guaranteed functioning outside of political influence, again they did not agree with the facts and analysis of technical documents approved by the commission experts at a time when the opposition had not yet become part of it. The opposition argued that indeed the analysis prepared by the commission's experts tried to scan the current state of the justice system in the country, but the problems identified by them did not always reflect the reality or were in any case not proven or confirmed by sources of accurate or statistical information. Then, it was reasoned in the same document prepared by the opposition experts, that the other documents of the Strategy and Platform for Action, since they start from the wrong premises, give also wrong and non-functional solutions for a large part of the universally accepted objectives of justice reform. For all the problems identified in the Analytical Document or the measures proposed in the Strategy, for which in the platform prepared by the opposition experts, no comments were given or alternative solutions / proposals were offered, the position was maintained that the representatives of the opposition agreed with

the existence of the problem and measures proposed by high-level experts. Meanwhile, following the treatment made in the Opposition Platform, the problems identified by it in the justice system, as well as finding solutions to these problems, the document of the opposition experts ended with 296 recommendations, divided according to specific areas. Each recommendation was in fact nothing more than a dividing point between the parties, each of the recommendations contradicted a certain finding of the commission experts, or gave a completely different solution to a certain issue.

Given that in order to understand how far the parties stood at the beginning of the constitutional debate, it is not enough just to highlight the large number of different recommendations of the representatives of the opposition but also the essential differences between the parties, we are presenting only some of them; 1. (Justice Reform is sectoral and should not aim at reforming the state organization as a whole. An opposite solution carries the risk of the need to review the three powers, which also leads to the discussion on the need for a new Constitution. Therefore, the constitutional norms of the President of the Republic should be treated as peripheral issues of the Justice Reform, for those parts whose competencies are related to the justice system); 2. (Not to change the formula for the selection of the President of the Republic.); 161. (The substantial majority of the members of the Prosecution Council should be elected by their colleagues. The elected prosecutorial members should represent all hierarchical structural levels of the prosecution system and should not be in leading administrative positions (heads of district prosecutions or appeal) and meet the criteria set out above for judges of the High Court and the High Court, for professional integrity, including the criteria of experience when they were in office and office during the communist regime.); 162. (In order to ensure the democratic legitimacy of this Council, the other members should be elected by the Parliament from among persons with appropriate qualifications (law professors and lawyers engaged in civil society, etc.); 163. (Members of the Prosecution Council , appointed by the Assembly, to be elected by a qualified majority as in the case of the Attorney General or with substantial opposition participation in order to guarantee impartiality and eliminate political capture.); 224. (Any way or mechanism to become part of the judicial system that avoids the School of Magistrates, the control of ability through competition to be admitted to it, is

INADMISSIBLE for the opposition and is considered a violation of constitutional principles for an independent and professional judiciary)

So the document prepared by the experts of the opposition, not only in many cases presented different problems from those drafted by the experts of the commission for the current justice system, but consequently provided different solutions to those proposed by the experts of the commission. Despite the fact that the drafting of this document had placed the parties in different positions regarding the solutions to a series of essential issues that were proposed for a successful reform of the justice system, it was in fact the beginning of a full and wide constitutional debate for the realization of a comprehensive justice reform, which if we consider the configuration of forces in the parliament of the country, was necessary as the only opportunity for the adoption of constitutional changes according to the requirements of the basic law of the country.

During this period, high-level experts of the special commission on justice, without the involvement of opposition experts, in the framework of their tasks previously defined by the special commission on justice reform, drafted the necessary constitutional amendments for the reform of the judiciary system. This first draft of constitutional amendments, which was subsequently approved by the special committee with only a majority vote, was based only on technical documents prepared in advance by high-level committee experts, without the participation of the opposition and without reflecting the platform prepared by the latter, because the first version of the draft constitutional amendments was drafted before the publication of the platform of opposition experts.

In this situation where on the one hand the political parties had fundamental differences in the constitutional debate on the changes needed to reform the system and on the other hand the majority had proceeded unilaterally with the approval of constitutional amendments that constituted the architecture of justice reform, the constitutional debate had entered a very difficult stalemate to solve.

At this point, the role of the Venice Commission, as a technical body specialized in legal issues of the Council of Europe, with a great legal experience in consulting deep legal reforms in the member states of the Council of Europe and beyond, takes on special importance. The political parties with diametrically opposed positions in the special commission agreed to refer to the expertise of the Venice Commission

and to adjust their opposing positions based on the recommendations of the Venice Commission.

Prior to the drafting of its opinion, the Venice Commission invited to the audience representatives of the majority in the Special Commission for Justice Reform, who had prepared the draft constitutional amendments under consideration. The parliamentary opposition sent a material in the form of opposition to the Venice Commission, where it submitted its remarks on the draft constitutional amendments. To understand how far apart the parties were for this first version of the constitutional amendments, suffice it to say that of the 58 articles proposed to be amended in the Constitution by the majority, the opposition was categorically against 11 of them and for the others questioned the Venice Commission, declaring its reservations about them and questioning the quality of those changes.

On 21.12.2015, the Venice Commission sent with its opinion no. 824, its preliminary opinion on the first version of the proposed constitutional changes. This preliminary opinion was a long report containing 138 paragraphs, which analyzed all the proposed constitutional amendments. It should be noted that this preliminary opinion, which was the first contribution of the Venice Commission to justice reform, had a double standard. On the one hand, he was very critical of almost all the main provisions of the constitutional amendments, finding them in conflict with the constitutional principles but also of human rights guaranteed by international acts, and on the other hand he tried to justify this content with the issue of the justice system in Albania and the need for very deep and radical interventions as the only way to get it out of the clutches of capillary corruption and corporatism in the justice system. To prove this dual position of the Venice Commission, we are bringing here the content of paragraph 98 of this opinion which speaks of one of the hottest issues of justice reform, that of creating a structure to control the integrity and figure of judges and prosecutors, the so-called Vetting. This paragraph explicitly states: "(98. The need for the vetting process is explained by an assumption - shared by each of the interlocutors who met with reporters in Tirana - that the level of corruption in the Albanian judiciary is extremely high and the situation requires measures The question is whether this broad consensus creates a sufficient basis to subject all judges (including honest ones) to re-evaluation, regardless of the specific circumstances of each individual judge. This is a matter

of political necessity and the Commission of Venice is not in a position to comment on it, but it must be borne in mind that such a radical solution would be inappropriate under normal circumstances, as it creates extreme tensions within the judiciary, destabilizes its work, increases public distrust of the judiciary, diverts the attention of judges from their normal duties, and, like any extraordinary measure, creates the risk of being caught red-handed by the political force that controls the process. "

As can be seen, the Opinion of the Venice Commission had many concrete reservations about the content of the constitutional amendments, but in the meantime encouraged the implementation of this reform at any cost and at any cost. And if you read the final and most important recommendations of this preliminary report, the recommendations listed at the end of it, you will come to the same conclusion. These recommendations which specifically required:

- All constitutional arrangements should be reviewed and simplified; constitutional amendments (especially for the evaluation process) should set out only the most important principles, and the details should be left to the implementing legislation;
- It is recommended to clarify who decides on disciplinary measures against judges of the Constitutional Court; the decisions of the Constitutional Court should have general binding force and the Constitutional Court should retain the power to review at least the procedure of constitutional amendments;
- The role of the Minister of Justice in the High Inspectorate of Justice and the High Judicial Council should be reviewed in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest; in general, institutional arrangements need to be revised in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest; The Minister of Justice should have no place in the Disciplinary Tribunal;
- The Constitution should set out general principles governing the process of appointing judges and prosecutors (merit-based selection, open calling for candidates, etc.); the proposed reference in the Constitution to the disciplinary responsibility of judges needs further clarification;

- The Constitution should clarify the relationship between the prosecutors of the Special Anti-Corruption Structure and the Prosecutor General;
- An anti-stalemate mechanism should be established in the election of the Prosecutor General; The Attorney General should not be a member of the Disciplinary Tribunal;
- The composition of the Independent Evaluation Commissions and the status of their members should guarantee their genuine independence and impartiality; judges / prosecutors subject to evaluation must enjoy basic guarantees of a fair trial and the right to appeal to an independent body;
- The status and conditions of appointment / removal of international observers should be defined; their powers should be described more precisely (and further developed in the implementing legislation), which at the top of them represented the need for a total review of constitutional amendments with a view to their simplification. While in spirit these recommendations required the continuation of this reform and its implementation at any cost and specifically this opinion took care of a politically unattractive judiciary, given that the components of anti-corruption and anti-corporatism were more complete in the first constitutional amendments analyzed by the Venice Commission. This must have been taken into account by the preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission where for many issues it has not been expressed concretely arguing that they are matters of political decision-making and where sometimes requires consensual solutions between the parties on the hottest issues, as the only way for a successful and quality reform.

The preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission, published in the last days of 2015, was followed by the referral of the constitutional debate between the parties. The parliamentary majority accepted the revision of its draft amendments to reflect the findings of the Venice Commission, while the opposition insisted on the need for substantial changes to the draft constitutional amendments under discussion. The drafting of the new constitutional amendments was dominated by discussions on many issues, but two of them were the most obvious

issues that the parties shared even after the publication of the preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission.

The first and most important issue was how to select the new organs of the system. The position of the majority was based on the qualified majority for the selection of these bodies by the Assembly, referring to other European models that were accepted by the preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission. While the opposition insisted that any qualified majority controlled by the current majority would be the premise for the new executive apparatus to be seized. And the only solution was to define a formula that ensured the representation of the opposition itself with a number of members in the new judiciary. And the opposition's concern and the solutions it provided were also based on the Venice Commission's preliminary opinion options.

The second point separating the parties had to do with a complex and augmented scheme of the new organs of the justice system. The opposition demanded their reduction, while the majority insisted on reviewing their composition and functioning, but not eliminating any of them. And in this case the preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission was not with a clear position. He acknowledged the danger posed by a series of new judicial bodies being created and then argued that they could stay and function in the particular conditions of the country's justice system.

In early 2016, after the debate that followed the preliminary report of the Venice Commission and the efforts of the experts of the parties to jointly draft a package of draft constitutional opinions in an attempt that failed, the representatives of the majority in the special commission on justice reform drafted a new set of constitutional amendments and claimed that they reflected the concerns of the Venice Commission preliminary report. This draft was sent back to the Venice Commission for consideration. This time too, the opposition did not prefer to go with its own draft before the commission, but drafted a position on its objections with a version no. 2 of the draft constitutional amendments. The constitutional debate was already focused on whether or not version 2 of the constitutional amendments respected the recommendations of the Venice Commission's preliminary opinion. The position of the opposition on these changes is clearly expressed at the beginning of the material that its representatives in the special commission on justice reform sent to the Venice Commission and that

it had this content; "The content of the draft unilaterally revised by the majority of the Draft Amendments, at first glance there are some changes. However, from their analysis we find that most and most of the recommendations of the Venice Commission have not been reflected, making the new draft inconsistent with the recommendations given, while another part has been reflected incompletely or contrary to the recommendations. We also find that the amendments do not take into account the standards already elaborated by the Venice Commission for other countries, or for Albania itself ".

Despite the fact that the representatives of the majority in the special commission on justice reform claimed that their version fully complied with the recommendations of the preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission, for example in fulfilling the recommendations succeeded 2 of the new bodies of the system such as the Justice Tribunal and The Supreme Administrative Court provided in the first version, again the compatibility of this version with the public questioned the fact that the Ministry of Justice, headed by a minister of the second largest party of the ruling coalition, drafted a completely different version for draft constitutional amendments, which further intensified the constitutional debate at this stage of the justice reform process.

We now had not 2 parties in the constitutional debate, but 3 of them. On the one hand the main majority in the assembly that had consolidated a concrete draft of constitutional amendments for justice reform, and on the other hand the opposition that categorically opposed the way provided by the main majority variant for the selection of members of new justice institutions, and the role left to the OMN" (Organization for International Monitoring) in the selection and evaluation process of judges and prosecutors. Among them was the second largest party of the parliamentary majority, which declared the necessity of finalizing the reform but also found the two final claims of the country's opposition justified.

The Venice Commission in its final opinion, which was published on 14.03.2016, expressed in the final conclusions and on the 2 issues that still divided the parties. In paragraph 88 of this opinion, regarding the manner of electing the governing bodies of the judiciary, the opinion stated: "If the parties in the political process do not accept the qualified majority required for non-judicial members of the HJC, HJC, KPC and DHSK, they they can choose a proportional system that guarantees the representation of the opposition between the collective

bodies or any other appropriate model that would ensure the influence of the opposition in the election process". As for the role and possibility of establishing an international body with competencies in the selection and evaluation of judges and prosecutors, the final opinion of the Venice Commission, in its conclusions, recommended this solution; "The powers of international observers need to be clarified; they should have procedural rights, but not decision-making powers. The mechanism for transferring jurisdiction over an issue from one panel / chamber to another needs to be reviewed. "

After the final report, the constitutional debate lasted and remained only these two final issues. The opposition demanded representation in the new governing bodies of the judiciary, while the majority insisted that such a solution would politicize these bodies and put them at the service of political interests by affecting the principle of independence of the justice system. The parties were also divided regarding the role of the OMN in the process of establishing new bodies of justice and evaluation of judges. The opposition insisted on a strict advisory or monitoring role rather than the OMN's decision-making, linking it to issues of national sovereignty, while the parliamentary majority demanded a significant role of international experts in these processes, and even the executive powers of international observers.

The Constitutional Debate on the two final issues lasted more than four months, even until the late hours of 21.07.2016, which was the day of the closing of the parliamentary session. In order to find a political consensus on the two final issues, the direct intervention with concrete variants of the US Deputy Secretary of State Mrs. Nuland, and the EU Enlargement Commissioner Mr. Hahn was valid. Based on these variants, the parties agreed on a complex formula for the selection of collegial bodies of the judiciary, where members of the bilateral parliamentary committee with equal representation between the opposition and the majority, had the right to select one of the nominees for each member for the bodies of the system and the list of collegial bodies of government of the justice system to be approved as a single list and only with a qualified majority of votes in the plenary session. The role of the OMN was also reduced compared to previous variants of the constitutional amendments.

The long and tedious constitutional debate, where technical and political views could not be separated, was worth it at the end of this process, as the constitutional changes for the justice reform were

passed in the Albanian Parliament in the last minutes of the first parliamentary session of the year 2016, with 140 votes of the members of the Assembly of the Republic of Albania. The effort of the parties to adopt a consensual reform was achieved. The country's opposition all voted in favor of the constitutional package for justice reform, which was the basic act of this reform.

After this period, the political climate in the country was severely aggravated by the country's opposition. At a time when parliament would have on the agenda the drafting of organic laws establishing new bodies of the justice system and their functioning, the country's opposition left parliament and entered a spiral of protests that culminated in February 2017 with the establishment of an umbrella on the main boulevard of the city where uninterrupted protests took place with political demands for the resignation of the prime minister of the country and for going to the elections with a technical government and a prime minister accepted by the parliamentary opposition.

Of course, in this political climate there was little or no room for consensus between the parties in drafting and approving the organic laws of the new organs of the justice system. Given that the majority of the time had the necessary numbers of 84 deputies to approve the minimum number of justice reform laws, it passed these laws alone and without the consensus of the opposition at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017.

The political crisis was closed with a political agreement between the parties, where part of the agreement was the agreement for the parliamentary opposition to be included in the work of the special parliamentary commission for the election of members of the vetting bodies which were elected by the opposition and majority MPs. Also in this period the opposition and its agreement for the so-called law of SPAK, the special anti-corruption structure in Albania. This agreement was made possible only after the whole proposal package of the opposition for this law was accepted in the bloc and without any opposition.

All other laws of the judiciary reform pact were passed without the consent of the country's opposition and it did not accept them with the argument that the constitutional mechanisms for selecting new members of the High Judicial Council and that of the High Prosecution Council were ignored by law because the legal mechanism avoided the

active role of the opposition in the selection of these members. And in this way it gave it a formal role as long as the above-ranked candidates were elected to these positions in case a consensual parliamentary majority was not reached for their selection. In fact, there was a discordance between the Constitutional provisions on the manner of selection of members of the new bodies of the system, mainly the HJC and the HJC, and the legal provisions on their selection. The law gave a greater role to the assembly administration in the right to disqualify a candidate from running for these positions due to non-compliance with the criteria. At this point the opposition claimed that the assembly administration, which had this fundamental right in the process of selecting new members from outside the HJC and HJC system, was under the influence of the majority and therefore the law was unconstitutional.

These laws were hit for this reason in the Constitutional Court, but it with a majority of votes upheld the main provisions shared by the parties in this case.

Today, 5 years have passed since the constitutional amendments of the justice reform were made, we can say that all this mechanism has entered into full function. Vetting has passed through the filter the elite of the justice system in the country and has excluded half of the judges and prosecutors investigated from the system, mostly because of their inability to justify assets. Also, the High Judicial Council and that of the Prosecution together with the Judicial Appointments Council and the High Inspectorate of Justice are in full function. Thanks to their work, today the country has 7 members of the Constitutional Court and very soon the full approval of the body with members appointed by the Supreme Court is expected. The completion of the body of the High Court is in the final stage, while the High Inspectorate of Justice continuously investigates and brings to trial judges and prosecutors that result in violations in their work. The School of Magistrates admits a large number of students each year that will fill vacancies created by judges and prosecutors expelled from the system due to vetting or disciplinary measures given to them.

All political actors in the country, including the opposition, are proud to have contributed to the implementation of this radical reform of the justice system in Albania and almost all parties declare their continued support for the new institutions of the justice system.

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