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Routinization and Transference in Sermons

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Abstract:

This paper discusses issues of Rabbinic sermon scholarship in the context of sermons delivered in Australian Synagogues. The study arose from the author's participation in the National Conference on Preaching at the Australian National Theological Seminary, in Canberra, in September 2013, and a subsequent author presentation on the paper's methodology at the International Symposium on Social Sciences in Hong Kong, December 2013. The Conference sought to identify a body of scholarship underlying the construction of sermons. Beginning with a discussion of the contemporary context in Australian Synagogues, in order to state the problem, the paper argues that routinized sermons satisfy an audience desire for propriety, allowing the congregation to routinely transfer imagos from ancient institutions onto the person of the Rabbi. In order to deal with the problem, the paper analyses Rabbinic homiletics and tries to place them within a sophistical rhetorical context of the various progymnasmata. The paper will suggest that the more routinized a congregation, the lower on the progymnasmata scale of oratory should be its sermons, due to operative transference.

Key words: Routinization, transference, Rabbinic sermon scholarship, Australian Synagogues

1. Introduction

This paper discusses issues of Rabbinic sermon scholarship in

the context of sermons delivered in Australian Synagogues. The study arose from the author's participation in the National Conference on Preaching at the Australian National Theological Seminary in Canberra, in September 2013. The presented and discussed the papers' methodology at the International Symposium of Social Sciences in Hong Kong in December 2013. As the Conference sought to identify a body of scholarship underlying the construction of sermons, I wanted to answer the problem of why sermon quality was consistently so poor in Australia.

I determined to apply the arguably stepping-stone methodological approach of Lonergan[1] to identifying any underlying context of sermon scholarship. I agree that Longergan's methodology requires more than minimal explanation. These stepping-stones begin on the basis of the received oral tradition, they traverse theories of psychoanalytic transference, relating them to developmental grades of sophistical oratory, and finally, the discussion will suggest a target field of scholarship in the sophistical progymnasmata, for the construction of sermons.

Received oral tradition suggests that the chief purpose of a Rabbinic sermon is to admonish, (rather than to exhort), the congregation by teaching them either a lesson or a law, deriving from ancient institutions. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*[2], Aristotle stated that the deliberative principle manifested itself in the actions of admonishment, rebuke and exhortation.[3] He added, later in the treatise, that an act conforming with virtue

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[1] B J F Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1975.

[2] Aristotle *The Nichomachean Ethics*, Book I, H. Rackham trans., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 67.

[3] Admonish. To put in mind of duties; to counsel; to warn. To inculcate. To put in mind, charge, exhort. To put in mind, warn. To put in mind, inform. Exhort. To admonish earnestly; to urge by words to laudable conduct. Of circumstances, to serve as an incitement. To recommend earnestly. Rebuke. A shameful or disgraceful check; a shame or disgrace. Shame, disgrace, reproach. Reproof, reprimand. *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989).

must be done with knowledge, be deliberate and chosen for its own sake, and must come from a fixed disposition of character.[4] In clarifying the process of deliberation, Aristotle stated that the field of deliberation was to discern actions that were within one's power to perform.[5]

The Rabbinic sermon generally is delivered directly after the public reading of the Torah, not uncoincidentally because the Rabbi must teach Torah to the congregation. He uses the sermon to expand, analyse, clarify, add insight, or otherwise teach the weekly Torah portion. His audience is embedded in the local culture, and theoretically, this must affect his sermon structure. My discussion is delimited to asking what body of scholarship might be of practical use in constructing and delivering sermons of this Rabbinic type.

As relevant to the article's methodology, Lonergan describes method, in theological research, as "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results", such as discovery of meaning.[6] However, the term 'operations' seems either unanchored in meaning, or insufficiently preceptual for a definition. Thus, Shea considered Lonergan's procedures for scholarly methodology, and concluded that Lonergan's meaning of 'operations' could be contextualised as follows. He said that for an understanding of the relationship between theory and practice, there must be a "critical mediation and appropriation of one's own cognitional, evaluative, and decisional processes or operations".[7] From this, it appears reasonable to suggest, on the basis of this conjunctive "or", that Lonergan's operations are

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[4] Aristotle *Ethics*, p. 85.

[5] Aristotle *Ethics*, p. 141.

[6] B J F Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1975, p. 5; As for method for developing meaning, Lonergan states that the formal act of meaning is an act of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining, supposing and formulating. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1975, p. 74.

[7] William M Shea, 'From Classicism to Method: John Dewey and Bernard Lonergan', *American Journal of Education*, vol. 99, no. 3, 1991, pp. 298-319, 303.

one's own cognitional, evaluative, and decisional processes. From this, according to Weber, it seems likely that each progressive removal of a magical aspect of research artefact, transforming it into synthesised knowledge, will represent one of Lonergan's operations.[8] I will try to illustrate this kind of operation, below, in sermon scholarship context, within a description of the myth of Proteus.

Subsequently, Lonergan formulates an act of meaning as an act of judging. As judging, it settles the status of the object of thought as either a mere object of thought, a mathematical theory, a real thing within human experience, or a transcendent reality beyond the human world of experience.[9] He clarifies his description of methodology by noting that method exists where there are distinct operations, each one related to the others, with the set of relations forming a recognisable pattern. He suggests that this pattern is described, possibly by others external to the process, as the "right way" of doing the job. And further, the operations may be repeated indefinitely, pursuant to the pattern. What he termed the fruits of these repetitions are not repetitious fruits, but rather, are cumulative and progressive.[10]

Apparently concerned at Lonergan's views on method, Gilkey stated that in the dialectic of history, the synthesis of yesterday might become the impediment to today's synthesis. He added that yesterday's clarity might be what obscured illumination later on.[11] Lonergan seemed to answer by recommending that results are progressive only when there is a continued sequence of discoveries. The results are cumulative only if each new insight is synthesised with all the previous

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[8] See Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1* , University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 464, where an inverse relationship is drawn between magical components of a religion and the importance of preaching.

[9] B J F Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1975, p. 74.

[10]ibid., p. 5.

[11] Langdon Gilkey, 'Response to Lonergan', *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 58, 1978, pp. S18-S23, at p. S23.

insights. Lonergan narrows the list of possible operations in the method's pattern as: seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking and writing.[12]

The scope of the research also is delimited primarily by a need to grade and assess the relevance of the scholarship relevant to sermons. It is further delimited by concentrating on sermon discourse, rather than sermon wordage. The paper tests the proposition that the routinized[13] mode of transmission and teaching of ancient truth is related to the psychoanalytic transference, because psychoanalytic transference links the ancient past to the present.[14] The latter clause will have to be argued.

The paper first presents an anecdotal narrative of Rabbinic sermons' Australian contexts showing how they have become routinized. Then, in order to begin to test the proposition that routinization is because of transference, the paper presents an analysis of some relevant scholarship based in the psychoanalytic works of Sigmund Freud on transference.[15] Finally, the paper addresses a range of insights into Rabbinic public rhetoric, by David Stern,[16] showing the presence of transference within the homiletics, and situating Rabbinic homiletics within a sophistical rhetorical context. In

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[12] B J F Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1975, p. 6.

[13] Routinization required each repetition of any divinity-related action be identical with previous observances, even to the least detail. D McIntosh, 'Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 35, no. 5, 1970, pp. 901 - 911, at p. 907.

[14] Referring to a child, Freud stated: "He fills in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth; he replaces occurrences in his own life by occurrences in the life of his ancestors". Freud, Standard Edition, XVII, p. 97.

[15] See, for example, S. Freud, *Dora – An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, Touchstone, New York, 1997.

[16] David Stern, *Parables in Midrash - Narrative and Exegesis in Rabbinic Literature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

order to contextualise routinized Rabbinic homiletics within an established body of scholarship, my enterprise proceeds to examine the general sophistical rhetorical principles of the progymnasmata, as translated by George Kennedy.[17] This enterprise is limited by a necessarily short discussion of progymnasmata oratory. However, each of these stages of the investigation will be linked by suggested cumulative syntheses.

The paper will conclude that the more routinized a congregation, the lower on the progymnasmata scale of oratory should be its sermons. This is because that kind of congregation would watch the service and transfer imagos of ancient institutions onto the person of the Rabbi. This kind of congregation would require a sermon to conform more closely to their expected rituals, so to teach a lesson, and could reject newly synthesised scholarship purporting to teach a law. However, the less routinized a congregation, the more likely they could be admonished successfully about constructing a law.

2. The Australian Rabbinic Context

This section of the paper serves to state the contemporary problem in sermon scholarship. I will try and show that, in Australia, an operative body of sermon scholarship appears to be receding, in Synagogue practice. Having shown that, I will suggest reasons why this might be so, in the following section on the psychoanalytic transference.

Evidence in this section is taken largely from Rabbinic collegiate discussions, and from the author's personal Rabbinic experience. In light of this, the Rabbinic sermon can be seen as a measure of the congregation's admixture with the Australian collective psyche. I will try to show that Rabbinic authority in contemporary Australia is largely symbolic, which will require

[17] George A Kennedy (trans.), *Progymnasmata - Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2003.

a short degession to examine the nature of symbolism in this context.

Symbolism in the world of religion might be subject to definitional problems. Geertz, arguing from a structural perspective, concluded that religion was a system of symbols acting to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods in people by establishing conceptions of a general order of existence, and interweaving these conceptions with such apparent factuality that the people's moods and motivations seemed realistic.[18] Fogelin observed that there was a widespread archaeological view that ritual was a form of human action leaving material traces.[19] On the other hand, he argued that religion was a more abstract symbolic system consisting of beliefs, myths and doctrines.[20] This suggested that symbolism, in a sermon context, might consist of beliefs, myths and doctrines. However, Cohn noted a modern use of the term 'symbol' as being equivalent to metaphor.[21] These apparently disparate descriptions suggest a brief look at defining the term "symbol".

Rene Wellek and Austin Warren defined a symbol as "an object which refers to another object but which demands attention also in its own right, as a presentation".[22] Cohn stated that symbol could be either in the sense of a sign, or in the sense of an image.[23] He described a sign as a word representing a phenomenon.[24]

Carlsson attempted to synthesise into a few sentences

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[18] C Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Basic Books, New York, 1973, p. 90.
[19] Lars Fogelin, 'The Archaeology of Religious Ritual', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 36, 2007, pp. 55-71, at p. 56.
[20] G Lilienthal, 'Rabbinic Representation in Australia' [Personal Interview with Rabbi Dr Jeffrey Cohen], 16 September 2013, Sydney, NSW.
[21] Robert G. Cohn 'Symbolism', The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 33, no. 2, 1974, pp. 181-192, at p. 186.
[22] Rene Wellek & Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, Harcourt, New York, 1949, chap. 15
[23] Robert G. Cohn 'Symbolism', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1974, pp. 181-192, at p. 181.
[24] ibid., p. 184.

Jung's long description of the term "symbol".[25] He stated that the symbol referred to an unknown entity, whose nature could not be expressed differently or better than by that particular symbol. Symbols had a life span, so that if an expression were found to formulate the unknown thing in a still better way, then the symbol would be dead. When dead, it would possess only a historical significance.[26]

Considering that religion uses symbols to persuade, and that Rabbis are arguably a sign of what will routinely happen during the service, a question arises as to the fate of the Rabbi as a sign. In the 1950s, many Australian Rabbis held doctoral degrees and substantial records of publication. Most were from foreign jurisdictions. Those in Australia who wanted ordination had to attend a Rabbinic academy in Britain, Europe or America.[27]

Contemporary Rabbinic activity in Australia is arguably a synthesis of, and dialectic between, the American schools and the British schools, with little Australian scholarly influence. There is some small interweaving of immigrant Israeli Rabbinic thought, and very little public teaching of Talmudic arguments. The American schools are overwhelmingly controlled in Australia by the Lubovitch movement. It is so pervasive that the other schools cannot gain a dominant voice. The Lubovitch movement has seized sole control of the Kashrut Authority,[28] the major authority in Australia for public and symbolic certification of foods.

The Lubovitch movement runs Rabbinic academies in Australia, and, in their Rabbinic ranks, there is little or no formal scholarly training in academic writing. The typical Lubovitch Rabbi is young, in his late twenties to mid thirties,

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[25] Allan Carlsson, 'Jung on Meaning and Symbols in Religion', *The Journal of General Education*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1970, pp. 29-40, at p. 36, referring to C G Jung, *Psychological Types*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., New York, 1923, p. 601 et seq.
[26] Ibid.
[27] G Lilienthal, 'Rabbinic Representation in Australia' [Personal Interview with Rabbi Dr Jeffrey Cohen], 16 September 2013, Sydney, NSW.
[28] Ibid.

without a degree and with no research training in the university sense. A Grand Rabbi headed the movement. The last Grand Rabbi passed away in the early 1990s. Since that time, the movement has not appointed a replacement Grand Rabbi. However, the last Grand Rabbi's teachings survive him in published form, and so do the teachings of his several predecessors. In all cases, they are published accounts of the Grand Rabbis' traditional oral sermons, lectures and classes. There are some publications of his written works, but few are referenced. They are, effectively, oral transcriptions of sermons recorded by appointed official scribes.[29]

Sermons in Australia by young Lubovitch Rabbis tend to be structured as commentaries on the weekly portion of Torah, some added free association, some reports on what the various Grand Rabbis had to say, and an arguably minimalist conclusion. Thus, they are primarily a retelling of different opinions, rather than a sustained argument. This avoids allowing the audience an argument to reject. It appears that synthesis is not encouraged, since the Grand Rabbis' works are treated as canonised sources.[30] The audiences are not known for listening carefully to these sermons.

The British school in Australia comprises graduates of Jews College in London. Jews College had a rigorous program of Rabbinic training. Its sermon training included the public delivery of 2 or 3 arguments, and a synthesis-conclusion with a moral component. Jews College graduates were arguably well-trained in the practical skills of public oratory. They spoke on issues associated with the weekly *Torah* portion, and their sermons' content was influenced by material supplied from a so-called Chief Rabbi's "Cabinet" sitting in London.[31]

Graduates in Australia occupy the pulpits in British-linked Synagogues, such as the Great Synagogue in Sydney. These Rabbis concentrate on presentation of the service, a

[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.

perfect reading of the Torah, delivering a well-argued sermon, and arranging for singing in an opera-trained style. Some have degrees in disciplines unrelated to Rabbinic theory and practice. It appears, that the principal aim of the British schools in Australia is to run the various Jewish Courts. None appears to have ordination at the level of Jewish Judge. There is no chief Jewish Judge in Australia, the most senior Rabbinic official being generally from the United Kingdom and designated as Registrar of the Jewish Court.[32]

The Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, and Hebrew Union Colleges in Los Angeles and Cincinnati, are both well-respected scholarly centres. Few, if any, of their doctoral scholars are appointed to Australian pulpits. There are now only 3 Jews College graduates in Australia, and the College is now called the London School of Jewish Studies. It now has no Ordination programme. The Lubovitch Rabbis now hold more than 50% of all pulpits in Australia. We call the ultra-Orthodox Rabbis by the term "haredi". The Lubovitch Rabbis are haredi. The non-haredi rabbis are primarily trained in the USA or Israel. Among the non-haredi Rabbis in Sydney, 3 graduated from Yeshiva University and 4 are from Israeli institutions. Those who went to Yeshiva University in New York, or previously went to Jews College in London, all have training in homiletics, while those whose training was in Israel usually have no such training. They are trained in giving a traditional dinner table insight, called a "vort", but not in sermons. There are probably over 20 non-Orthodox Rabbis in Australia. In Sydney 6 out of 7 non-Orthodox Rabbis were trained in USA, and the other was trained in London. Among the other 15 in Australia, 1 each in Adelaide and Perth, most were trained in USA, and 3 in London. All have training in homiletics. Most of the previous generation of Rabbis, be they Orthodox or Reform, had to earn a Ph.D. prior to receiving Ordination, the educational standard since having declined. This did not apply

[32] Ibid.

to the haredi Rabbis.[33]

In summary, more than 50% of Australian Synagogues have Rabbis untrained in homiletics, and without a formal body of scholarship informing their sermon construction. This form of traditional authority is arguably not generated by purpose or value, but must be a systematic style of rationality.[34]McIntosh noted that this type of authority involved the systematic application of ritual procedures to every outward aspect of the life of the society, allowing authority to become purely symbolic in nature.[35] This sense of the word "symbolic" sounds like the definition of symbol, by Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, described above.[36] Therefore, the next sections examine the nature of the personage of the Rabbi within the context of his sermon.

3. Scholarship and Rabbinic Discourse

This section examines Freud's work on treatment of ancient information through the mechanism of the transference. I want to show that Weber's concept of routinization, operating in most Australian Synagogues, subsists together with the psychoanalytic transference. Thus, the section tests the general proposition that the transmission and teaching of ancient truth is related to the psychoanalytic transference. Then it examines evidence for transference within the fields of Rabbinic homiletics and sophistical oratory, to see how the sermon admonitions might survive their presentation to the congregation.

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[33] Ibid.

[34] "The form of rationalization typical of traditional authority is neither purpose nor value rationality but systematic rationality". D McIntosh, 'Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority', American Sociological Review, vol. 35, no. 5, 1970, pp. 901 - 911, at p. 907.

[35] Ibid.

[36] See Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, Harcourt, New York, 1949, chap. 15.

3.1 Sigmund Freud - The Psychoanalytic Transference

It is well-known in Rabbinic circles, although the proposition remains controversial, that Freud developed psychoanalysis from Talmudic and other ancient Rabbinic texts. From this, it is reasonable to assert that common ideas inhere in psychoanalysis and Rabbinic rhetoric. In this section I try to show that remnants of these ancient formulae re-appear through the psychoanalytic transference, during sermons, and could be transferred onto the person of the Rabbi.

Freud characterised transference as replacing persons, sublimation, resistance to constructions, and a context he called a stereotype plate, to be explained below. In the postscript to Freud's case exposition of *Dora*, Freud stated that during analysis the formation of new symptoms is stopped, with the productive power of the neurosis engaged in creating a special class of mental structures. To the contrary, some modern critiques of the Dora case-study would argue that Freud was projecting his theory on to Dora, so as not to hear the distressing circumstances of her case, thus producing new symptoms/symbols of repression. For example, in her play *Portrait of Dora*, Hélène Cixous presented a view of hysteria as having its own particularly female logic, and therefore void of pathology. She claimed hysteria to be as a valid mode of female being, with the properties of a symbol of women's place in society.[37]

Nevertheless, Freud gave these identified structures the name of "transference", and designated them for the most part unconscious. This suggests transference need not necessarily be treated as pathological, but more probably characterological. Freud separated transferences into new impressions or reprints, or revised editions.[38] Without delimiting the earliest time of the replaced earlier person, but simply basing

[37] See the play Portrait of Dora (Paris: des femmes, 1976), discussed in Martha Noel Evans, 'Portrait of Dora: Freud's Case History As Reviewed by Hélène Cixous', SubStance, vol. 11, no. 3, 1982, pp. 64-71, at p. 70.
[38] Freud's *Dora*, pp. 106, 107.

transference on some non-specific earlier person, he described transferences, as follows.

What are transferences? They are new editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and phantasies, which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment. Some of these transferences have a content which differs from that of their model in no respect whatever except for the substitution. These, then—to keep to the same metaphor—are merely new impressions or reprints. Others are more ingeniously constructed; their content has been subjected to a moderating influence—to *sublimation,* as I call it— and they may even become conscious, by cleverly taking advantage of some real peculiarity in the physician's person or circumstances and attaching themselves to that. These, then, will no longer be new impressions, but
revised editions.[39]

Freud also designated transferences as inevitable necessities. They were to be resolved in analysis so that the patient could sense the validity of connections constructed during analysis.[40] The patient called up affectionate transferences to aid recovery, and if this could not be done, the patient broke away. Within analysis, the patient used all his-her tendencies, including hostile ones. Those made conscious, acted to destroy the transference. Thus, the analyst must detect the transference and explain it to the patient.[41]

In his 1912 paper *The Dynamics of Transference*, Freud

[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., p.107.
[41] Ibid., p. 108.

noted the subject's specific conduct of their erotic life, [42] demonstrated repeatable and repeated preconditions for falling in love.[43]

He called this repetition a stereotype plate for satisfying instincts and setting aims.[44] These could be divided into those oriented towards reality, which became conscious and formed part of the personality, and those held up in development, which could only expand within phantasy and thus remained unconscious. Both streams of impulses worked together in forming an anticipatory attitude based on libidinal ideas/drives. As a result, the libidinal cathexis of a partly satisfied person would be directed onto the figure of the doctor. In this way the doctor was included in the pre-formed stereotype plate. The fact that the transference might arise on the lines of the father, mother, sister or brother imago,[45] suggests the question of whether it might arise similarly in institutions.

McIntosh concluded that, on the basis of Freudian theory, the psychological source of the emotions of loyalty and rebelliousness within institutions is within the people's original family relations.[46] As an imago would inherently include a recursive reference to prior generations, these imago bases for the stereotype plates of transference could be in the form of a king, queen or any other substitute form for a father, mother, sister or brother,[47] or even prior institutions. We may note, at this point, that anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski proposed that the mythical permeated all of life, as an intimate connection existed between the word, the mythos, the sacred tales of a tribe, on the one hand, and their ritual acts, their moral deeds, their social organization, and even their practical

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[42] *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XII*, The Hogarth Press, London, 2001, p. 99.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., p. 100.
[46] D McIntosh, 'Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority', American Sociological Review, vol. 35, no. 5, 1970, pp. 901 - 911, at p. 908.
[47] The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XII, The Hogarth Press, London, 2001, p. 100.

activities.[48] As such, this implied that transference could involve mythical modes of thought, both within families and within institutions.

Knapp considered the suggestion that myth was a way of thinking speculatively about the conditions of human life. Myth was a mode of thinking with a grammar of its own, detectable in cultural products as diverse as marriage rules and the classification of plants. Because the human mind was substantially the same, everywhere in the world, its patterns were patent in the deep structure of all its language products. Possibly meaning irony rather than paradox, he concluded that, 'faced with the irreconcilable paradoxes of human life, man created systems of thought in language and myth, which served to mediate paradox and reconcile him to the conditions of his life'.[49] Thus, the question arises as to how this mediation of paradox might be understood in a sermon context.

An example of such mediation of irony might be illustrated in the following discussion of the myth of Proteus. The Proteus stories exemplify this kind of irony, because they suggest at once a certain implication of underlying old laws into modern laws by ancient customary royal and priestly techniques, and at once a congregation's common denial of underlying historical norms. Proteus was a king and therefore a likely imago. I have already described Lonergan's ideas of methodology by cumulate synthesis in a series of operations. Proteus' arguably predictable changes from form to form, only delivering truth when the truth-seeker ignored his deceptive forms, recall Lonergan's methodology by repetitive and cumulative operations.

It will suggest that an underlying, very old, customary public image of law will repeatedly emerge with its form maintained, as if it had been subject to Weber's concept of

[48] B Malinowski, 'Myth in Primitive Psychology', cited in B Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion*, Doubleday, New York, 1954, p. 96.
[49] Ibid.

routinization.[50] McIntosh considered and summarised Weber's views on transformation from personal to institutional authority, as follows. Since domination and authority were relations between persons, and an organised institution was a coherent system of action, regulated in part by these personal relations, thus personal authority became transformed within a stable institutional system. Weber framed this transformation using his three interconnected ideas of routinization, rationalization, and formalization. He considered that these three processes resulted in the typical ritualism of institutions. The form of rationalization of traditional authority was the systematic use of ritual procedures in every overt facet of society's life. Formalization made traditional ritual activity purely symbolic. Ritualization also occurred in other non-traditional systems, signifying in them that the inner justification of behavior had become partly traditional.[51] On Weber's account, when a religious schema justified public authority, the leader did not need charisma. Instead, his authority had to be based on a divinity.[52] Thus, the argument about mediation and reconciliation of irony is illustrated as follows, referring to the writings of O'Nolan, Lane, Lawler and Beloe, each of whom showed the regular routines of Proteus.

Lane discussed Book Four of the Odyssey as having recorded the difficulties of the hero Menelaus, who was stranded on the island of Naxos. Menelaus sought advice from the god Proteus, who when approached, changed from shape to shape, thus eluding the inquirer. Menelaus found that when he grasped Proteus tightly through each astounding transformation, the god would take on his real form, and then submit to questioning.[53]

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[50] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 248 et seq.
[51] D McIntosh, 'Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority', American Sociological Review, vol. 35, no. 5, 1970, pp. 901 - 911, at p. 907.
[52] Ibid., p. 909.
[53] Jessica Lane, 'The Poetics of Legal Interpretation', Columbia Law Review, vol. 87, no. 1, 1987, pp. 197-216, at p. 197.

O'Nolan's account suggests the importance of maintaining firmness of position until the truth emerged. He characterised Proteus as a god of human extraction, essentially with no recorded background. He seemed to be a late arrival among the gods, whose credentials had not been very carefully checked. The first account of Proteus was Homer's, describing 'an old man of the sea' who was a keeper of seals, and who sought a daily siesta on the island of Pharos with his ungainly flock.[54] He was a prophet who, if seized, would change his shape, becoming a tree, or a river, or fire, or assuming various beastly shapes in his efforts to escape his captor. If he were to be held, he would eventually resume his own shape and divulge his prophetic knowledge. This was reminiscent of how the various animal head-pieces worn ceremonially by ancient Egyptian kings gave rise to the shape-changing legend of Proteus.[55] The seal held a peculiar place in European folk tradition, in which at certain times seals might change their appearance and take on human shape. Generally this was managed by laying aside their skins.[56] If the temporarily discarded skin were taken, the seal to whom it belonged followed the taker and appeared to be in his power.[57] When a new seeker came to Proteus in due course, the whole routine started again.

Lawler narrowed the scope to some kind of metamorphosis from a past to a future form. Referring to Lucian's treatise *Of Pantomime,*[58] Lawler reported the view

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[54] K O'Nolan, 'The Proteus Legend', *Hermes*, vol. 88, no. 2, 1960, pp. 129-138, at p. 137.
[55] Ibid., p.129.
[56] Ibid., p.134.
[57] Ibid., p. 137.
[58] "If I am not mistaken, the Egyptian Proteus of ancient legend is no other than a dancer, whose mimetic skill enables him to adapt himself to every character: in the activity of his movements, he is liquid as water, rapid as fire; he is the raging lion, the savage panther, the trembling bough; he is what he will. The legend takes these data, and gives them a supernatural turn,--for mimicry substituting metamorphosis. Our modern pantomimes have the same gift, and Proteus himself sometimes appears as the subject of their rapid transformations." H W Fowler & F G Fowler, (trans.) *The Works of*

that the ancient Egyptian Proteus was nothing but a dancer, portraying a lion, a panther, then a branch of a tree, with superb mimetic artistry.[59] As the story of this metamorphic skill was received from antiquity, it turned into a tale of actual metamorphosis.[60] Lawler suggested that Proteus was either an Egyptian king or a Greek sea divinity who, when seized, changed into flame, water, and a variety of animals, one after the other.[61] However, if his assailant held him fast, Proteus resumed his own shape and foretold the future. Lawler opined that in this strange legend there was probably a combination of several elements, one of which might have been an old ritual dance, perhaps to a sea or river divinity, in which a prominent individual, or a priest, or a priest-king, portrayed a routine sequence of ideas such as "lion", "fire", "serpent", and "water".[62] Pointing to a distant past in the mythology, he added that such dances were common to all primitive races and were offered to divinities of all sorts, invariably accompanied by an illusion of spiritual "possession" or identification of the dancer with a god, or, with the animal or thing portrayed.[63]

Beloe's view was of a king taking on the guise of a deity. He identified the successor of King Pheron of Egypt as a citizen of Memphis, whose name in the Greek tongue was Proteus. Proteus was the Egyptian title of the deity, under which he was worshipped, both in Pharos and at Memphis.[64] This suggests that routinisation of public rule infers public perception of deity.

Mediation of irony by holding Proteus close, through the several apparition phases, and then receipt of truth, sounds like

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Lucian of Samosata, Vol II, Of Pantomime, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1905, p. 245.

[59] Lillian B Lawler, 'Proteus Is a Dancer', *The Classical Weekly*, vol. 36, no. 10, 1943, p. 116-117, at p. 116.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid., p.117.

[64] William Beloe (transl.) *The History of Herodotus*, Leigh and Sotheby, London, 1741, 344, at fn 197.

the repetition inherent in the psychoanalytic transference, conveying ancient imagos into the present. Its ritual character also sounds like Weber's routinization.[65] This suggestion might imply that the congregation does not hear all the sermon if they are in process of transference. If this is so, I must ask what they do hear and see. I will try to show they hear and see ancient imagos.

An answer could well be illustrated in Nordh's examination of the nature of the ancient Egyptian pharaonic administration. Her research outcomes might arguably exemplify Lacan's mythic knowledge as operations of master signifiers on the public consciousness, referred to below. She was able to identify both curse and blessing formulae as oral formulations made credible by mythic knowledge.[66] Both curses and blessings were issued and delivered, in a routized form, by government officials. Weber stated that the origin of state authority was charisma, but it was closed off within the offices of the administrative officials in order to preserve the continuing authority of the paramount leader.[67]

The curse formula, or for short, the curse, was a verbal written description of an act, displeasing to the sender of the formula and to society in general, an act being performed by the receiver of the formula and aimed at the sender and his self-interests. These self-interests might be property, relatives, existence forms, tomb, stelae, offerings, or name. The threatened act would be in life upon earth and in the beyond. Furthermore, it described the consequences of this act, which might befall the actor and his self-interests in life upon earth and in the beyond, through the agency of an executor who was

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[65] D McIntosh, 'Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 35, no. 5, 1970, pp. 901 - 911, at p. 907.

[66] At the moment of onset of an analytic discourse, arose a certain kind of knowledge, which Lacan called mythic knowledge. Mark Bracher, Marshall Alcorn, Ronald Cortnell and Françoise Massardier-Kenney (eds.), *Lacanian Theory of Discourse – Subject, Structure, and Society,* New York University Press, New York, 1994, p. 127.

[67] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 249.

identified with the sender, or even the receiver.[68]

Similar in structure, but opposite in substance to the curse, the blessing formula, or for short, the blessing, was a verbal written description of an act, pleasing to the sender of the formula and to society in general, an act being performed by the receiver of the formula and aimed at the sender and his self-interests. These self-interests might be property, relatives, existence forms, tomb, stelae, offerings, or name. The threatened act would be in life upon earth and in the beyond. Furthermore, it described the consequences of the proposed act, which would befall the actor and his self-interests in life on earth and in the beyond, through the agency of an executor who identified with the sender, or even the receiver.[69]

In both cases, the sender pronounced a message aimed at the receiver. The receiver had to be somebody else other than the sender. Otherwise it was an oath. The formulae were conditional bipartite structures: first the stipulations and second the injunctions, the first being causal of the second.[70]

The House of Life and Books administered the transmission of these blessings and curses.[71] It was a complex organisation of priest-scribes, acting as officials of the state.[72] Thus, learning and libraries were the essence of the government's administration. According to Nordh, the antique gods of the House of Life and Books might be summarised as follows.

- *Thoth*. The patron of scribes, books, writings, knowledge and learning.
- *Sechat*. The female form of Thoth officially responsible for all record-keeping of the state.
- *Neith*. Opener of the door to the House of Life.

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[68] Katarina Nordh, *Aspects of Ancient Egyptian Curses and Blessings, Conceptual background and Transmission*, ACTA Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, Sweden, 1996, at p. 2.
[69] Ibid., pp. 2, 3.
[70] Ibid., p.3.
[71] Ibid., p.107.
[72] Ibid., p.32.

- *Horus*. Executor in the curse formula.
- *Isis*. Extraordinary knowledge and competence.[73]

In this way, a householder receiving a visit from a civil servant scribe carrying either a blessing or a curse, might well form the view that it had come from one of the antique deities listed above. A government injunction might be perceived as, for example, a "blessing from Isis". These ancient blessings and curses would be effective, in large part, because of the name of their source, and would arguably generate public consent by virtue of a desire for compliance. The fact that blessings and curses were anchored in the names of deities and structurally routinised, and must have created some anxiety in their recipients, suggested a public transference of mythic knowledge onto those deities. *Mutatis mutandis*, the congregation might transfer imagos of ancient institutions onto the person of the Rabbi. This inference leads directly to the next section, in which Rabbinic homily is examined, similarly, for traces of transference.

3.3 David Stern - Rabbinic Homiletics

Stern noted the use of fables and parables in Rabbinic literature. This style of Rabbinic exegesis is in contemporary use in Australian Lubovitch Synagogues. These Rabbis use the style of rhetoric prescribed by former Grand Rabbis. Together, as a bundle of rhetorical devices, this style of rhetoric was called the *mashal*. Stern described a fable as the use of anthropomorphic animals or plants to portray the particularly theriomorphic[74] or phytomorphic[75] features of human behaviour. He suggested that the Rabbinic parable was a set of parallels between an imagined fictional event and an immediate "real" situation confronting the parable's author and

[73] Ibid., pp. 213-215.
[74] Having an animal form.
[75] Having or represented with the attributes of a plant.

his audience.[76] In both rhetorical forms, the task of understanding was left to the audience. However, in Rabbinic literature, the *mashal* actively elicited from the audience its solution or meaning.[77]

Weber stated that, as a revealed religion becomes routized by its transformation into a priestly enterprise, its preaching becomes less important. He stated that preaching stands in inverse proportion to the magical elements of a religion.[78] Thus, as the *mashal* became what Stern called regularised, but sounding like Weber's routinization, it became a literary form in which the protagonist was a king, and the other characters were members of the court, such as advisers, counsellors, generals, soldiers, princes, princesses, the queen, and so on. The king tended to symbolise God.[79] Ziegler noted that the king's features and characteristics in the king-*mashal* were modelled on those of the Roman Emperor.[80] With this irony, the *mashal* therefore was infused with stories and characters of the Roman world.[81]

Reminiscent of the prescribed structure of ancient Egyptian blessings and curses, Stern suggested that, via the oral recording of customs of the world, this led to a standard *mashal* structure, based in the inevitable relationship between a king and the deity. He proposed that this amounted to stereotyping, extending to the specific language of the *mashal*, its conventional themes and its narrative motifs.[82] From this arises the strong suggestion of an aspect of the transference within Weber's routinization.

Illustrative of this structure, Stern suggested that the *mashal* was written in one of three ancient rhetorical styles:[83]

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[76] Stern, p. 5.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 464.
[79] Stern, p. 19.
[80] I Ziegler, Die Konigssleichnisse des Midrash, (Breslau, 1903), pp. xxii-xxiii.
[81] Stern, 20.
[82] Ibid., p. 24.
[83] Ibid., p.36.

illustration, secret speech and rhetorical narrative. The third style he regarded as including the first two.[84] Critically, this suggested that the *mashal* was rhetorical narrative styled as a synthesis of mythical and legal forms of narratives. Illustration was exemplified in the *mashal* where Abraham was told that perfume spread itself widely for maximal scent, and therefore, he should move throughout the world.[85] Secret speech generally was implied within narrative so as to communicate controversial issues.[86]

What did Abraham resemble? A bottle of balsam with an air- tight lid that was off in a corner, and its perfume could not spread. Similarly, the Holy One, Blessed by He, said to Abraham: Move yourself from place to place so that your name will grow great through the world. Hence (from Genesis 12:1): 'Take yourself . . . ."[87]

This suggested a legal form of narrative, rather than either the chronological or mythical forms of narrative. In legal narrative, charged facts went to make up a state of affairs, by inference. According to D'Angelo, legal narrative analysis characteristically led to propositions, which were either confirmed or refuted by inductive examples.[88] Applying this reasoning, Stern stated that a homily, as a brief passage whose express purpose was the teaching of a lesson or law, often synthesised exegesis within a *mashal* to prove its point.[89] In consequence of this, the Rabbinic homily could be seen as king-*mashal*, ironically rooted in Roman-era morés, based on mythical and legal narratives, the inherent exegesis being inferred from the latter.

Thus, the structure of Rabbinic homily appears to agree

[84] Ibid., pp. 48-53.
[85] Ibid., p.48.
[86] Ibid., p.50.
[87] Midrash, Bereishis Rabbah, 39.2.
[88] Frank J D'Angelo, Composition in the Classical Tradition, Allyn and Bacon, New York, 2000., pp. 22, 23.
[89] Stern, p. 154.

with the notion of the congregation transfering ancient institutions, such as the Roman Imperial Court, onto the person of the Rabbi. I want to examine how this sermon context might be moved, up and down a scale of quality of scholarship, so that it can match the propensity of the congregation for transference. If the sermon could agree with the congregation's operative transference, possibly the sermon might achieve clearer and more successful admonishment.

3.4 George Kennedy - The Progymnasmata

Because of the original research context of this paper, arising from the Canberra Conference on Preaching, and having briefly considered the Rabbinic *mashal* in the light of the transference, there is a need to contextualise it into a general field of established scholarship. This makes necessary a research methodology somewhat outside a chain of argument. Hence the application of Lonergan's method. This section inclines toward the view that the general field of established scholarship of the sophistical progymnasmata is suitable for sermons construction. This is most probably strengthened because the *mashal* was embedded in Roman-era morés and its contemporary ambient rhetoric.

The progymnasmata were taught in European schools until early modern times. Their taught habits of thinking and writing, learned in schools using the progymnasmata, moulded the secular literature of the Greeks and of the Romans.[90] Kennedy translated the progymnasmata of four ancient treatises, those of Aelius Theon, Hermogenes, Aphthonius the Sophist and Nicolaus the Sophist.[91] Although Stern had referred to the oratory device of refutation within the *mashal*, and also what amounted to that of characterisation, it appeared that the *mashal* was composed mainly of fable, narrative, and

[90] George A Kennedy, (trans.) Progymnasmata - Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2003, p. ix.
[91] Ibid., p. xiii.

possibly maxims.[92] This section suggests that the rhetorical form of chreia,[93] explained below, would be implicit in the *mashal*.

The various formats of progymnasmata were each a graded teaching system, apparently matched to the child-learners' development.[94] Each successive oratorical exercise was built cumulatively on the learned skill of the previously-learnt level. From this, the reader might intuit that the exercises demonstrated the nature of the human mind's development, and from that, the development of laws and methods for admonishing the community. It is a reasonable suggestion, until the reader notices the complexities at the lower end of the oratorical exercise systems, the differing sizes of the systems, and disagreement about the placement of the higher level "make a law" exercise. Thus, these sophistical disputes were likely to have been over the nature of adapting to human development. This suggests the subsistence of a range of imagos, transferred into the lower levels of progymnasmata oratory.

If making law for the community were the objective, then the ancient sophistical scholars failed to agree on the initial steps, or how many steps should be taken to do it. Theon graded chreia at the lowest level, rising to fable, then narrative.[95] Hermogenes graded fable at the bottom, rising to narrative, chreia then maxim.[96] Aphthonius graded fable at the bottom, rising to narrative, chreia and maxim.[97] Nicolaus the Sophist graded fable at the bottom, rising to narrative, chreia and maxim.[98] Theon graded introduction of a law to level 12 out of 17,[99] Hermogenes graded it at 12 of 12,[100] Aphthonius graded

[92] Stern, p. 49.
[93] R Rainolde, *The Foundation of Rhetoric – 1563,* The Scholar Press Limited, Menston, 1972, Folios xvi, xvii.
[94] Kennedy, p. ix.
[95] Ibid., pp. 15, 23, 28.
[96] Ibid., pp. 74, 75, 76, 77.
[97] Ibid., pp. 90, 96, 96, 97.
[98] Ibid., pp. 133, 136, 139, 142.
[99] Ibid., p. 62

it at 14 of 14[101] and Nicolaus graded it at 13 of 13.[102]

Thus, descriptions of chreia and fable will assist the reader. Theon called a chreia a brief saying or action making a point, attributed to a specific person or something analogous to a person, connected with a recollection.[103] Hermogenes agreed, but emphasised the meaning as pointed for the sake of something useful.[104] Aphthonius' description agreed with that of Hermogenes.[105] Nicolaus also agrees, but stated that the useful something must be something in life.[106] Rainolde had set out three kinds of chreia: the saying kind; the action kind; and, the composite saying and action kind. He proposed that the most erudite form of the *chreia* comprised the following elements: a praise of the author; expounding the meaning of the saying; the reason for the saying; comparison by a contrary; gather the evidence of witnesses; conclusion.[107]

Plutarch used chreia as the basis of drawing parallels between sets of two famous lives. He appeared to have established a progymnasmata-based methodology for characterising human development and rhetorically constructing imagos. Russell stated that the genre in which Plutarch wrote his Lives[108] was rooted in the 4th century B.C.E. structures of Isocrates and Xenophon.[109] Plutarch's standard form and arrangement, for comparison of the two lives, was in nine divisions: ancestry; personality revealed in childhood anecdotes; campaigns as a boy; entry into politics; first main climax; in the wilderness in war and peace; second main climax;

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[100] Ibid., p. 88.
[101] Ibid., p. 124.
[102] Ibid., p. 171.
[103] Ibid., p. 15.
[104] Ibid., p. 76.
[105] Ibid., p. 97.
[106] Ibid., p. 140.
[107] R Rainolde, The Foundation of Rhetoric – 1563, The Scholar Press Limited, Menston, 1972, Folios xvi, xvii.
[108] Plutarch's Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, Englished by Sir Thomas North Anno 1579, David Nutt, London, 1895.
[109] Barbara Scardigli, (ed.), Essays on Plutarch's Lives, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 86.

dramatic change of fortune; and, post-war governments, old age, death, funeral, children. Plutarch dealt with childhood by the device of anecdotes, which were either the building block units of, or complete statements of, the *chreia*, presented as a story based on amplification of a famous statement or action. He dealt with wars using the device of epitome, which was a summary of an already-written work, rather than a seamless narrative.[110] This represented a methodology for communicating a person's character, based on progymnasmata adaptations to human development, and therefore, based in a constructed imago.

Having discussed chreia, the discussion now moves to an understanding of the next level of fable, as a level of imagery. The rhetorician, when constructing images, might choose either apparition or semblance. Semblance would preserve proportion in form, but apparition would distort the truth of the verbal image.[111] Theon stressed that the fable was a fictitious story giving an image of truth.[112] Hermogenes added that fables must be useful for some aspect of life, and must be plausible.[113] Aphthonius defined fable as a fictive statement imaging a truth.[114] Nicolaus called a fable false speech imaging the truth,[115] directly suggesting apparition, and inferring imago.

Hermogenes's recipe for fable required the element of plausibility. According to Campbell, the circumstances operating chiefly on the passions were probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connexion of place, relation to

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[110] Ibid., p. 88.

[111] "The very notion of the Exodus temple as a tenting tabernacle becomes a trope for semblance: In appearance it is motion and activity; in reality it is permanent form." Doll, Mary A., 'The Temple: Symbolic Form in Scripture', Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, vol. 70, no. 1/2, 1987, pp.145-154, at p. 147.

[112] Kennedy, p. 23.

[113] Ibid., p. 74.

[114] Ibid., p. 96.

[115] Ibid., p. 133.

the persons concerned, and interest in the consequences.[116]

Plausibility arose, in practice, from the consistency of the narration with things the audience already knew, and was therefore evidenced by inference. It could therefore provide proof at a sub-level of truth, such as for example a system of mere hegemony. For example, Gaylen claimed that he had proved the brain to be the *hegemonikon* of the rational soul by an apodeictic proof. He argued this provided a superior level of truth to the kind of argument derived from plausibility alone. The basis of Gaylen's apodeictic proof was his theory of transmission of hegemonical data in the brain by means of "pneuma",[117] acceptible as a signifier to the audience. There is the suggestion in this that he devised the pneuma as a master signifier, and that his discourse was sermonic in nature, because it communicated propriety to his "congregation", by a plausible mythology.

However, a want of plausibility implied an internal improbability, which might be surmounted by stronger external evidence. A matter of the poetic, requiring mimesis such as within fables, plausibility appealed to the effects of tragedy, epic and romance. Plausibility might be emplaced in the stream of ideas by annotating the ideas with discussions of experiments. Nevertheless, however plausible the narration, it might still fail to influence passion if it was solely decorative, and thus dislocated from context. As such, the mind quickly rejected plausible narratives unsupported by proper arguments, the term "proper" being used, rather, in the sense of relevant context.[118] Thus, the audience desire for propriety again recalls Weber's routinization, discussed above. It would be a natural step to suggest that this propriety could be supplied to the

[116] Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric cited in P Bizzel & B Herzberg, (eds.), The Rhetorical Tradition, Bedford Books, Boston, 1990, ch. IV.
[117] J Rocca, Gaylen on the Brain – Anatomical Knowledge and Physiological Speculation in the Second Century AD, Brill, Boston, 2003, p. 50.
[118] Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric cited in P Bizzel & B Herzberg, (eds.), The Rhetorical Tradition, Bedford Books, Boston, 1990, ch. IV.

congregation by their transferences from ancient institutions, imagos with an equal level of propriety as their families. There is only a small step to augmenting or interpreting this transference, with admonitory information, by means of homily graded for the congregation's developmental level of routinization.

4. Conclusions

The paper sought to identify a body of scholarship underlying the construction of admonitory sermons. Such sermons were to teach the congregation either a lesson or a law deriving from ancient institutions. It set out to test the proposition that the routinized mode of transmission and teaching of ancient truth was related to the psychoanalytic transference, because psychoanalytic transference linked the ancient past to the present.

Rene Wellek and Austin Warren defined a symbol as "an object which refers to another object but which demands attention also in its own right, as a presentation".[119] Thus, symbols had a life span, as people referred to them further along the chain, so that if an expression were found to formulate the unknown thing in a still better way, then the symbol would effectively be dead. When dead, by virtue of being too far back in the chain of symbols, it would possess only a historical significance, arguably shrinking the Rabbi's own personage.

More than 50% of Australian Synagogues have Rabbis untrained in homiletics, and without a formal body of scholarship informing their sermon construction, allowing authority to become purely symbolic in nature.

The fact that the transference might arise on the lines of the father, mother, sister or brother imago, suggests the question of whether it might arise similarly in institutions. If

[119] Rene Wellek & Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, Harcourt, New York, 1949, chap. 15.

so, it could explain aspects of sermon communications. As an imago would inherently include a recursive reference to prior generations, these imago bases for the stereotype plates of transference could be in the mythical form of a king, queen or any other substitute form for a father, mother, sister or brother, or therefore, even prior institutions.

Illustrating what has been said about symbols, transference and imagos, Proteus' arguably predictable changes from form to form, only delivering truth when the truth-seeker ignored his deceptive forms, recalls Lonergan's methodology by repetitive and cumulative operations. Each change in form sounds like an operation from symbol to symbol. Mediation of this irony by holding Proteus close, through the several apparition phases, and then receipt of truth, sounds like the repetition inherent in the psychoanalytic transference, conveying ancient imagos into the present. Its ritual character also sounds like the consequences of Weber's routinization,[120] as people were prepared to undergo the ritual of successive dead symbols. This suggests that routinization provides a context in which transference can take place, and might imply that the congregation does not hear all of the sermon, while they are in process of transfering imagos onto the person of the Rabbi.

Nordh's discoveries about blessings and curses anchored in the names of deities and structurally routinised, suggested a public transference of mythic knowledge onto those deities by which government department were perceived by the public. Government department would appear to the public as bodies corporate with great propriety. *Mutatis mutandis*, the congregation might transfer imagos of ancient institutions onto the person of the Rabbi.

Applying these suggestions to Rabbinic literature, in which the *mashal* actively elicited from the audience its solution or meaning, we learn that the *mashal* was infused with stories and characters of not merely the Roman world, but of

[120] D McIntosh, 'Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority', American Sociological Review, vol. 35, no. 5, 1970, pp. 901 - 911, at p. 907.

the Roman Imperial Court. In consequence of this, the Rabbinic homily could be seen as king-*mashal*, ironically rooted in Roman-era propriety morés, based on mythical and legal narratives.

The structure of Rabbinic homily appears to agree with the notion of the congregation transfering ancient institutions, such as the Roman Imperial Court, onto the person of the Rabbi. Why not transference, as well, of older institutions? The rhetorical form of chreia,[121] explained as operating at the lower end of the various progymnasmata, would be implicit in the *mashal*. The complexities of imagery at the lower end of the oratorical exercise systems, the differing sizes of the systems, and disagreement about the placement of the higher level "make a law" exercise, arguably represented sophistical disputes. These disputes suggest the subsistence in progymnasmata oratory of a range of imagos based on a chain of symbols, transferred into the lower levels of progymnasmata oratory and rising up to the higher levels. A detailed investigation of all the progymnasmata oratory forms would contextualise and confirm this suggestion.

The Roman Empire era priest, Plutarch, used chreia as the basis of drawing parallels between sets of two famous lives. In this, he appeared to have established a progymnasmata-based methodology for characterising human development and rhetorically constructing imagos. His parallel lives worked like sermons because they taught lessons and laws by admonition. The audience desire for this kind of propriety, again recalls Weber's routinization. It would be a natural step to suggest that this propriety could be supplied to the congregation by their transferences from ancient institutions.

[121] R Rainolde, The Foundation of Rhetoric – 1563, The Scholar Press Limited, Menston, 1972, Folios xvi, xvii.

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